IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL MUMBAI BENCHES “G”, MUMBAI<\/p>\n
Before Shri JOGINDER SINGH, Judicial Member, and Shri G. MANJUNATHA, Accountant Member<\/p>\n
ITA NO.622\/Mum\/2016<\/p>\n
Assessment Year: 2009-10<\/p>\n
ACIT, Circle-7(1)-1, Room No.23, Ground Floor, Aayakar Bhavan, M.K. Road, Mumbai-400020<\/p>\n
Vs.<\/p>\n
M\/s Goldmohur Design and Apparel Park Ltd. Goldmohur Textile Mill, Dadasaheb Phalke Road, Dadar (E), Mumbai-400014 (_ज___\/Revenue) (____ !"ी \/Assessee)<\/p>\n
P.A. No.AADCG1613M _ज___________ \/ Revenue by Shri Abhijit Patankar-DR ____ !"ी ________ \/ Assessee by Shri Vipul Joshi _#___$ _% "_&__\/_Date of Hearing : 23\/04\/2018 घ_षण_ _% "_&_\/Date of Pronouncement 20\/06\/2018<\/p>\n
_द_श_\/_O R D E R<\/p>\n
Per Joginder Singh (Judicial Member)<\/p>\n
The Revenue is aggrieved by the impugned order dated 30\/11\/2015 of the Ld. First Appellate Authority, Mumbai in setting aside the reopening of assessment holding that information was already available with the Assessing Officer while completing the assessment u\/s 143(3) of the Act without appreciating the fact that explanation-1 to section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter the Act) that the production of books of accounts or other evidences in itself by the assessee would not necessarily amounts to disclosure where the escapement arises out of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment.<\/p>\n
2. During hearing, the Ld. CIT-DR, Shri Abhijit Patankar, invited our attention to the provision of section 147 of the Act, reasons for reopening of assessment (page- 52 of the paper book), para 4.3. (page-5 of the impugned order) by contending that the reopening was done within four years by following the procedure prescribed in the section and there was information with the Assessing Officer from the ROC that the premium was at higher value. Reliance was placed upon the decision from Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Jhaveri (291 ITR 500) (Supreme Court). It was pleaded that sufficient and correctness is not required at early stages for which reliance was placed upon the decision in Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. vs Income-Tax Officer And Ors. 236 ITR 34 (Supreme Court). In reply, the ld. counsel for the assessee, Shri Vipul Jain, defended the impugned order by contending that it is not a case of bogus shares and the assessee is a government owned company and the issue pertains to excess share premium. It was pleaded that the source is doubted and the premium is mentioned in the agreement itself. Our attention was invited to paper book pages 43, 44 and 47. In reply, the Ld. CIT-DR, contended that it is a case of abnormal share premium. He relied upon the decision in COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX vs PRECISION FINANCE PVT. LTD. 208 ITR 465 (Cal.) and CIT vs Vir Bhan & Sons 273 ITR 206 (P & H).<\/p>\n
2.1. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. Before adverting further, it is our bounded duty to analyze section 147 of the Act also, which is reproduced hereunder:-<\/p>\n
"147. Income escaping assessment.—If the Assessing Officer,<\/em> has reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has<\/em> escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject<\/em> to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such<\/em> income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has<\/em> escaped assessment and which comes to his notice<\/em> subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section,<\/em> or re-compute the loss or the depreciation allowance or any other<\/em> allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year<\/em> concerned (hereafter in this section and in sections 148 to 153<\/em> referred to as the relevant assessment year) :<\/em> Provided that where an assessment under sub-section (3) of<\/em> section 143 or this section has been made for the relevant<\/em> assessment year, no action shall be taken under this section<\/em> after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant<\/em> assessment year, unless any income chargeable to tax has<\/em> escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the<\/em> failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under section<\/em> 139 or in response to a notice issued under sub- section (1) of<\/em> section 142 or section 148 or to disclose fully and truly all<\/em> material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment<\/em> year.<\/em><\/p>\n Explanation 1.—Production before the Assessing Officer of<\/em> account books or other evidence from which material evidence<\/em> could with due diligence have been discovered by the Assessing<\/em> Officer will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the<\/em> meaning of the fore going proviso.