{"id":20033,"date":"2019-01-29T17:28:04","date_gmt":"2019-01-29T11:58:04","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/?p=20033"},"modified":"2019-01-29T17:28:04","modified_gmt":"2019-01-29T11:58:04","slug":"dcit-vs-kargwal-products-p-ltd-itat-mumbai-s-147-reopening-for-taxing-bogus-share-capital-even-in-a-s-1431-intimation-the-ao-is-not-entitled-to-reopen-on-the-ground-that-the-assessee-has-receive","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/dcit-vs-kargwal-products-p-ltd-itat-mumbai-s-147-reopening-for-taxing-bogus-share-capital-even-in-a-s-1431-intimation-the-ao-is-not-entitled-to-reopen-on-the-ground-that-the-assessee-has-receive\/","title":{"rendered":"DCIT vs. Kargwal Products P. Ltd (ITAT Mumbai)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>IN THE INCOME-TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL \u201cH\u201d BENCH MUMBAI<br \/>\nBEFORE SHRI G.S. PANNU, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND<br \/>\nSHRI PAWAN SINGH, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER<br \/>\nITA No. 1462\/Mum\/2017 (Assessment Year 2009-10)<br \/>\nDCIT, CC- 4(3) Central<br \/>\nRange-4, Room No. 1921,<br \/>\nC-11, 19th Floor, Air India<br \/>\nBuilding, Nariman Point,<br \/>\nMumbai-400021.<br \/>\nVs.<br \/>\nM\/s Kargwal Products P. Ltd.<br \/>\nOm Shiv Sai CHS, Off Eastern<br \/>\nExpress Highway, Opp Sion<br \/>\nChunabhati Signal, Sion,<br \/>\nMumbai-400022.<br \/>\nPAN: AADCK3047P<br \/>\nAppellant Respondent<br \/>\nCross Objection No.132\/Mum\/2018 (Assessment Year 2009-10)<br \/>\nM\/s Kargwal Products P. Ltd.<br \/>\nOm Shiv Sai CHS, Off Eastern<br \/>\nExpress Highway, Opp Sion<br \/>\nChunabhati Signal, Sion,<br \/>\nMumbai-400022.<br \/>\nPAN: AADCK3047P<br \/>\nVs.<br \/>\nDCIT, CC- 4(3) Central<br \/>\nRange-4, Room No. 1921,<br \/>\nC-11, 19th Floor, Air India<br \/>\nBuilding, Nariman Point,<br \/>\nMumbai-400021.<br \/>\nAppellant Respondent<br \/>\nAppellant by : Shri Dharmesh Shah (DR)<br \/>\nRespondent by : Ms. Pooja Swaroop (Sr. AR)<br \/>\nDate of Hearing : 11.07.2018<br \/>\nDate of Pronouncement : 26.09.2018<br \/>\nORDER UNDER SECTION 254(1)OF INCOME TAX ACT<br \/>\nPER PAWAN SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER;<br \/>\n1. The instant appeal by the Revenue is directed against the order of Ld.<br \/>\nCommissioner (Appeals)- 12, Mumbai dated 16th December 2016 which in<br \/>\nturn arises from assessment order dated 30th March 2015 passed under<br \/>\nsection 143(3) read with section 147 of the Act. On service of notice of<br \/>\nappeal the assessee has filed its cross objections. The revenue has raised<br \/>\nfollowing grounds of appeal:<br \/>\n(i) Whether on facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the<br \/>\nlearned Commissioner (Appeals) has erred in treating the notice under<br \/>\nsection 148 of the Act is invalid and bad in law by holding that assessing<br \/>\nITA No. 1462 Mum 17 &#038; C.O. 132 Mum 18-M\/s Kargwal Products P. Ltd.<br \/>\n2<br \/>\nofficer does not have any tangible material either from assessment record<br \/>\nor from any other source.<br \/>\n(ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the<br \/>\nlearned Commissioner appeal has erred in holding the order under<br \/>\nsection 143(3) read with section 147 of the act is invalid, hence failed to<br \/>\ndecide the issue to receipt of share application money\/share capital\/share<br \/>\npremium treated as cash credit by the assessing officer on merits.<br \/>\n(iii) The appellant prays to leave, to add, to amend and\/or to alter any of the<br \/>\ngrounds of appeal, if need be.<br \/>\n2. Brief facts of the case are that the assessee is engaged in the business of<br \/>\nmanufacturing, processing and dealing in civil items and job works, filed<br \/>\nits return of income for Assessment Year 2009-10 on 31st March 2010<br \/>\ndeclaring taxable income at Rs.