{"id":5778,"date":"2012-10-10T10:31:13","date_gmt":"2012-10-10T10:31:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/?p=5778"},"modified":"2012-10-10T10:31:13","modified_gmt":"2012-10-10T10:31:13","slug":"j-b-roy-vs-dcit-allahabad-high-court-a-retrospective-amendment-does-not-affect-completed-matters","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/archives\/j-b-roy-vs-dcit-allahabad-high-court-a-retrospective-amendment-does-not-affect-completed-matters\/","title":{"rendered":"J.B. Roy vs. DCIT (Allahabad High Court)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\n
Click here to download the judgement (JB_Roy_retrospective_amendment_effect.pdf) <\/strong> <\/a><\/p><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n


\nA Retrospective Amendment does not affect completed matters
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

The assessee filed a belated appeal to the High Court u\/s 260A. The High Court dismissed the appeal following CIT vs. Farooqui<\/strong> 317 ITR 305 (All) (FB) where it was held that the High Court had no power to condone delay in filing a s. 260A appeal. S. 260-A (2A) was inserted by the Finance Act, 2010 w.r.e.f. 01.10.1998 to give the High Court the power to condone delay. Pursuant to the said retrospective amendment, the assessee filed a review petition and requested that its appeal mat be restored. HELD dismissing the review petition: <\/p>\n

Though s. 260A (2A) has been inserted retrospectively<\/strong> w.e.f. 01.10.1998 by the Finance Act, 2010, the fact remains that cases already settled<\/strong> before the said amendment cannot be re-opened<\/strong> as per the ratio laid down in Babu Ram v. C. C. Jacob<\/strong> AIR (1999) SC 1845, where it was observed that the prospective declaration of law is a devise innovated by the apex court to avoid reopening of settled issues<\/strong> and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It is also a devise adopted to avoid uncertainty<\/strong> and avoidable litigation. By the very object of prospective declaration of law, it is deemed<\/strong> that all actions taken contrary to the declaration of law prior to its date of declaration are validated<\/strong>. This is done in the larger public interest. In matters, where decisions opposed to the said principle have been taken prior to such declaration of law cannot be interfered<\/strong> with on the basis of such declaration of law. The amendment<\/strong> is applicable to future cases<\/strong> to avoid uncertainty as per the ratio laid down in M. A. Murthy v. State of Karnatka<\/strong> 264 ITR 1 SC, where it was observed that prospective over-ruling is a part of the principles of constitutional canon of interpretation and can be resorted to by the Court while superseding the law declared by it earlier. It is not possible<\/strong> to anticipate<\/strong> the decision of the highest court or an amendment<\/strong> and pass a correct order in anticipation as per the ratio laid down in CIT v. Schlumberger Sea Company<\/strong> 264 ITR 331 (Cal). Therefore, the amendment introduced in s. 260-A(2A) has the effect only on pending and future cases<\/em><\/strong>. On the date when the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation, there was no discretion with the court to condone the delay. A discretion has come to the court by virtue of the amendment by inserting s. 260-A (2A). The appeal was (rightly) dismissed as per the then law and the subsequent amendment is not applicable as the matter has already attained finality. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Though s. 260A (2A) has been inserted retrospectively<\/strong> w.e.f. 01.10.1998 by the Finance Act, 2010, the fact remains that cases already settled<\/strong> before the said amendment cannot be re-opened<\/strong> as per the ratio laid down in Babu Ram v. C. C. Jacob<\/strong> AIR (1999) SC 1845, where it was observed that the prospective declaration of law is a devise innovated by the apex court to avoid reopening of settled issues<\/strong> and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It is also a devise adopted to avoid uncertainty<\/strong> and avoidable litigation. By the very object of prospective declaration of law, it is deemed<\/strong> that all actions taken contrary to the declaration of law prior to its date of declaration are validated<\/strong>. This is done in the larger public interest. In matters, where decisions opposed to the said principle have been taken prior to such declaration of law cannot be interfered<\/strong> with on the basis of such declaration of law. The amendment<\/strong> is applicable to future cases<\/strong> to avoid uncertainty as per the ratio laid down in M. A. Murthy v. State of Karnatka<\/strong> 264 ITR 1 SC, where it was observed that prospective over-ruling is a part of the principles of constitutional canon of interpretation and can be resorted to by the Court while superseding the law declared by it earlier. It is not possible<\/strong> to anticipate<\/strong> the decision of the highest court or an amendment<\/strong> and pass a correct order in anticipation as per the ratio laid down in CIT v. Schlumberger Sea Company<\/strong> 264 ITR 331 (Cal). Therefore, the amendment introduced in s. 260-A(2A) has the effect only on pending and future cases<\/em><\/strong>. On the date when the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation, there was no discretion with the court to condone the delay. A discretion has come to the court by virtue of the amendment by inserting s. 260-A (2A). The appeal was (rightly) dismissed as per the then law and the subsequent amendment is not applicable as the matter has already attained finality<\/p>\n

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