{"id":7684,"date":"2020-06-04T10:01:38","date_gmt":"2020-06-04T04:31:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/?p=7684"},"modified":"2020-06-04T10:01:38","modified_gmt":"2020-06-04T04:31:38","slug":"mere-bald-assertions-by-the-ao-in-the-reasons-for-reopening-would-confer-valid-jurisdiction-to-the-ao-to-reopen","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/mere-bald-assertions-by-the-ao-in-the-reasons-for-reopening-would-confer-valid-jurisdiction-to-the-ao-to-reopen\/","title":{"rendered":"Mere Bald Assertions By The AO In The Reasons For Reopening Would Confer Valid Jurisdiction To The AO To Reopen?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-content\/uploads\/Sunil-Maloo.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"85\" height=\"100\" class=\"alignleft size-full wp-image-5823\" \/><strong>CA Sunil Maloo has pointed out that under the First Proviso to Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, a burden is cast upon the AO, in cases relating to reopening after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year, to show that income has escaped assessment due to a failure on the part of the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of the material facts. The ld. author has referred to all the important judgements and submitted that the AO has to give particulars of what facts were omitted to be disclosed for valid exercise of jurisdiction and a mere bald assertion by him is not sufficient <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1. Section 147 of the Act is code in itself, it provides a complete  mechanism for the powers of the AO for reopening the Assessments to tax the  income which has escaped assessment. However, at the same time the power  conferred upon the AO by sections 147 is not an unbridled one. The provisions  of section 147 contain basic conditions and the safeguards which have been  inbuilt for ensuring that the assessments are reopened only for lawful reasons  and in a transparent manner. The power of the AO in  reopening the Assessment is hedged with several safeguards conceived in the  interest of eliminating room for abuse of such power. The idea is to  save the Assessees from harassment resulting from mechanical reopening of  assessments. In case, any of such safeguards are flouted, it would invalidate  the exercise of jurisdiction u\/s 147 and 148.<\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p>2. First proviso to Section 147 comes up with one of such safeguards,  which restrict the power of the AO to make reassessment beyond a period of four  years from end of the Assessment Year in a case, where: &#8211;<\/p>\n<p>a) An assessment has already been  made previously u\/s 143(3) or u\/s 147; <strong>AND<\/strong><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>b) the income has escaped by the  reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly  all material facts necessary for his assessment.<strong><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>3. It is settled position of the law that in  the AO has to make an averment in the reasons recorded u\/s 148 that the income has escaped by the reason of  the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all  material facts necessary for his assessment.<\/p>\n<p>4. The very next question arise as to whether  mere making such bald assertion in the reasons  recorded, would suffice the requirement of the law. <\/p>\n<p>5. In this article, we have tried to analyse  this crucial aspect with the help of the relevant judicial pronouncements.<\/p>\n<p>6. It is held by various court of law that  the adequacy or sufficiency of the reasons cannot be subject matter of the  challenge at the threshold, but the existence of the belief can validly be  subject matter of the challenge.<\/p>\n<p>7. Hon&rsquo;ble Supreme Court in the case of <strong>CIT Vs Sati Oil Udyog Ltd. 372 ITR 746<\/strong> has held  that &ldquo;<em>The burden of proving that the assessee has so attempted to evade tax  is on the revenue which may be discharged by the revenue by establishing facts  and circumstances from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the  assessee has, in fact, attempted to evade tax lawfully payable by it.&rdquo;<\/em><\/p>\n<p>8. First proviso to Section 147 of the Act  also casts similar type of burden of proof on the AO to bring on record that  the escaped income is on account of failure of the Assessee to disclose fully and truly all  material facts necessary for his assessment. This condition precedent is to be  shown to be fulfilled by the AO by positively stating in the reasons which  particular material fact was not disclosed by the Assessee, he cannot be  permitted to keep this onus to be proved at later states of the Re-Assessment.<\/p>\n<p>9. Hon&rsquo;ble Bombay High Court in the case of <strong>Hindustan  Lever Ltd. v. R. B. Wadkar, Asstt. CIT (2004) 268 ITR 332 (Bom)<\/strong> has  made a very categorical finding, which is extracted as under: &#8211;<\/p>\n<p><em>&quot;The  reasons recorded by the assessing officer nowhere state that there was failure  on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts  necessary for the assessment of that assessment year. It is needless to mention  that the reasons are required to be read as they were recorded by the assessing  officer. No substitution or deletion is permissible. No additions can be made  to those reasons. No inference can be allowed to be drawn based on reasons not  recorded. It is for the assessing officer to disclose and open his mind through  reasons recorded by him. He has to speak through his rea&#8217;sons. <strong>It is for the  assessing officer to reach the conclusion as to whether there was failure on  the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts  necessary for his assessment for the concerned assessment year.<\/strong> It is for  the assessing officer to form his opinion. <strong>It is for him to put his opinion  on record in black and white.<\/strong> The reasons recorded should be clear and  unambiguous and should not suffer from any vagueness. The reasons recorded must  disclose his mind. The reasons are the manifestation of the mind of the  assessing officer. The reasons recorded should be self-explanatory and should  not keep the assessee guessing for the reasons. Reasons provide the link  between conclusion and evidence. <strong><u>The reasons recorded must be based on  evidence.