High Court Takes Notice of TDS Refund Harassment by Dept & Demands Answers

One Anand Parkash, FCA, addressed a letter dated 30.4.2012 to the High Court in which he set out the numerous problems being faced by the assesses across the Country owing to the faulty processing of the Income Tax Returns and non-grant of TDS credit & refunds. He claimed that because of the department’s fault, the assessees were being harassed. The High Court took judicial notice of the letter, converted it into a public interest writ petition and directed the CBDT to answer each of the allegations made in the letter. In addition, the Court demanded an answer to the following issues:

(1) Whether procedure under Section 245 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is being followed before making adjustment of refunds and whether assessees are being given full details with regard to demands, which are being adjusted.

 

(2) Whether the Revenue is taking caution and care to communicate rejection of TDS certificates and intimation under Section 143(1) in case any adjustment or modification is made to taxes paid, either as advance tax, self assessment tax or TDS.

 

(3) Whether and what steps are taken to verify and ascertain that the old demands against which adjustment is being made was communicated to the assessee?

 

(4) What steps have been taken to ensure that the deductors correctly upload the TDS details/particulars on the Income Tax website?

 

(5) What is the remedy available to the assessee and can he/she approach the Department in case the deductor fails to correctly upload the particulars in his/her cases?

 

(6) Whether an assessee can get benefit of TDS deducted or/and paid but not uploaded by the deductor and procedure to claim the said benefit?

S. 234A, 234B & 234C interest, though mandatory, is not payable if AO does not direct it to be charged in assessment order

The AO passed a s. 143(3) assessment order in which he omitted to direct that interest u/s 234A, 234B & 234C should be levied. The Tribunal, relying on Ranchi Club Ltd 247 ITR 209 (SC) held that in the absence of a specific direction, interest was not leviable. Before the High Court, the department relied on the larger bench decision in Anjum M.H Ghaswala 252 ITR 1 (SC) and argued that as interest u/s 234A, 234B & 234C was mandatory, there was no need for the assessment order to specifically direct that interest should be charged. HELD dismissing the appeal:

In CIT vs. Ranchi Club Ltd 247 ITR 209 (SC) it was held that the order of the AO in the assessment order to charge interest has to be specific and clear and the assessee must be made to know that the AO after applying his mind has ordered charging of interest. In Anjum M.H. Ghaswala 252 ITR 1 (SC), it was held, in the context of whether the Settlement Commission could waive interest, that the levy was mandatory and could not be waived. Subsequently, in Insilco Ltd 278 ITR 1 (SC), the Supreme Court remanded the matter to decide whether the law laid down in Ranchi Club had been changed by Anjum M.H. Ghaswala or not. Ranchi Club Ltd has not been expressly overruled nor has a different view been taken in Anjum M.H. Ghaswala‘s case. There is also no force in the department’s argument that even if assessment order or computation sheet does not provide for interest, since interest is mandatory, it can be charged in the demand notice which is signed by the AO. Even if a provision of law is mandatory and provides for charging of tax or interest, the view taken in Ranchi Club Ltd is that such charge by the AO should be specific and clear and assessee must be made to know that the AO has applied his mind and has ordered charging of interest. The mandatory nature of charging of interest and the actual charging of interest by application of mind and the mention of the proviso of law under which such interest is charged are two different things. Consequently, if the assessment order is silent, interest u/s 234A, 234B & 234C cannot be levied.

Despite “Last Chance” appeal should be adjourned if there is sufficient cause

The department’s appeal was adjourned at the assessee’s request to 9.02.2010 and it was made clear that it would be the “last opportunity”. The assessee’s counsel filed an application for adjournment on 8.02.2010 on the ground that he was going to Mumbai for some urgent work. On 9.2.2010, no one appeared for the assessee and so the Tribunal rejected the adjournment application and allowed the department’s appeal. On appeal by the assessee to the High Court HELD:

Ordinarily, it is not incumbent on the Tribunal to adjourn the case when a last opportunity had already been granted to the assessee. However, there may be number of circumstances where adjournment becomes necessary in the interest of justice. If Counsel for assessee had to go for some urgent work to Mumbai and an application for adjournment was moved in advance, then in the interest of justice, a short adjournment should have been granted. If number of opportunities had already been afforded to the Counsel for assessee, then adjournment could have been granted, on payment of cost. The Tribunal has not assigned any reason as to whether reason mentioned in the application for adjournment, constituted sufficient cause for adjournment or not. Even if a last opportunity is granted and case is fixed for hearing and sufficient cause is shown on the date fixed for hearing, then the case can be adjourned and it should be adjourned, in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the Tribunal committed an illegality in rejecting the application for adjournment and in deciding the appeal exparte. Appeal remitted to the Tribunal for decision on merits on payment of costs of Rs.21,000 by the assessee.

Objective tests to classify shares gains as STCG vs. biz profits laid down

The assessee offered gains from sale and purchase of securities as “capital gains”. The AO assessed it as business profits on the ground that in the earlier years, it was offered as such. The CIT (A) & Tribunal accepted the assessee’s plea on the ground that the securities were shown as “investments” in the accounts and in the earlier years, the STCG was offered as business profits as there was no difference in the tax rate. On appeal by the department, HELD reversing the Tribunal:

There was a dispute whether in the earlier years, the gains were offered as business profits or as capital gains and the Tribunal had not given a clear finding. The Tribunal ought to examine the issue holistically keeping in mind the parameters/tests laid down in CIT vs. Rewashanker A. Kothari 283 ITR 338 (Guj) and CBDT’s Circular No.4/2007 dated 15th June 2007 on when income from transactions in securities should be treated as “business profits” and when as “capital gains”:

 

(a) Whether the initial acquisition of the subject-matter of transaction was with the intention of dealing in the item or with a view to finding an investment?;

 

(b) Why and how and for what purpose the sale was effected subsequently?;

 

(c) How the assessee dealt with the subject-matter of transaction during the time the asset was with the assessee. Has it been treated as stock-in-trade or as an investment in the balance sheet?

 

(d) How the assessee returned the income from such activities and how the department dealt with the same in the preceding and succeeding assessments?;

 

(e) Whether the deed of partnership or memorandum of association, if the assessee is a firm or a company, authorises such an activity?

 

(f) Most importantly, what is the volume, frequency, continuity and regularity of transactions of purchase and sale of the goods concerned?

To “make available” technical knowledge, mere provision of service is not enough; the payer must be enabled to perform the service himself

The assessee, engaged in prospecting and mining for diamonds entered into an agreement with a Netherlands company for conducting air borne survey and providing high resolution geophysical data. The AO held that the consideration was chargeable to tax as “fees for technical services” under Article 12 of the India-Netherlands DTAA and held the assessee liable u/s 195 & 201 for failure to deduct TDS. This was reversed by the CIT (A) & Tribunal on the ground that though the Dutch company had performed services using technical knowledge and expertise, such technical experience etc had not been “made available” to the assessee. On appeal by the department to the High Court, HELD dismissing the appeal:

Article 12(5) of the DTAA defines “fees for technical services” to mean payments in consideration for the rendering of any technical or consultancy services “which make available technical knowledge, experience, etc or consist of the development and transfer of a technical pIan or technical design. To be said to “make available”, the service should be aimed at and result in transmitting technical knowledge etc so that the payer of the service could derive an enduring benefit and utilize the knowledge or know-how on his own in future without the aid of the service provider. In other words, to fit into terminology “making available”, the technical knowledge, skills” etc must remain with the person receiving the service even after the particular contract comes to an end. It is not enough that the services offered are the product of intense technological effort and a lot of technical knowledge and experience of the service provider has gone into it. The technical knowledge or skills of the provider should be imparted to and absorbed by the receiver so that the receiver can deploy similar technology or techniques in the future without depending upon the provider. On facts, while the Dutch company performed the surveys using substantial technical skills, it has not made available the technical expertise in respect of such collection or processing of data to the assessees, which the assessee can apply independently and without assistance and undertake such survey independently. Consequently, the consideration is not assessable as “fees for technical services” (AAR Rulings in Perfetti Van Melle Holding, Shell India & Areva T&D distinguished)