(-) 33230\/-. The return of income was<br \/>\nprocessed under section 143(1) of the Act. The assessment was reopened<br \/>\nunder section 147 on 29th March 2014. Accordingly, notice under section<br \/>\n148 was issued to the assessee on 29th March 2014. The assessee vide its<br \/>\nletter dated November 2014 furnish the copy of acknowledgement of<br \/>\nreturn filed earlier on 31st March 2010. The assessee requested for supply<br \/>\nof reasons recorded. The following reasons were recorded by the<br \/>\nAssessing Officer:<br \/>\n\u201cFrom the records, it is seen that the assessee is in receipt of huge share<br \/>\npremium to Rs. 1,33,77,000\/- during the financial year 2008-09 relevant<br \/>\nto assessment year 2009-10. As there was no scrutiny assessment and for<br \/>\nthis year, the so-called share premium having been received by the<br \/>\nassessee was not examined. The assessee is an unlisted company and the<br \/>\nnature of share application received (the intrinsic value of the share in<br \/>\ncomparison to the excess premium received) is not substantiated.\u201d<br \/>\n3. The assessee vide its letter dated 15th July 2014 raised objection against<br \/>\nthe reopening. The objection of assessee was disposed of by Assessing<br \/>\nOfficer vide order dated 15th January 2014. After disposing the objection<br \/>\nfiled by assessee, the Assessing Officer proceeded to make the reassessment.<br \/>\nOn perusal of details furnished by assessee, the Assessing<br \/>\nOfficer noted that during the relevant period the assessee company<br \/>\nintroduced a sum of Rs. 1,36,50,000\/- on account of share application<br \/>\nITA No. 1462 Mum 17 &#038; C.O. 132 Mum 18-M\/s Kargwal Products P. Ltd.<br \/>\n3<br \/>\nmoney\/share capital and share premium received on issue of 27300 equity<br \/>\nshares to the face value of Rs. 10\/- each at a premium of Rs. 490\/- per<br \/>\nshare from the following four parties;<br \/>\nS.N Name of the<br \/>\nperson<br \/>\nNo of<br \/>\nshares<br \/>\nFace<br \/>\nvalue<br \/>\nIssue<br \/>\nprice<br \/>\nPremiu<br \/>\nm per<br \/>\nshare<br \/>\nMoney Received towards<br \/>\nShare capital, share premium &#038;<br \/>\nTotal<br \/>\n(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)=(3)*(4) (8)=(3)*(6) (7)+(8)<br \/>\n1. K.R.C.<br \/>\nTrading Co.<br \/>\nPvt. Ltd.<br \/>\n13,400 10 500 490 134000 65,66,000 67,00,000<br \/>\n2. Gyaneshwar<br \/>\nTrading &#038;<br \/>\nFinance Co.<br \/>\nLtd.<br \/>\n1000 10 500 490 10000 4,90,000 5,00,000<br \/>\n3. Oshin<br \/>\nInvestment &#038;<br \/>\nFinance P.<br \/>\nLtd.<br \/>\n5300 10 500 490 53000 25,97,000 26,50,000<br \/>\n4. Doldrum<br \/>\nInvestment &#038;<br \/>\nFinance Pvt.<br \/>\nLtd.<br \/>\n7600 10 500 490 76000 37,24,000 38,00,000<br \/>\nTotal 27,300 2,73,000 1,33,77,000 1,36,50,00<br \/>\n0<br \/>\n4. The assessee was asked to furnish share valuation report to justify the<br \/>\nissue of share at a huge premium. In response to the notice of the<br \/>\nAssessing Officer, the assessee vide its reply dated 2nd March 2015<br \/>\nfurnished the copy of share valuation report. The Assessing Officer issued<br \/>\nnotice under section 133(6) dated 02.02.2015 to all four parties who have<br \/>\nacquired share on payment of premium for identification of parties,<br \/>\nbusiness profile and performance, capacity to invest, credit worthiness and<br \/>\nsource of funds. The notice sent to all the parties were return back. The<br \/>\nassessing officer issued show cause to the assessee as to why the entire<br \/>\namount of Rs. 1.36 crore should not be treated as unexplained credit under<br \/>\nsection 68 of the act. The assessee filed its reply and contended that<br \/>\nsection 68 is not applicable in the present case. The assessee filed its detail<br \/>\nexplanation with regard to source and nature of the proceed from the issue<br \/>\nof share and submitted various evidences. The contention of assessee was<br \/>\nnot accepted by the assessing officer. The Assessing Officer made the<br \/>\nITA No. 1462 Mum 17 &#038; C.O. 132 Mum 18-M\/s Kargwal Products P. Ltd.