S. 245R(2): Pendency of question in payee’s hands disbars payer’s application

The Applicant, a PSU, entered into an offshore services contract with a Russian company for setting up a power plant. The Applicant claimed that the income arising to the Russian company from offshore supply of equipment was not chargeable to tax in India and that it was not liable to deduct/ bear TDS thereon u/s 195. However, as in the assessment of the Russian company, the AO had already taken the view that the income from offshore supply was chargeable to tax u/s 44BBB and the issue was pending before the Tribunal, the question arose whether the application was maintainable in view of clause (1) of the Proviso to s. 245R(2) which provides that an application is not maintainable if the question raised in it “is already pending before any income-tax authority or Appellate Tribunal, or any Court.” The Applicant claimed that the pendency in the case of the recipient did not affect the maintainability in the context of the payer’s obligation to deduct tax u/s 195. HELD rejecting the application:

The argument that the pendency of the question in the case of the recipient cannot bar the application in the case of the payer is not acceptable because an “advance ruling” is a determination in relation to a “transaction”. A “transaction” always involves the payer and payee. It is not possible to separate an applicant from a transaction while he is seeking a Ruling, since the Ruling relates to a transaction undertaken by him or to be undertaken by him. A ruling also cannot be divorced from a transaction. The question posed before the income-tax authorities in the case of the recipient and before the AAR in the case of the payer is the same, namely, whether the income is assessable to tax. Consequently, the bar in s. 245R(2) applies and the payer’s application is not maintainable. The contrary view taken by the AAR in Airports Authority of India In re 168 Taxman 158 is not correct (Foster (AAR No. 975 of 2009) followed).

Gains arising on sale of shares of foreign company by NR to NR taxable in India if the foreign co only held Indian assets

Two French companies named “Murieux Alliance” (‘MA’) and “Groupe Industrial Marcel Dassault” (“GIMD”) held shares in another French company named “ShanH”. MA & GIMD acquired shares in an Indian company named “Shantha Biotechnics Ltd” (“Shantha”). The shares in Shantha were transferred to ShanH. MA and GIMD subsequently sold the shares in ShanH to another French company named “Sanofi Pasteur Holding”. The assessees filed an application for advance ruling claiming that as the two French companies had sold the shares of another French company to a third French company, the gains were not chargeable to tax in India. The department opposed the application on the ground that ShanH was formed with no purpose other than to hold the shares of the Indian company and that the transaction was taxable in India. HELD upholding the department’s plea:

(i) Azadi Bachao Andolan, though binding on the AAR, may not be the final word because under the proviso to s. 245R(2), the AAR is entitled to disallow an application if the question raised therein relates to an issue which is designed, prime facie, for the avoidance of income-tax. The AAR is entitled to see whether the steps taken were a device to avoid liability to tax. Also it is difficult to accept the arguments based on Azadi Bachao Andolan because that judgement appears to proceed on the basis that the views expressed by Chinnappa Reddy, J. were his own and did not represent the view of the Court as a whole. The view that has emerged is that notwithstanding the legal validity of a transaction or a set of transactions, if the purpose was to create a legal smoke screen to avoid the payment of tax that would legitimately be due as having arisen on the basis of a transaction or an event, the legal effect of the transaction in the context of the taxing statute, has to be considered, notwithstanding its reality or validity;

(ii) On facts, the French company’s (ShanH) only asset were the shares in the Indian company & it had no other business. When its shares were sold, what really passes were the underlying assets and the control of the Indian company. A gain was generated by the transaction. If the transaction is accepted at face value, control over Indian assets and business can pass from hand to hand without incurring any liability to tax in India. Such transactions have to be treated as ineffectual. It is not necessary to ignore the existence of ShanH to come to a conclusion that what is put up is a facade in the context of the tax law and would amount to a scheme for avoidance of tax;

(iii) Under Article 14(5) of the India-France DTAA, gains from the alienation of shares representing a participation of at least 10% in an Indian company may be taxed in India. Here, though the shares being transferred are that of a French company, the situs of the underlying assets & controlling interest cannot be ignored. What is involved in the transaction is an alienation of the assets and controlling interest of an Indian company. Consequently, even though such interest is not an alienation of the shares of an Indian company, still, on a purposive construction of Article 14(5), the capital gains is taxable in India.