Tribunal has to deal with factual findings of AO & give reasons for its conclusion

Pursuant to a search u/s 132, the AO passed a block assessment order u/s 158BC. The Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal on the ground that (i) the search warrant did not mention the assessee’s name and (ii) the assessment was not based on material found during the search. The department filed an appeal claiming that (a) the search warrant & panchnama did refer to the assessee’s name and (b) the detailed assessment order exposing the assessee’s modus operandi had not been dealt by the Tribunal. HELD by the High Court allowing the appeal:

The Tribunal recorded a wrong factual finding that the search warrant did not include the assessee’s name. The Tribunal has not specifically referred to and dealt with the findings of the AO. which are detailed, specific & with reference to several factual aspects, documents, etc. The Tribunal is required to deal with the factual findings recorded by the AO and give its factual conclusions. The factual conclusion should be based upon reasons and should be outcome of analysis and discussion. The Tribunal being the final fact finding authority cannot merely record its conclusions without discussing the factual matrix, evidence and material. Merely stating that the papers etc. do not pertain to the assessee and the contents of the document cannot be utilized, is the conclusion or the final inference which is not sufficient in the light of what has been held by the AO in the block assessment order. The fact that the assessee filed a detailed written synopsis does not mean that the order of the Tribunal meets the legal requirement. The law mandates that the Tribunal should give reasons which are discernible and apparent from the order. What weighed with the Tribunal cannot be assumed in the absence of discussion.

Tests to determine where shares gain is capital gains or business profits

The assessee offered LTCG of Rs. 2.59 crores and STCG of Rs. 5.53 crores on sale of shares. The AO held that the LTCG & STCG were assessable as business profits on the ground that (a) the dividend was meager, (b) the assessee had undertaken risk by dealing in shares, (c) the holding period of most of the securities was very short, (d) the ratio of sales to purchases is was 1.77, (d) the sale and purchase transactions were frequent and (e) the scale of the activity of sale and purchase of securities was substantial. The CIT (A) upheld the taxability of STCG as business profits though the Tribunal deleted that as well. On appeal by the department, HELD dismissing the appeal:

To determine whether an assessee is an investor in shares or a dealer in shares, a pragmatic and common sense approach has to be adopted always keeping in mind commercial considerations. The tests have been laid down in Instruction No.4/2007 dated 15.6.2007 & CIT vs. Rewashanker A. Kothari 283 ITR 338 (Guj). On facts, the Tribunal was right that the STCG was not assessable as business profits because (a) the assessee was a salaried employee, (b) He maintained two separate portfolios for investment and trading, (c) the shares were held for periods ranging from 2.4 months to 11 months, (d) though the quantum or total number shares was substantial, the transactions in question were only seven in number and the period of holding was not insignificant and small. While the quantum or total number may not be determinative but in a given case keeping in view period of holding may indicate intention to make investment, (e) substantial dividend income had been received, (f) the element of uncertainty and risk is always there in securities and this factor cannot be a determinative factor to decide whether the assessee is trading in shares or is an investor. Some investors do take risk, (g) The ratio of sales and purchase will always be in favour of sales when the sales are sold and (h) in the earlier assessment years, transactions in the investment portfolio were accepted by the AO.

S. 40(b)(v): Partnership deed need not quantify partner’s remuneration

The assessee’s partnership deed provided that the partners would be paid remuneration / salary “according to the standards and norms fixed by the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961”. The AO disallowed the claim for deduction of the salary paid to the partners u/s 40(b)(v) on the ground that as the deed did not quantify the amount of remuneration. This was reversed by the CIT (A) and Tribunal. On appeal by the department, HELD dismissing the appeal:

The Tribunal finding that “The quantification of the remuneration was apparent from clause 8 of the partnership deed which provided that the remuneration would be payable as per norms fixed by the Income-tax Act. The requirement in law is that remuneration should have been authorized and the amount of remuneration shall not exceed the amount specified in s. 40(b)(v) which uses the word ‘authorised‘ and not the word ‘quantify‘” is a finding of fact which cannot be interfered with by this Court.