<br \/>\n4<br \/>\naddition of entire amount under section 68 of the Act. On appeal before<br \/>\nthe Ld. Commissioner (Appeals), the reopening was held as invalid. The<br \/>\nLd. Commissioner (Appeals) held that the basic requirement of reopening<br \/>\nof the assessment i.e \u201creason to believe\u201d is not fulfilled at the time of<br \/>\nrecording the reasons for reopening. Since reopening was held as invalid,<br \/>\ntherefore the other grounds of appeal raised by assessee was not<br \/>\nadjudicated by Ld. Commissioner (Appeals). Thus, aggrieved by the order<br \/>\nof Ld. Commissioner (Appeals) the revenue has filed the present appeal<br \/>\nbefore us. On service of notice, the assessee has raised Cross Objection for<br \/>\nnot adjudicating the grounds of appeal by Ld. Commissioner (Appeals).<br \/>\n5. We have heard the learned DR for the revenue and learned AR of the<br \/>\nassessee and perused the material available on record. We have also<br \/>\ndeliberated on various case laws referred by lower authorities. The ld. DR<br \/>\nfor the revenue supported the order of Assessing Officer. The ld. DR<br \/>\nfurther submits that the Assessing Officer supplied the reasons of<br \/>\nreopening. The objection of assessee was disposed of. The assessment was<br \/>\ncompleted under section 133(1) on 31.03.2010 and the Assessing Officer<br \/>\nhas no occasion to examine the issue of share premium received by<br \/>\nassessee during the relevant period.<br \/>\n6. On the other hand, the ld. AR of the assessee supported the order of Ld.<br \/>\nCommissioner (Appeals). The ld. AR further submits that the reasons<br \/>\nrecorded by the Assessing Officer were not valid to invoke section 148 of<br \/>\nthe Act. The reopening is without tangible material available with<br \/>\nAssessing Officer for doubting the receipt of share application money.<br \/>\nThere was no evidence before the Assessing Officer at the time of<br \/>\nrecording the reasons which could prove that some income had escape<br \/>\nassessment. It was further submitted that in case the reasons recorded are<br \/>\ninsufficient to establish any belief of Assessing Officer, such reason<br \/>\ncannot be said to be giving rise to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer<br \/>\nITA No. 1462 Mum 17 &#038; C.O. 132 Mum 18-M\/s Kargwal Products P. Ltd.<br \/>\n5<br \/>\nto reassess the income. Unless any tangible evidence is referred and relied<br \/>\nupon while recording the reasons, the Assessing Officer have no<br \/>\njurisdiction to reopen the assessment. The ld. AR further submits that the<br \/>\nshares were subscribed by the holding and associate company, whose<br \/>\nidentities cannot be doubted and without group concern valuation cannot<br \/>\nbe suspected. In support of his submission, the ld. AR of the assessee<br \/>\nrelied upon the decisions of Hon\u2019ble Bombay High Court in case of NIVI<br \/>\nTrading Ltd. vs. Union of India (278 CTR 219), CIT vs. Smt. Maniben<br \/>\nValji Shah [283 ITR 453 (Bom)], Infrastructure and Energy Services Ltd.<br \/>\nVs. ACIT [332 ITR 587(Bom)], Khubchandani Health parks Pvt. Ltd. vs.<br \/>\nITO &#038; Ors [384 ITR 322], Hon\u2019ble Gujarat High Court in case of Krupesh<br \/>\nGhanshyambhai Thakkar vs. DCIT [77 taxmann.com 293], Hon\u2019ble Delhi<br \/>\nHigh Court in CIT vs. Batra Bhatia Company [321 ITR 526], CIT vs.<br \/>\nOrient Craft Ltd. [354 ITR 536], Decision of Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court in<br \/>\ncase of CIT vs. Kelvinator of India Ltd. [320 ITR 561(SC)] .