{"id":12095,"date":"2015-11-26T16:49:31","date_gmt":"2015-11-26T11:19:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/?p=12095"},"modified":"2015-11-26T16:56:03","modified_gmt":"2015-11-26T11:26:03","slug":"dcit-vs-zuari-estate-development-investment-co-ltd-supreme-court-s-1431-147-as-a-s-1431-intimation-is-not-an-assessment-there-is-no-question-of-change-of-mind-by-the-ao","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/dcit-vs-zuari-estate-development-investment-co-ltd-supreme-court-s-1431-147-as-a-s-1431-intimation-is-not-an-assessment-there-is-no-question-of-change-of-mind-by-the-ao\/","title":{"rendered":"DCIT vs. Zuari Estate Development &#038; Investment Co Ltd (Supreme Court)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>After going through the detailed order passed by the High Court (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.itatonline.org\/f\/o.php?url=http:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/524673\/\">Zuari Estate Development vs J.R. Kanekar 271 ITR 269 (Bom)<\/a>), we find that the main issue which is involved in this case is not at all addressed by the High Court. A contention was taken by the appellant-Department to the effect that since the assessee&#8217;s return was accepted under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, there was no question of \u201cchange of opinion\u201d inasmuch as while accepting the return under the aforesaid provision no opinion was formed and therefore, on this basis, the notice issued was valid. We find that this aspect is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers Private Limited [2008 (14) SCC 208] in the following manner: &#8211;<\/p>\n<p><em>\u201c15. In the scheme of things, as noted above, the intimation under Section 143(1)(a) cannot be treated to be an order of assessment. The distinction is also well brought out by the statutory provisions as they stood at different points of time. Under Section 143(1)(a) as it stood prior to 1-4-1989, the assessing officer had to pass an assessment order if he decided to accept the return, but under the amended provision, the requirement of passing of an assessment order has been dispensed with and instead an intimation is required to be sent. Various circulars sent by the Central Board of Direct Taxes spell out the intent of the legislature i.e. to minimise the departmental work to scrutinise each and every return and to concentrate on selective scrutiny of returns. These aspects were highlighted by one of us (D.K. Jain, J.) in Apogee International Ltd. v. Union of India. <\/p>\n<p>16. It may be noted above that under the first proviso to the newly substituted Section 143(1), with effect from 1-6-1999, except as provided in the provision itself, the acknowledgment of the return shall be deemed to be an intimation under Section 143(1) where (a) either no sum is payable by the assessee, or (b) no refund is due to him. It is significant that the acknowledgment is not done by any assessing officer, but mostly by ministerial staff. Can it be said that any \u201cassessment\u201d is done by them? The reply is an emphatic \u201cno\u201d. The intimation under Section 143(1)(a) was deemed to be a notice of demand under Section 156, for the apparent purpose of making machinery provisions relating to recovery of tax applicable. By such application only recovery indicated to be payable in the intimation became permissible. And nothing more can be inferred from the deeming provision. Therefore, there being no assessment under Section 143(1)(a), the question of change of opinion, as contended, does not arise.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p>The offshoot of the aforesaid discussion is to hold that judgment of the High Court is erroneous and warrants to be set aside. We allow this appeal setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court.<\/p>\n<div class=\"journal2\">Note: The High Court had struck down the reopening on the basis that &#8220;<em>no prudent or reasonable person, reasonably instructed in law, could have come to the conclusion that an agreement as contemplated by section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act had been entered into for the assessment year 1991-92<\/em>&#8220;. The High Court had held that the AO had proceeded on a misconception and there could be no &#8220;<em>reason to believe<\/em>&#8221; that income had escaped assessment. This point is lost sight of by the Supreme Court<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Can it be said that any \u201cassessment\u201d is done by them? The reply is an emphatic \u201cno\u201d. The intimation under Section 143(1)(a) was deemed to be a notice of demand under Section 156, for the apparent purpose of making machinery provisions relating to recovery of tax applicable. By such application only recovery indicated to be payable in the intimation became permissible. And nothing more can be inferred from the deeming provision. Therefore, there being no assessment under Section 143(1)(a), the question of change of opinion, as contended, does not arise<\/p>\n<div class=\"read-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/dcit-vs-zuari-estate-development-investment-co-ltd-supreme-court-s-1431-147-as-a-s-1431-intimation-is-not-an-assessment-there-is-no-question-of-change-of-mind-by-the-ao\/\">Read more &#8250;<\/a><\/div>\n<p><!-- end of .read-more --><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[4,7],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12095","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-all-judgements","category-supreme-court","judges-a-k-sikri-j","judges-rohinton-fali-nariman-j","section-35","section-42","section-43","counsel-dhruv-aggarwal","court-supreme-court","catchwords-1431-assessment","catchwords-reopening","genre-domestic-tax"],"acf":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12095","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12095"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12095\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12095"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12095"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12095"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}