License fee for Software, even if “copyrighted article”, taxable as “royalty”

The applicant was the developer of software. It granted a non-exclusive and non-transferable license to an Indian company to use the software without any sub-licensing rights. The licensee was not allowed to modify the software programme and could make copies only for its own use. The applicant filed an application for advance ruling in which it claimed, relying on Dassault Systems 322 ITR 125 (AAR) and Tata Consultancy Services 271 ITR 401 (SC), that the transaction involved the use/ right to use of a “copyrighted article” but not the “copyright” itself and so the license fees were not assessable to tax as “royalty” u/s 9(1)(vi) of the Act & Article 12 of the India-Sri Lanka DTAA. HELD rejecting the applicant’s plea:

S. 9(1)(vi) & Article 12 define the term “royalty” to include any payment for the use of, or the right to use, a “copyright” of scientific work. Software programmes are a “copyright” and are protected under the Copyright Act, 1957. As the software programme is a “copyright”, any payment received for transferring the right to use it is “royalty” as defined in the Act. The argument that there is a distinction between a “copyright” and a “copyrighted article” is not acceptable because there is no such distinction made either in the Income-tax Act or the Copyright Act. The use of software involves the use of the copyright; the software cannot be divorced from the copyright itself. Accordingly, even a fee for the use of a “copyrighted article” is assessable as “royalty”. (Microsoft/Gracemac 42 SOT 550 (Del) followed; Dassault Systems 322 ITR 125 (AAR) not followed; Tata Consultancy 271 ITR 401 (SC) distinguished)

Off-shore supplies not taxable despite composite contract & PE’s role in clearance

The assessee, a Korean company, entered into three contracts with Delhi Transco Ltd for (i) offshore supply contract on CIF basis, (ii) onshore supply contract and (iii) onshore service contract. The applicant claimed that the income arising from the offshore supply contract was not taxable in India. The revenue claimed that the profits from the off-shore supply was taxable in India on the basis that (a) though the supply contract was awarded separately, any breach under one contract was deemed breach of the other contracts, (b) the award of separate contracts did not dilute the responsibility of the applicant for successful completion of the facility as per specifications, (c) the three contracts were composite contracts and one could not exist without the other, (d) the offshore supplies were on CIF basis and the contracts for offshore supply and onshore contracts were signed on the same date, (e) the insurance requirement of the offshore supplies contract require that the applicant will take out and maintain insurance of cargo, installation, worker compensation, etc, (f) the case is not a case of a sale simpliciter but is for full package involving onshore services. It could not have made a difference had the contract been one instead of three divisible contracts. HELD rejecting the contentions of the department:

(i) The clauses in the offshore supply contract agreement regarding the transfer of ownership, the payment mechanism in the form of letter of credit which ensures the credit of the amount in foreign currency to the applicant’s foreign bank account on receipt of shipment advice and insurance clause establish that the transaction of sale and the title took place outside Indian Territory. The ownership and property in goods passed outside India. The transit risk borne by the applicant till the goods reach the site in India is not necessarily inconsistent with the sale of goods taking place outside India. The parties may decide between them as to when the title of the goods should pass. As the consideration for the sale portion is separately specified, it can well be separated from the whole. (Ishikwajima Harima 288 ITR 410 (SC) & Hyosung Corporation 314 ITR 343 (AAR) followed; Ansaldo Energia SPA 310 ITR 237 (Mad) distinguished);

(ii) Nothing in law prevents parties to enter into a contract which provides for sale of material for a specified consideration although they were meant to be utilized in the fabrication and installation of a complete plant;

(iii) Though the assessee had a PE in India, that came into existence for the purpose of carrying out the contract for onshore supplies and services etc and had no role to play in offshore supplies. Even if the PE was involved in carrying on some incidental activities such as clearance from the port and transportation, it cannot be said that the PE is in connection with the offshore supplies.