<br \/>\n7. We have considered the rival submission of the parties and have gone<br \/>\nthrough the orders of authorities below. The assessee filed return of<br \/>\nincome on 31.03.2010 for Assessment Year 2009-10. The assessment was<br \/>\nprocessed under section 143(1). The assessment was reopened on<br \/>\n29.03.2014 without four year from the end of relevant Assessment Year.<br \/>\nWe have noted that the Assessing Officer nowhere mentioned in the<br \/>\nreasons recorded that any tangible material either from assessment record<br \/>\nor from other source has come in the notice of Assessing Officer for his<br \/>\nreason to believe that any income has escape assessment. Therefore, the<br \/>\nbasic requirement of reopening of the assessee i.e. reason to believe was<br \/>\nnot fulfilled at the time of recording the reasons of reopening.<br \/>\n8. The Hon\u2019ble Bombay High Court in case of NIVI Trading Ltd. (supra)<br \/>\nheld as under:<br \/>\nITA No. 1462 Mum 17 &#038; C.O. 132 Mum 18-M\/s Kargwal Products P. Ltd.<br \/>\n6<br \/>\n\u201c25. &#8230;&#8230;.The principal condition for issuance of notice is to be found in section<br \/>\n147 of the Income Tax Act and that is on the reason to belief that any income<br \/>\nchargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, then, the<br \/>\nAssessing Officer may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess<br \/>\nor reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has<br \/>\nescaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course<br \/>\nof the proceedings under this section, or re-compute the loss or the depreciation<br \/>\nallowance or any other allowance, as the case may be. In the present case, the<br \/>\nRespondents do not state that any income chargeable to tax has escaped<br \/>\nassessment. All that the Revenue desires is verification of certain details and<br \/>\npertaining to the gift. That is not founded on the belief that any income which<br \/>\nis chargeable to tax has escaped assessment and hence, such verification is<br \/>\nnecessary. That belief is not recorded and which alone would enable the<br \/>\nAssessing Officer to proceed. Thus, the reasons must be founded on the<br \/>\nsatisfaction of the Assessing Officer that income chargeable to tax has escaped<br \/>\nassessment. Once that is not to be found, then, we are not in a position to<br \/>\nsustain the impugned notice.\u201d<br \/>\n9. Further, the Hon\u2019ble jurisdictional High Court in case of<br \/>\nKhubchandani Health parks Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held that notice issued<br \/>\nunder section 148 would be without jurisdiction for absence of reason<br \/>\nto believe that income had escaped assessment even in case where<br \/>\nassessment has been completed earlier by intimation under section<br \/>\n143(1).<br \/>\n10. The Hon\u2019ble Gujarat High Court in Krupesh Ghanshyambhai Thakkar vs.<br \/>\nDCIT (supra) held as under:<br \/>\n\u201c11. \u2026\u2026\u2026.as per the reasons recorded, the notice has been issued and<br \/>\nassessment is sought to be reopened for deep verification of the claims. Even in<br \/>\nthe order disposing of the objections, it has been specifically stated that to<br \/>\nverify whether all the criteria are met by the said transaction of Rs. 50 lakhs<br \/>\nrouted through the group and also to verify the claim of having recorded these<br \/>\ntransactions in the regular books of account, notice under Section 148 has been<br \/>\nissued. Even with respect to investment in shares of M\/s. Rushil Decor, it has<br \/>\nbeen submitted that whether the investment in shares of M\/s. Rushil Decor<br \/>\nwere acquired from the capital of the assessee and the same is duly recorded in<br \/>\nthe books of account, needs to be verified and for that purpose, the assessment<br \/>\nfor A.Y 2009-2010 is sought to be reopened.