<\/em><\/p>\n Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this section, the following<\/em> shall also be deemed to be cases where income chargeable to<\/em> tax has escaped assessment, namely :—<\/em><\/p>\n (a) where no return of income has been furnished by the<\/em> assessee although his total income or the total income of any<\/em> other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act<\/em> during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which<\/em> is not chargeable to Income-tax ;<\/em><\/p>\n (b) where a return of income has been furnished by the assessee<\/em> but no assessment has been made and it is noticed by the<\/em> Assessing Officer that the assessee has understated the income<\/em> or has claimed excessive loss, deduction, allowance or relief in<\/em> the return ;<\/em><\/p>\n (c) where an assessment has been made, but—<\/em> (i) income chargeable to tax has been under assessed ; or<\/em> (ii) such income has been assessed at too low a rate ; or<\/em> (iii) such income has been made the subject of excessive relief<\/em> under this Act ; or<\/em> (iv) excessive loss or depreciation allowance or any other allow<\/em> ance under this Act has been computed.<\/em><\/p>\n Explanation 3.—For the purpose of assessment or reassessment<\/em> under this section, the Assessing Officer may assess or reassess<\/em> the income in respect of any issue, which has escaped<\/em> assessment, and such issue comes to his notice subsequently in<\/em> the course of the proceedings under this section, notwithstanding<\/em> that the reasons for such issue have not been included in the<\/em> reasons recorded under sub- section (2) of section 148."<\/em><\/p>\n 2.2. If the aforesaid provision of the Act is analyzed, we are of the view that for reopening an assessment made under section 143(3) of the Act, the following conditions are requires to be satisfied :<\/p>\n (i) the Assessing Officer must form a tentative or prima facie<\/em> opinion on the basis of material that there is<\/em> underassessment or escapement of income ;<\/em> (ii) he must record the prima facie opinion into writing ;<\/em> (iii) the opinion formed is subjective but the reasons<\/em> recorded or the information available on record must show<\/em> that the opinion is not a mere suspicion.<\/em> (iv) reasons recorded and\/or the documents available on<\/em> record must show a nexus or that in fact they are germane<\/em> and relevant to the subjective opinion formed by the<\/em> Assessing Officer regarding escapement of income.<\/em> (v) In cases where the first proviso applies, there is an<\/em> additional requirement that there should be failure or<\/em> omission on the part of the assessee in disclosing full and<\/em> true material facts. The Explanation to the section stipulates<\/em> that mere production of books of account or other<\/em> documents from which the Assessing Officer could have,<\/em> with due diligence, inferred material facts, does not amount<\/em> to "full and true disclosure of material facts" (the proviso is<\/em> not applicable where reasons to believe for issue of notice<\/em> are recorded and notice is issued within four years from the<\/em> end of assessment year).<\/em><\/p>\n 2.3. The term and facets of the term "change of opinion". The expression "change of opinion" postulates formation of opinion and then a change thereof. In the context of section 147 of the Act it implies that the Assessing Officer should have formed an opinion at the first instance, i.e., in the proceedings under section 143(3) and now by initiation of the reassessment proceeding, the Assessing Officer proposes or wants to take a different view.<\/p>\n 2.4. The word "opinion" is derived from the latin word "opinari" which means "to believe", "to think". The word "opinion" as per the Black’s Law Dictionary means a statement by a judge or a court of a decision reached by him incorporating cause tried or argued before them, expounding the law as applied to the case and, detailing the reasons upon which the judgment is based. Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (third edition) explains the term "opinion" to mean "something more than mere retaining of gossip or hearsay ; it means judgment or belief, that is, a belief or a conviction resulting from what one thinks on a particular question . . . An opinion is a conviction based on testimony . . . they are as a result of reading, experience and reflection".