Non-residents not eligible for benefit of second proviso to s. 112

The applicant, a company based in Scotland sold shares of Cairns India Limited to Petronas Corporation Intl. Limited for a consideration of USD 241,426,379 in off-market-mode and not through a recognized stock exchange. The assessee filed an application for advance ruling claiming that it was entitled to the benefit of the Proviso to s. 112 (1) and liable to pay tax at 10% of the capital gains. The Revenue resisted the plea on the ground that the benefit of the Proviso to s. 112 was available only to assessees who were eligible to the benefit of indexation in the second proviso to s. 48 and as the assessee was not eligible for indexation, it could not claim the benefit of the lower rate of tax in the Proviso to s. 112. HELD upholding the Revenue’s plea:

The expression “before giving effect to the 2nd proviso to s. 48‟ in the Proviso to s. 112(1) pre-supposes the existence of a case where computation of long-term capital gains could be made in accordance with the formula contained in the 2nd proviso in s. 48. It means that the asset must be one qualified for indexation under the second proviso to s. 48. There is no justification in not giving effect to the words used in the proviso. As the 2nd proviso to s. 48 is not applicable to non-residents, occasion to apply the proviso to s. 112(1) does not arise. A non-resident foreign company cannot claim the double benefit of protection against rupee value fluctuation as well as indexation (Timken 294 ITR 513 (AAR) not followed; BASF AG 293 ITR (AT) 1 followed).

Transfer Pricing: Despite “Implicit support” by holding company, subsidiary entitled to pay holding company at arms’ length for “explicit support”

The assessee, a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Electric Capital US (GECUS), was in the business of providing financial services and took loans for this purpose in the form of commercial paper and unsecured debentures. Between 1988 and 1995, GECUS provided to the assessee, at no cost, an explicit guarantee for its debt issuances. From 1996, GECUS began charging a fee equal to 1% of the face amount of the assessee’s debt issuances for that same guarantee which amounted to about $135.4 million. The assessee’s claim for deduction of the fee was denied by the tax department u/s 69(2)/247(2) (transfer pricing provisions) on the ground that as there was “implicit support” by GECUS to the assessee, the payment of the guarantee fee was “superfluous” and not at arms’ length. This was reversed by the Tax Court on the basis that by the explicit guarantee from the holding company, the assessee had a better rating and had to pay lower interest and received a benefit which was valued at 1.83%. As the fee paid for the benefit was only 1%, it was at arms’ length. On appeal by the department, HELD dismissing the appeal:

(i) In determining the arms length price, all economically relevant factors (including the “implicit support” that the subsidiary enjoys from the holding company) have to be considered. The explicit guarantee by the holding company also has a value to the subsidiary (Para 1.6 of the OECD Commentary on Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations referred). The question is how much an arm’s length party, benefiting from the implicit guarantee would be willing to pay for the explicit guarantee;

(ii) The “yield method” can be adopted which requires a comparison between the credit rating which an arm’s length party, in the same circumstances as the assessee, would have obtained and the credit rating which would have been obtained without the explicit guarantee. On facts, it was shown that the assessee would have enjoyed a lower credit rating without the explicit guarantee from the holding company and would have had to pay a higher interest than it did with the explicit guarantee. The incremental cost that the assessee would have had to pay if it did not have the explicit guarantee was valued at 1.83% and so the guarantee fee was at arms length.

Australian Tax Office Ruling on Transfer Pricing Implications

The Australian Taxation Office has issued a ‘Taxation Ruling’ dated 9.2.2011 in which it has discussed the application of the transfer pricing provisions to business restructuring by multinational enterprises.

The Ruling considers situations where such transfers occur between MNE members to implement changes in the MNE’s existing business arrangements or operations. Common examples are product supply chain restructurings involving conversion of a distributor into a sales agency arrangement or of a manufacturer into a provider of manufacturing services. Business restructurings also commonly involve the transfer of the ownership and management of intangibles such as patents, trademarks and brand names.