<br \/>\n12. In case of Inductotherm (India) (P.) Ltd. (supra), Division Bench of this<br \/>\nCourt has observed that for a mere verification of the claim, the power of<br \/>\nreopening of assessment could not be exercised. It is further observed that the<br \/>\nAssessing Officer under the guise of power to reopen an assessment, cannot<br \/>\nseek to undertake a fishing or roving inquiry and seek to verify the claims, as if<br \/>\nit were a scrutiny assessment.<br \/>\nITA No. 1462 Mum 17 &#038; C.O. 132 Mum 18-M\/s Kargwal Products P. Ltd.<br \/>\n7<br \/>\n12.1 Similar view has been expressed by the Division Bench in case of Deep<br \/>\nRecycling Industries (supra) wherein it has been held and observed that for<br \/>\nmere scrutiny, reopening of the assessment would not be permissible. It is<br \/>\nfurther observed that the reopening of the assessment could be made if the<br \/>\nAssessing Officer had formed a belief that income chargeable to tax had<br \/>\nescaped assessment. The Court has further observed that in order to do so, the<br \/>\nAssessing Officer must have some tangible material having live link with the<br \/>\nescapement of the income on the basis of which he can form a bona fide belief<br \/>\nof escapement of income chargeable to tax. It has also been observed that<br \/>\nreopening cannot be resorted to for fishing or roving inquiry on mere suspicion<br \/>\nthat income chargeable to tax may have escaped assessment.<br \/>\n13. Applying the aforesaid two decisions to the facts of the present two cases<br \/>\non hand and the reasons recorded to reopen the assessment, we are of the<br \/>\nopinion that under the guise of reopening of the assessment, the Assessing<br \/>\nOfficer wants to have a roving inquiry; as observed hereinabove. Even as per<br \/>\nthe Assessing Officer in the reasons recorded has specifically mentioned that<br \/>\nfor the purpose of verification\/deep verification of the claim, it is necessary to<br \/>\nreopen the assessment. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the<br \/>\nAssessing Officer had any tangible material to form an opinion that the income<br \/>\nchargeable to tax has escaped the assessment. Under the circumstances, the<br \/>\nimpugned action of reopening of the assessment in exercise of power under<br \/>\nSection 148 of the I.T Act for the reasons recorded hereinabove cannot be<br \/>\nsustained\u201d.<br \/>\n11. The Hon\u2019ble Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Batra Bhatia Company (supra)<br \/>\nheld as under:<br \/>\n\u201cA reading of the reasons recorded did not disclose that the Assessing Officer,<br \/>\nin fact, had reasons to believe that any income had escaped assessment. It is not<br \/>\njust the belief of the Assessing Officer that is material, but such a belief must<br \/>\nbe based on certain reasons. There was no indication as to on what information<br \/>\nor on what material the Assessing Officer had harboured the belief that the<br \/>\nclaim of the assessee required deeper scrutiny. In fact, no new material was on<br \/>\nrecord after the filing of the return till the issuance of notice under section 147.<br \/>\nThe proceedings under section 147 are not to be invoked at the mere whim and<br \/>\nfancy of the Assessing Officer. It has to be seen in every case as to whether the<br \/>\ninvocation is arbitrary or reasonable one. Merely because the Assessing Officer<br \/>\nfelt that the issue required &#8216;much deeper scrutiny&#8217;, it was not enough ground for<br \/>\ninvoking section 147. It is not belief per se that is a pre-condition for invoking<br \/>\nsection 147, but a belief founded on reasons. The expression used in section<br \/>\n147 is &#8216;If the Assessing Officer has reason to believe&#8217; and not &#8216;If the Assessing<br \/>\nOfficer believes&#8217;. There must be some basis upon which the belief can be built.