<\/p>\n 2.5. In the context of assessment proceedings, it means formation of belief by an Assessing Officer resulting from what he thinks on a particular question. It is a result of understanding, experience and reflection to use the words in Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar. The question of change of opinion arise when an Assessing Officer forms an opinion and decides not to make an addition or holds that the assessee is correct and accepts his position or stand. In Hari Iron Trading Co. v. CIT [2003] 263 ITR 437 (P&H), a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court observed that an assessee has no control over the way an assessment order is drafted. It was observed that generally, the issues which are accepted by the Assessing Officer do not find mention in the assessment order and only such points are taken note of on which the assessee’s explanations are rejected and additions\/disallowances are made. Applying the principles laid down by the Full Bench of this court as well as the observations of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, we find that if the entire material had been placed by the assessed before the Assessing Officer at the time when the original assessment was made and the Assessing Officer, applied his mind to that material and accepted the view canvassed by the assessee, then merely because he did express this in the assessment order, that by itself would not give him a ground to conclude that income has escaped assessment and, therefore, the assessment needed to be reopened. On the other hand, if the Assessing Officer did not apply his mind and committed a lapse, there is no reason why the assessee should be made to suffer the consequences of that lapse.<\/p>\n 2.6. The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Consolidated Photo and Finvest Ltd. [2006] 281 ITR 394 (Delhi) held as under:<\/p>\n "In the light of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme<\/em> Court referred to above, which are binding upon us and the<\/em> observations made by the High Court of <\/em>Gujarat<\/em> with which we find<\/em> ourselves in respectful agreement, the action initiated by the<\/em> Assessing Officer for reopening the assessment cannot be said to<\/em> be either incompetent or otherwise improper to call for interference<\/em> by a writ court. The Assessing Officer has in the reasoned order<\/em> passed by him indicated the basis on which income exigible to tax<\/em> had in his opinion escaped assessment. The argument that the<\/em> proposed reopening of assessment was based only upon a<\/em> change of opinion has not impressed us. The assessment order<\/em> did not admittedly address itself to the question which the<\/em> Assessing Officer proposes to examine in the course of<\/em> reassessment proceedings. The submission of Mr. Vohra that<\/em> even when the order of assessment did not record any explicit<\/em> opinion on the aspects now sought to be examined, it must be<\/em> presumed that those aspects were present to the mind of the<\/em> Assessing Officer and had been held in favour of the assessee is<\/em> too far-fetched a proposition to merit acceptance. There may<\/em> indeed be a presumption that the assessment proceedings have<\/em> been regularly conducted, but there can be no presumption that<\/em> even when the order of assessment is silent, all possible angles<\/em> and aspects of a controversy had been examined and determined<\/em> by the Assessing Officer. It is trite that a matter in issue can be<\/em> validly determined only upon application of mind by the authority<\/em> determining the same. Application of mind is, in turn, best<\/em> demonstrated by disclosure of mind, which is best done by giving<\/em> reasons for the view which the authority is taking. In cases where<\/em> the order passed by a statutory authority is silent as to the reasons<\/em> for the conclusion it has drawn, it can well be said that the<\/em> authority has not applied its mind to the issue before it nor formed<\/em> any opinion. The principle that a mere change of opinion cannot<\/em> be a basis for reopening completed assessments would be<\/em> applicable only to situations where the Assessing Officer has<\/em> applied his mind and taken a conscious decision on a particular<\/em> matter in issue. It will have no application where the order of<\/em> assessment does not address itself to the aspect which is the<\/em> basis for reopening of the assessment, as is the position in the<\/em> present case. It is in that view inconsequential whether or not the<\/em> material necessary for taking a decision was available to the<\/em> Assessing Officer either generally or in the form of a reply to the<\/em> questionnaire served upon the assessee. What is important is<\/em> whether the Assessing Officer had based on the material available<\/em> to him taken a view. If he had not done so, the proposed<\/em> reopening cannot be assailed on the ground that the same is<\/em> based only on a change of opinion."