The Ruling explains the following process for setting or reviewing transfer pricing

Step 1: Characterize the international dealings between the associated enterprises in the context of the taxpayer’s business

 

Step 2: Select the most appropriate transfer pricing methodology or methodologies

 

Step 3: Apply the most appropriate method and determine an arm’s length outcome

The Ruling refers extensively to the “Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (OECD Guidelines)”.

The Ruling also gives practical examples to explain the transfer pricing law.

S. 115JB (MAT) not applicable to foreign company without presence in India

The assessee, a foreign company, without a presence or PE in India, earned long-term capital gains which were exempt u/s 10(38). The assessee applied for a ruling on whether it was liable to pay Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) u/s 115JB on the said gains. HELD ruling in favour of the assessee:

(i) In P.No. 14 of 1997 (234 ITR 335) the AAR held that s. 115JA (akin to s. 115JB) applied to every “company” and as the term “company” was defined in s. 2(17) to include a “foreign company”, there was no reason to presume that the legislature did not intend s. 115JA to apply to a foreign company. This ruling is not applicable because:

(a) It was rendered in the case of an assessee who was doing business and had a PE in India. Its income was being assessed under the head “income from business and profession”. It was required to maintain accounts under section 44AA of the IT Act and prepare accounts under ss. 591 & 594 of the Companies Act;

 

(b) S. 591 of the Companies Act applies only to foreign companies who have established a place of business within India and requires the preparation of a balance sheet and P&L A/c as per s. 594. The obligation in s. 115JA(2) to prepare P&L Account in accordance with Parts II and III of Schedule VI can apply only to a foreign company which has a place of business within India. As the applicant does not have a place of business in India, its preparation of P&L Account in accordance with Parts II & III of Schedule VI cannot be complied;

 

(c) In the ruling, the AAR has not taken into account the Budget Speech, Memorandum & Notes on Clauses explaining the purpose behind introduction of s. 115JA which makes the legislative intent clear that MAT was not intended to apply to foreign companies;

 

(d) Though s. 2(17) defines a “company” to include a “foreign company”, the context of the definition has to be seen. Income, which does not have a source in India, cannot be made part of the book profits. The annual accounts, including the P&L Account, cannot be prepared as per s.115JB(2) in respect of the world income and laid before the company at its AGM in accordance with s. 210 of the Companies Act. The speech of the Finance Minister and the Memorandum explaining the provision also become out of sync if the meaning of “company” appearing in s. 115JB is adopted as ‘foreign company”. Any other meaning would take away force and life from the true intent of the makers of the Act. The contention of the department that there is no demarcation between a ‘domestic company’ and a ‘foreign company’ while applying s. 115JB is not acceptable. As the applicant did not have a place of business in India and was not required to prepare its accounts under s. 594 r.w.s. 591 of the Companies Act, it could not have prepared its accounts in accordance with the provisions of Part II and III of Schedule VI of the companies Act, 1956.

(ii) Accordingly, s. 115JB is not designed to apply to a foreign company which has no presence or PE in India.

India-Mauritius treaty benefits cannot be denied on the ground that assessee is a subsidiary of a USA Corp

The applicant, a resident of Mauritius, was a subsidiary of a USA company. It received capital contribution and loans from the USA parent which were used to purchase shares in ILFS, an Indian company. On sale of the shares, the applicant earned capital gains which were chargeable to tax under the Act. However, under Article 13 (4) of the India-Mauritius tax treaty, such gains were not chargeable to tax in India. The applicant filed an application for advance ruling on the question whether in view of the said Article 13 (4), the gains were chargeable to tax in India. The department resisted the application on the ground that though the legal ownership ostensibly vested with the applicant, the real and beneficial owner of the capital gains was the US Company which controlled the applicant and the applicant was merely a façade made use of by the US holding Company to avoid capital gains tax in India. HELD rejecting the stand of the department:

(i) The effect of Azadi Bachao Andolan 263 ITR 706 (SC) is that there is no “legal taboo” against ‘treaty shopping’. Treaty shopping and the underlying objective of tax avoidance/mitigation are not equated to a colourable device. If a resident of a third country, in order to take advantage of a tax treaty sets up a conduit entity, the legal transactions entered into by that conduit entity cannot be declared invalid. The motive behind setting up such conduit companies is not material to judge the legality or validity of the transactions. The principle that “every man is entitled to order his affairs so that the tax is less than it otherwise would be” is applicable though a colourable device adopted through dishonest methods can be looked into in judging a legal transaction from the tax angle. Tax avoidance is not objectionable if it is within the framework of law and not prohibited by law. However, a transaction which is ‘sham’ in the sense that “the documents are not bona fide in order to intend to be acted upon but are only used as a cloak to conceal a different transaction” stands on a different footing. For an act to be a ‘sham’, the parties thereto must have a common intention not to create the legal rights and obligations which they give the appearance of creating;

(ii) On facts, as all legal formalities for purchase of the shares and their subsequent transfer had been gone through and the consideration had been received by the applicant, it was difficult to assume that the capital gain has not arisen in the hands of the applicant but had arisen in the hands of the USA parent;

(iii) The fact that the USA parent provided the funds and played a role in negotiating the transaction of sale does not lead to the legal inference that the shares were in reality owned by the USA parent. To take such a view would be contrary to the ground realities of mutual business and economic relations between a holding and subsidiary company and the inter-se legal structure. The fact that the subsidiary has its own corporate personality and is a separate legal entity cannot be overlooked. The fact that the holding company exercises acts of control over its subsidiary does not in the absence of compelling reasons dilute the separate legal identity of the subsidiary. It is unrealistic to expect that a subsidiary should keep off the clutches of the holding company and conduct its business independent of any control and assistance by the parent company;

(iv) Consequently, the gains made by the Applicant were not chargeable to tax in India.

Obiter: It looks odd that the Indian tax authorities are not in a position to levy capital gains tax on the transfer of shares in an Indian company. Whether the policy considerations underlying Article 13 (4) of the treaty and the spirit of the CBDT Circular would still be relevant in the present day fiscal scenario is a debatable point.

Fees for services coming within S. 44BB are not taxable u/s 9 (1) (vii) r.w.s. 44DA

The Applicant, a Polish company, was engaged in conducting seismic surveys and providing seismic data to oil companies in connection with their oil exploration and drilling activities. The AAR had to consider whether the income derived by the Applicant was assessable u/s 44BB or u/s 9 (1) (vii) r.w.s. 44DA. HELD, deciding in favour of the Applicant:

(i) S. 44BB applies to an assessee engaged in the business of providing services or facilities in connection with ….. the prospecting … of mineral oils. On the other hand, Explanation 2 to s. 9 (1) (vii) defines “fees for technical services” to mean consideration for the rendering of technical services but not including consideration for mining or like project undertaken by the recipient.

(ii) The Applicant’s case falls within s. 44BB because the words in connection with therein have an expansive meaning. The services provided by the Applicant have a real, intimate and proximate nexus with the prospecting for or extraction of mineral oils. The seismic survey and data acquisition is a prelude and critical component of the oil and gas exploration activity. Without seismic data acquisition and interpretation, it is impracticable to carry out the activity of prospecting which is a step in aid to exploration.

(iii) The argument of the Revenue that that the term ‘services’ in s. 44BB are other than the services covered by Expl. 2 to s. 9(1)(vii) is not acceptable. There is no compelling reason to assign a narrow and restricted meaning to the expression ‘services’ and confine it to services other than technical, consultancy or managerial services.

(iv) The argument of the Revenue that that the exclusion with regard to mining projects in Expl. 2 to s. 9 (1)(vii) is applicable only to those who have taken up main project but not to those who rendered services to the enterprise promoting the main project is also not acceptable in view of binding Instruction No. 1862 issued by the CBDT on 22.10.1990 wherein it was held that the term ‘mining project’ in Expl 2 to s. 9(1)(vii) covers the rendering of services.

(v) Even on first principles, s. 44BB is a special provision dealing with the computation of profits of non-residents engaged in providing services in prospecting for etc of mineral oils and will prevail over s. 9 (1) (vii) which is a general provision for charging fees for technical services to tax.