<br \/>\nIt does not matter whether that belief is ultimately proved right or wrong, but<br \/>\nthere must be some material upon which such a belief can be founded.\u201d<br \/>\nITA No. 1462 Mum 17 &#038; C.O. 132 Mum 18-M\/s Kargwal Products P. Ltd.<br \/>\n8<br \/>\n12. Further, the Hon\u2019ble Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Orient Craft Ltd. (supra)<br \/>\nheld it is not permissible to adopt different standards while interpreting the<br \/>\nwords &#8216;reason to believe&#8217; vis-\u00e0-vis section 143(1) and section 143(3), the<br \/>\nHon\u2019ble Court had held as under:<br \/>\n\u201c13. Having regard to the judicial interpretation placed upon the expression<br \/>\n&#8220;reason to believe&#8221;, and the continued use of that expression right from 1948<br \/>\ntill date, we have to understand the meaning of the expression in exactly the<br \/>\nsame manner in which it has been understood by the courts. The assumption of<br \/>\nthe Revenue that somehow the words &#8220;reason to believe&#8221; have to be understood<br \/>\nin a liberal manner where the finality of an intimation under Section 143(1) is<br \/>\nsought to be disturbed is erroneous and misconceived. As pointed out earlier,<br \/>\nthere is no warrant for such an assumption because of the language employed<br \/>\nin Section 147; it makes no distinction between an order passed under section<br \/>\n143(3) and the intimation issued under section 143(1). Therefore it is not<br \/>\npermissible to adopt different standards while interpreting the words &#8220;reason to<br \/>\nbelieve&#8221; vis-\u00e0-vis Section 143(1) and Section 143(3). We are unable to<br \/>\nappreciate what permits the Revenue to assume that somehow the same<br \/>\nrigorous standards which are applicable in the interpretation of the expression<br \/>\nwhen it is applied to the reopening of an assessment earlier made under Section<br \/>\n143(3) cannot apply where only an intimation was issued earlier under Section<br \/>\n143(1). It would in effect place an assessee in whose case the return was<br \/>\nprocessed under Section 143(1) in a more vulnerable position than an assessee<br \/>\nin whose case there was a full-fledged scrutiny assessment made under Section<br \/>\n143(3). Whether the return is put to scrutiny or is accepted without demur is<br \/>\nnot a matter which is within the control of assessee; he has no choice in the<br \/>\nmatter. The other consequence, which is somewhat graver, would be that the<br \/>\nentire rigorous procedure involved in reopening an assessment and the burden<br \/>\nof proving valid reasons to believe could be circumvented by first accepting the<br \/>\nreturn under Section 143(1) and thereafter issue notices to reopen the<br \/>\nassessment. An interpretation which makes a distinction between the meaning<br \/>\nand content of the expression &#8220;reason to believe&#8221; in cases where assessments<br \/>\nwere framed earlier under Section 143(3) and cases where mere intimations<br \/>\nwere issued earlier under Section 143(1) may well lead to such an unintended<br \/>\nmischief. It would be discriminatory too. An interpretation that leads to absurd<br \/>\nresults or mischief is to be eschewed.<br \/>\n14. Certain observations made in the decision of Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers<br \/>\n(P.) Ltd. (supra) are sought to be relied upon by the revenue to point out the<br \/>\ndifference between an &#8220;assessment&#8221; and an &#8220;intimation&#8221;. The context in which<br \/>\nthose observations were made has to be kept in mind. They were made to point<br \/>\nout that where an &#8220;intimation&#8221; is issued under section 143(1) there is no<br \/>\nopportunity to the assessing authority to form an opinion and therefore when its<br \/>\nfinality is sought to be disturbed by issuing a notice under section 148, the<br \/>\nproceedings cannot be challenged on the ground of &#8220;change of opinion&#8221;. It was<br \/>\nnot opined by the Supreme Court that the strict requirements of section 147 can<br \/>\nbe compromised. On the contrary, from the observations (quoted by us earlier)<br \/>\nit would appear clear that the court reiterated that &#8220;so long as the ingredients of<br \/>\nsection 147 are fulfilled&#8221; an intimation issued under section 143(1) can be<br \/>\nITA No. 1462 Mum 17 &#038; C.O. 132 Mum 18-M\/s Kargwal Products P. Ltd.