S. 147 reopening reasons need not be supplied within limitation period

For AY 2004-05, the AO issued a notice u/s 148 on 15.3.2011. The recorded reasons were supplied to the assessee on 30.8.2011 (after the expiry of the limitation period of 6 years). The assessee, relying on Haryana Acrylic vs. CIT 308 ITR 38 (Del), challenged the reopening inter alia on the ground that as the recorded reasons were supplied after the expiry of the limitation period, the reassessment proceedings were invalid. HELD dismissing the petition:

There is no requirement in s. 147, 148 or 149 that the reasons recorded should also accompany the notice issued u/s 148. The requirement in s. 149(1) is only that the notice u/s 148 shall be issued. There is no requirement that it should also be served on the assessee before the period of limitation. There is also no requirement in s. 148(2) that the reasons recorded shall be served along with the notice of reopening the assessment. The only mandatory requirement is that before issuing the notice to reopen the assessment the AO shall record his reasons for doing so. After GKN Driveshafts 259 ITR 19 (SC) the AO is duty bound to supply the recorded reasons to the assessee after the assessee files the return in response to the s. 148 notice. Haryana Acrylic turned on the peculiar facts of that case, where two sets of reasons had been recorded by the AO. As the second set of reasons alleging non-disclosure of material facts surfaced for the first time in the affidavit filed by the Revenue before the High Court after the expiry of 6 years, it was held that the reassessment proceedings were invalid. As this is not the fact situation here, the assessee’s plea cannot be accepted.

Unaccounted expenditure to be set-off against unaccounted income despite Expl. to s. 37(1) & proviso to s. 69C. Govt. criticized for apathy towards black money

Pursuant to a search u/s 132, an assessments u/s 158BC was made and various additions were made. One of the issues was whether if the AO makes an addition of unaccounted income on the basis of seized records, he is required to give a deduction for the unexplained expenditure shown in the same records. HELD by the Court:

(i) The assessee was engaged in unaccounted business and the seized accounts showed unaccounted receipts and unaccounted expenditure. There is no justification for doubting the entries found in the seized records pertaining to expenditure while accepting the income found recorded therein. When the Department relies on the seized records for estimating undisclosed income, there is no reason why the expenditure stated therein should be disbelieved merely because there is no written agreement and that payments were not made through cheques or demand drafts. This would be unrealistic and not justified. The statute authorizes assessment of “undisclosed income” which has to be arrived at after allowing expenditure incurred by the assessee whether it be accounted in the regular books or not. The Explanation to s. 37(1) does not apply because the unaccounted business is not an “illegal business” and the proviso inserted to s. 69C by the Finance (No.2) Act, 1998 w.e.f. 1.04.1999 does not cover excess expenditure over accounted expenditure in business is covered by s. 69C itself.

(ii) We are constrained to observe about the effort made by us to persuade the Central Government to take steps to prevent generation and circulation of black money. Through a detailed interim order we appraised the Government that unless prohibition is introduced against cash dealings particularly in property sales in film industry and the like against at least for payments over a certain limit in cash, black money generation and circulation cannot be controlled because the disincentives on cash dealings contained under the various provisions of the Income Tax Act have failed to achieve the objective. Further, by prohibiting use of cash in major transactions terror and mafia funding and corruption could be arrested to a large extent. Above all, the worst enemy of our economy that is, circulation of high denomination counterfeit currencies (presently estimated at 7000 crores) could be prevented to a large extent. Unfortunately, the response of the Central Finance Ministry is not at all encouraging in as much as Government wants status quo to continue to the detriment of the economic interest of the country and the people as a whole. Our limitations while exercising appellate jurisdiction u/s 260A inhibit us from initiating any proceedings or issuing direction against the Central Government. However, we express our anguish on the attitude of the Central Government to have created this vicious situation and allow the same to continue.