<\/em><\/p>\n 2.7. From the foregoing discussion, the clear position emerges as under:<\/p>\n (1) Reassessment proceedings can be validly initiated in case<\/em> return of income is processed under section 143(1) and no<\/em> scrutiny assessment is undertaken. In such cases there is no<\/em> change of opinion.<\/em><\/p>\n (2) Reassessment proceedings will be invalid in case the<\/em> assessment order itself records that the issue was raised and is<\/em> decided in favour of the assessee. Reassessment proceedings in<\/em> the said cases will be hit by the principle of "change of opinion".<\/em><\/p>\n (3) Reassessment proceedings will be invalid in case an issue or<\/em> query is raised and answered by the assessee in original<\/em> assessment proceedings but thereafter the Assessing Officer does<\/em> not make any addition in the assessment order. In such situations<\/em> it should be accepted that the issue was examined but the<\/em> Assessing Officer did not find any ground or reason to make<\/em> addition or reject the stand of the assessee. He forms an opinion.<\/em> The reassessment will be invalid because the Assessing Officer<\/em> had formed an opinion in the original assessment, though he had<\/em> not recorded his reasons.<\/em><\/p>\n 2.8. Thus, where an Assessing Officer incorrectly or erroneously applies law or comes to a wrong conclusion and income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, resort to section 263 of the Act is available and should be resorted to. But initiation of reassessment proceedings will be invalid on the ground of change of opinion. Here a distinction has to be drawn between erroneous application\/interpretation \/understanding of law and cases where fresh or new factual information comes to the knowledge of the Assessing Officer subsequent to the passing of the assessment order. If new facts, material or information comes to the knowledge of the Assessing Officer, which was not on record and available at the time of the assessment order, the principle of "change of opinion" will not apply. The reason is that "opinion" is formed on facts. "Opinion" formed or based on wrong and incorrect facts or which are belied and untrue do not get protection and cover under the principle of "change of opinion". Factual information or material which was incorrect or was not available with the Assessing Officer at the time of original assessment would justify initiation of reassessment proceedings. The requirement in such cases is that the information or material available should relate to material facts. The expression "material facts" means those facts which if taken into account would have an adverse effect on the assessee by a higher assessment of income than the one actually made. Correct material facts can be ascertained from the assessment records also and it is not necessary that the same may come from a third person or source, i.e., from source other than the assessment records. However, in such cases, the onus will be on the Revenue to show that the assessee had stated incorrect and wrong material facts resulting in the Assessing Officer proceeding on the basis of facts, which are incorrect and wrong. The reasons recorded and the documents on record are of paramount importance and will have to be examined to determine whether the stand of the Revenue is correct. A decision of from Hon’ble Delhi High Court dated September 26, 2011 in Dalmia P. Ltd. v. CIT [2012] 348 ITR 469 (Delhi) and another decision from Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court dated November 8, 2011, in Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Asst. CIT [2012] 348 ITR 439 (Bom) are two such cases, which throws light on the issue. In the first case, the Assessing Officer in the original assessment had made addition of Rs. 19,86,551 under section 40(1) on account of unconfirmed sundry creditors. The reassessment proceedings were initiated after noticing that unconfirmed sundry creditors, of which details, etc., were not furnished, were to the extent of Rs. 52,84,058 and not Rs. 19,86,551. In Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. (supra), after verification the claim under section 54EC was allowed but subsequently on examination it transpired that the second property was purchased prior to the date of sale. The aforesaid decisions\/ facts cases must be distinguished from cases where the material facts on record are correct but the Assessing Officer did not draw proper legal inference or did not appreciate the implications or did not apply the correct law. The second category will be a case of "change of opinion" and cannot be reopened for the reason that the assessee, as required, has placed on record primary factual material but on the basis of legal understanding, the Assessing Officer has taken a particular legal view.