<br \/>\n9<br \/>\nsubjected to proceedings for reopening. The court also emphasised that the<br \/>\nonly requirement for disturbing the finality of an intimation is that the<br \/>\nassessing officer should have &#8220;reason to believe&#8221; that income chargeable to tax<br \/>\nhas escaped assessment. In our opinion, the said expression should apply to an<br \/>\nintimation in the same manner and subject to the same interpretation as it<br \/>\nwould have applied to an assessment made under section 143(3). The argument<br \/>\nof the revenue that an intimation cannot be equated to an assessment, relying<br \/>\nupon certain observations of the Supreme Court in Rajesh Jhaveri Stock<br \/>\nBrokers (P.) Ltd. (supra) would also appear to be self-defeating, because if an<br \/>\n&#8220;intimation&#8221; is not an &#8220;assessment&#8221; then it can never be subjected to section<br \/>\n147 proceedings, for, that section covers only an &#8220;assessment&#8221; and we wonder<br \/>\nif the revenue would be prepared to concede that position. It is nobody&#8217;s case<br \/>\nthat an &#8220;intimation&#8221; cannot be subjected to section 147 proceedings; all that is<br \/>\ncontended by the assessee, and quite rightly, is that if the revenue wants to<br \/>\ninvoke section 147 it should play by the rules of that section and cannot bog<br \/>\ndown. In other words, the expression &#8220;reason to believe&#8221; cannot have two<br \/>\ndifferent standards or sets of meaning, one applicable where the assessment<br \/>\nwas earlier made under section 143(3) and another applicable where an<br \/>\nintimation was earlier issued under section 143(1). It follows that it is open to<br \/>\nthe assessee to contend that notwithstanding that the argument of &#8220;change of<br \/>\nopinion&#8221; is not available to him, it would still be open to him to contest the<br \/>\nreopening on the ground that there was either no reason to believe or that the<br \/>\nalleged reason to believe is not relevant for the formation of the belief that<br \/>\nincome chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. In doing so, it is further open<br \/>\nto the assessee to challenge the reasons recorded under section 148(2) on the<br \/>\nground that they do not meet the standards set in the various judicial<br \/>\npronouncements.<br \/>\n15. In the present case the reasons disclose that the Assessing Officer reached<br \/>\nthe belief that there was escapement of income &#8220;on going through the return of<br \/>\nincome&#8221; filed by the assessee after he accepted the return under Section 143(1)<br \/>\nwithout scrutiny, and nothing more. This is nothing but a review of the earlier<br \/>\nproceedings and an abuse of power by the Assessing Officer, both strongly<br \/>\ndeprecated by the Supreme Court in Kelvinator of India Ltd. (supra). The<br \/>\nreasons recorded by the Assessing Officer in the present case do confirm our<br \/>\napprehension about the harm that a less strict interpretation of the words<br \/>\n&#8220;reason to believe&#8221; vis-\u00e0-vis intimation issued under section 143(1) can cause<br \/>\nto the tax regime. There is no whisper in the reasons recorded, of any tangible<br \/>\nmaterial which came to the possession of the assessing officer subsequent to<br \/>\nthe issue of the intimation. It reflects an arbitrary exercise of the power<br \/>\nconferred under section 147.\u201d<br \/>\n13. Considering the above factual and legal discussion that in absence of<br \/>\nreason to believe that income had escape assessment. We do not find any<br \/>\nillegality or infirmity in the order passed by ld. Commissioner (Appeals)<br \/>\nin holding the reopening as invalid. Hence, the grounds of appeal raised by<br \/>\nrevenue are dismissed.<br \/>\nITA No. 1462 Mum 17 &#038; C.O. 132 Mum 18-M\/s Kargwal Products P. Ltd.<br \/>\n10<br \/>\n14. In the result, appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.<br \/>\nC.O. No. 132\/Mum\/2018<br \/>\n15. The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal:<br \/>\n1. The ld. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has erred in law and facts<br \/>\nin not adjudicating the ground no.3 relating to addition on account of share<br \/>\ncapital and share premium amounting to Rs. 1,36,50,000\/-.<br \/>\n2. The ld. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has erred in law and facts<br \/>\nin not adjudicating that the addition on account of share capital and share<br \/>\npremium amounting to Rs. 1,36,50,000\/- treating the same as unexplained<br \/>\ncash credit u\/s. 68 of the Act was incorrect and unjustified.<br \/>\n16. Considering the fact that we have dismissed the appeal of the Revenue, the<br \/>\ngrounds raised in Cross Objection by assessee have become infructuous.<br \/>\n17. In the result, the Cross Objection of assessee is dismissed as infructuous.<br \/>\nOrder pronounced in the open court on 26\/09\/2018.<br \/>\nSd\/- Sd\/-<br \/>\nG.S. PANNU PAWAN SINGH<br \/>\nACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER<br \/>\nMumbai, Date: 26.09.2018<br \/>\nSK<br \/>\nCopy of the Order forwarded to :<br \/>\n1. Assessee 2. Respondent<br \/>\n3. The concerned CIT(A) 4.The concerned CIT<br \/>\n5. DR \u201cH\u201d Bench, ITAT, Mumbai<br \/>\n6. Guard File<br \/>\nBY ORDER,<br \/>\nDy.\/Asst. Registrar<br \/>\nITAT, Mumbai<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The assessment was processed under section 143(1). The assessment was reopened on 29.03.2014 without four year from the end of relevant Assessment Year. We have noted that the Assessing Officer nowhere mentioned in the reasons recorded that any tangible material either from assessment record or from other source has come in the notice of Assessing Officer for his reason to believe that any income has escape assessment. Therefore, the basic requirement of reopening of the assessee i.e. reason to believe was not fulfilled at the time of recording the reasons of reopening<\/p>\n<div class=\"read-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/dcit-vs-kargwal-products-p-ltd-itat-mumbai-s-147-reopening-for-taxing-bogus-share-capital-even-in-a-s-1431-intimation-the-ao-is-not-entitled-to-reopen-on-the-ground-that-the-assessee-has-receive\/\">Read more &#8250;<\/a><\/div>\n<p><!-- end of .read-more --><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[4,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-20033","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-all-judgements","category-tribunal","judges-g-s-pannu-am","judges-pawan-singh-jm","section-42","section-43","section-368","counsel-pooja-swaroop","court-itat-mumbai","catchwords-bogus-share-capital","catchwords-bogus-share-premium","catchwords-reopening-of-assessment","genre-domestic-tax"],"acf":[],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20033","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=20033"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20033\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=20033"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=20033"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=20033"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}