<\/p>\n However, as stated above, an erroneous decision, which is also prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, can be made subject-matter of adjudication under section 263 of the Act.<\/p>\n 2.9. A division Bench of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in New Light Trading Co. v. CIT [2002] 256 ITR 391 (Delhi), referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in CIT v. P. V. S. Beedies P. Ltd. [1999] 237 ITR 13 (SC) and made following observations. (page 392) :<\/p>\n "In the case of CIT v. P. V. S. Beedies P. Ltd. [1999] 237 ITR 13<\/em> (SC), the apex court held that the audit party can point out a fact,<\/em> which has been overlooked by the Income-tax Officer in the<\/em> assessment. Though there cannot be any interpretation of law by the<\/em> audit party, it is entitled to point out a factual error or omission in the<\/em> assessment and reopening of a case on the basis of factual error or<\/em> omission pointed out by the audit party is permissible under law. As<\/em> the Tribunal has rightly noticed, this was not a case of the Assessing<\/em> Officer merely acting at the behest of the audit party or on its report.<\/em> It has independently examined the materials collected by the audit<\/em> party in its report and has come to an independent conclusion that<\/em> there was escapement of income. The answer to the question is,<\/em> therefore, in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the<\/em> assessee."<\/em><\/p>\n “As recorded above, the reasons recorded or the documents<\/em> available must show nexus that in fact they are germane and<\/em> relevant to the subjective opinion formed by the Assessing Officer<\/em> regarding escapement of income. At the same time, it is not the<\/em> requirement that the Assessing Officer should have finally<\/em> ascertained escapement of income by recording conclusive findings.<\/em> The final ascertainment takes place when the final or reassessment<\/em> order is passed. It is enough if the Assessing Officer can show<\/em> tentatively or prima facie on the basis of the reasons recorded and<\/em> with reference to the documents available on record that income has<\/em> escaped assessment.”<\/em><\/p>\n This takes us to the observations of the Delhi High Court in Kelvinator of India Ltd. [2002] 256 ITR 1 (Delhi) [FB] which read as under (page 18):<\/p>\n "The Board in exercise of its jurisdiction under the<\/em> aforementioned provisions had issued the circular on<\/em> October 31, 1989<\/em>. The said circular admittedly is binding on<\/em> the Revenue. The authority, therefore, could not have taken<\/em> a view, which would run counter to the mandate of the said<\/em> circular.”<\/em><\/p>\n From a perusal of clause 7.2 of the said circular it would appear that in no uncertain terms it was stated as to under what circumstances the amendments had been carried out, i.e., only with a view to allay the fears that the omission of the expression ‘reason to believe’ from section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the Assessing Officer to reopen past assessment on mere change of opinion. It is, therefore, evident that even according to the CBDT a mere change of opinion cannot form the basis for reopening a completed assessment.<\/p>\n 2.10. Another aspect of the matter also cannot be lost sight of. A statute conferring an arbitrary power may be held to be ultra virus article 14 of the Constitution of India.<\/p>\n If two interpretations are possible, the interpretation which upholds constitutionality, it is trite, should be favoured. In the event it is held that by reason of section 147 if the Income-tax Officer exercises its jurisdiction for initiating a proceeding for re-assessment only upon mere change of opinion, the same may be held to be unconstitutional. I am, therefore, of the opinion that section 147 of the Act does not postulate conferment of power upon the Assessing Officer to initiate reassessment proceeding upon his mere change of opinion.<\/p>\n 2.11. The Hon’ble Apex Court thereafter referred to the subsequent decision in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC), wherein it was observed that some of the observations made in Kalyanji Mavji (supra) were far too wide and the statute did not permit reappraisal of material considered by the Assessing Officer during the original assessment. The observations in Kalyanji Maviji (supra) that reopening would cover a case "where income has escaped assessment due to the oversight, inadvertence or mistake" was too broadly expressed and did not lay down the correct law. It was clarified and observed at page 1004 in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC) as under :<\/p>\n "Now, in the case before us, the Income-tax Officer had, when he<\/em> made the original assessment, considered the provisions of<\/em> sections 9 and 10. Any different view taken by him afterwards on<\/em> the application of those provisions would amount to a change of<\/em> opinion on material already considered by him. The Revenue<\/em> contends that it is open to him to do so, and on that basis to reopen<\/em> the assessment under section 147(b). Reliance is placed on<\/em> Kalyanji Mavji and Co. v. CIT [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC), where a<\/em> Bench of two learned judges of this court observed that a case<\/em> where income had escaped assessment due to the ‘oversight,<\/em> inadvertence or mistake’ of the Income-tax Officer must fall within<\/em> section 34(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. It appears to<\/em> us, with respect, that the proposition is stated too widely and travels<\/em> farther than the statute warrants in so far as it can be said to lay<\/em> down that if, on reappraising the material considered by him during<\/em> the original assessment, the Income-tax Officer discovers that he<\/em> has committed an error in consequence of which income has<\/em> escaped assessment it is open to him to reopen the assessment. In<\/em> our opinion, an error discovered on a reconsideration of the same<\/em> material (and no more) does not give him that power. That was the<\/em> view taken by this court in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh v. CIT<\/em> [1959] 35 ITR 1 (SC), CIT v. A. Raman and Co. [1968] 67 ITR 11<\/em> (SC) and Bankipur Club Ltd. v. CIT [1971] 82 ITR 831 (SC), and we<\/em> do not believe that the law has since taken a different course. Any<\/em> observations in Kalyanji Mavji and Co. v. CIT [1976] 102 ITR 287<\/em> (SC) suggesting the contrary do not, we say with respect, lay down<\/em> the correct law."<\/em><\/p>\n 2.12. In A. L. A. Firm (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court explained that there was no difference between the observations of the Supreme Court in Kalyanji Maviji [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC) and Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society case [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC), as far as proposition (4) is concerned. It was held that (page 297 of 189 ITR) :<\/p>\n "We have pointed out earlier that Kalyanji Maviji’s case [1976]<\/em> 102 ITR 287 (SC) outlines four situations in which action under<\/em> section 34(1)(b) can be validly initiated. The Indian Eastern<\/em> Newspaper Society’s case [1979] 119 ITR 996 (SC) has only<\/em> indicated that propo sition (2) outlined in this case and<\/em> extracted earlier may have been somewhat widely stated ; it<\/em> has not cast any doubt on the other three propositions set out<\/em> in Kalyanji Mavji’s case. The facts of the present case squarely<\/em> fall within the scope of propositions 2 and 4 enunciated in<\/em> Kalyanji Maviji’s case [1976] 102 ITR 287 (SC). Proposition (2)<\/em> may be briefly summarized as permitting action even on a<\/em> ‘mere change of opinion’. This is what has been doubted in the<\/em> Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society case [1979] 119 ITR<\/em> 996 (SC) and we shall discuss its application to this case a little<\/em> later. But, even leaving this out of consideration, there can be<\/em> no doubt that the present case is squarely covered by<\/em> proposition (4) set out in Kalyanji Maviji’s case [1976] 102 ITR<\/em> 287 (SC). This proposition clearly envisages a formation of<\/em> opinion by the Income-tax Officer on the basis of material<\/em> already on record provided the formation of such opinion is<\/em> consequent on ‘information’ in the shape of some light thrown<\/em> on aspects of facts or law which the Income-tax Officer had not<\/em> earlier been conscious of. To give a couple of illustrations ;<\/em> suppose an Income-tax Officer, in the original assessment,<\/em> which is a voluminous one involving several contentions,<\/em> accepts a plea of the assessee in regard to one of the items<\/em> that the profits realised on the sale of a house is a capital<\/em> realisation not chargeable to tax. Subsequently, he finds, in the<\/em> forest of papers filed in connection with the assessment,<\/em> several instances of earlier sales of house property by the<\/em> assessee. That would be a case where the Income-tax Officer<\/em> derives information from the record on an investigation or<\/em> enquiry into facts not originally undertaken. Again, suppose the<\/em> Income-tax Officer accepts the plea of an assessee that a<\/em> particular receipt is not income liable to tax. But, on further<\/em> research into law he finds that there was a direct decision<\/em>