<\/u><\/strong> The assessing officer, in the event of challenge to the  reasons, must be able to justify the same based on material available on  record. <strong>He must disclose in the reasons as to which fact or material was not  disclosed by the assessee fully and truly necessary for assessment of that  assessment year<\/strong>, so as to establish the vital link between the reasons and  evidence. That vital link is the safeguard against arbitrary reopening of the  concluded assessment. The reasons recorded by the assessing officer cannot be  supplemented by filing an affidavit or making an oral submission, otherwise, the  rea&#8217;sons which were lacking in the material particulars would get  sup&#8217;plemented, by the time the matter reaches the court on the strength of the  affidavit or oral submissions advanced.&quot;<\/em><\/p>\n<p>10. Subsequent to the above judgment, further detailed discussion on the  issue of first proviso to Section 147 was made in by the Hon&rsquo;ble <strong>Bombay<\/strong><strong> High Court in case  of <\/strong><strong>Bombay<\/strong><strong> stock Exchange Ltd.  vs DCIT 365 ITR 0181<\/strong>.  In this case the Assessee argued that apart from making a bald assertion that  there was a failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly  all material facts necessary for its assessment, no details whatsoever were  given with reference to the same. On the other hand, the Department argued that  the reasons for initiating the reassessment proceedings under section 147 of  the Act clearly stated that there had been a failure on the part of the  petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for its  assessment and, therefore, AO was fully justified in initiating the  reassessment proceedings. Ultimately the High Court has held as under: &#8211;<\/p>\n<p><em>10. In  the present case, admittedly, there are no details given by the assessing  officer (respondent No. 1) as to which fact or material was not disclosed by  the petitioner that led to its income escaping assessment. There is merely a  bald assertion in the reasons that there was a failure on the part of the  petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material facts without giving any  details thereof. This being the case, the impugned notice is bad in law and on  this ground alone the petitioner is entitled to succeed in this writ petition.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>11. Similar view has been taken by Bombay  High Court in following cases: &#8211;<\/p>\n<p>   <em> <strong>Anand Developers v. Asstt. CIT<\/strong><br \/>\n    <strong>BOMBAY<\/strong><strong> HIGH COURT Writ  Petition No. 17 of 2020<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>15. In the present case as well, apart  from bald assertion that the Petitioner had not disclosed fully and truly all  material facts, no details have been disclosed as to the material which was  allegedly not disclosed either truly, or fully&hellip;<\/p>\n<p>17. This means that normally, the  limitation period for reassessment under Section 147 of the IT Act is 4 years.  However, in a case where the assessment has been made under Section 143(3) of  the IT Act where, inter alia, the assessee fails to disclose fully and truly  all material facts necessary for assessment for that assessment year,  reassessment can be made even beyond the period of 4 years in terms of Section  148 of the IT Act. Therefore, in order to sustain a notice seeking to reopen  assessment beyond normal period of 4 years, it is necessary for the Respondents  to establish, at least, prima facie that there was failure to disclose fully  and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment for that assessment  year.<\/p>\n<p>18. In the facts of the present case, the  Respondents have failed to establish this precondition even prima facie.  Rather, the material on record establishes that there were full and true  disclosures of all material facts necessary for the assessment of the  Petitioner for the assessment year 2012-13. Despite this, the impugned notice  seeking to reopen the assessment for the assessment year 2012-13 has been  issued beyond the normal period of 4 years. According to us, on this short  ground the impugned Notice dated 29-3-2019 and the impugned  Order dated 17-12-2019 are required to  be quashed and set aside.<\/p>\n<p><\/em><\/p>\n<p> <em> <\/p>\n<p><strong>S.S. Landmarks v. ITO<\/strong><br \/>\n      <strong>BOMBAY<\/strong><strong> HIGH COURT (2020)  312 CTR 0402<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>11. It is also to be noted merely alleging  that there is failure to disclose truly and fully all material facts necessary  for assessment, would not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement unless the  reasons indicate what material facts the Petitioner had failed to disclose  fully and truly during the course of the regular assessment. In fact our Court  in the case of Bombay Stock Exchange Ltd. v. Dy. DIT (E) &amp;Ors. (2014) 365  ITR 181 (Bom) : 2014 TaxPub(DT) 2678 (Bom-HC) has observed as follows :<\/p>\n<p>In the present case, admittedly, there are  no details given by the assessing officer (respondent no.1) as to which fact or  material was not disclosed by the petitioner that led to its income escaping  assessment. There is merely a bald assertion in the reasons that there was a  failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly all material  facts without giving any details thereof. This being the case, the impugned  notice is bad in law and on this ground alone the petitioner is entitled to  succeed in this writ petition .<\/p>\n<p>In the above view also the impugned notice  is without jurisdiction as the proviso to section 147 of the Act will be  applicable in these facts.<\/p>\n<p><strong>CIT (LTU) v. IDBI Bank Ltd.<\/strong><br \/>\n      <strong>BOMBAY<\/strong><strong> HIGH COURT Income  Tax Appeal No. 1679 of 2017<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>12. Admittedly, there is no details given  by assessing officer as to which the fact or material was not disclosed by the  assessee which lead to escape assessment. Merely referring a bald assertion  that I have reason to believe that it is a failure of assessee part or not to  add back the amount of Rs. 58,94,437 to the total income under section.  40(a)(ia) of the Act is not sufficient to frame notice for re-opening concluded  assessment beyond the four years. Thus the notice (impugned notice under  section 48 is bad in law) and does not qualify a sustainable notice under the  scrutiny of law, hence, the legal ground raised by the assessee is allowed and  the re-opening of assessment is declared as invalid.&quot;&nbsp; <\/p>\n<p><\/em><\/p>\n<p><strong>Key Take Away to Sum up: &#8211;<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>12. All the above judgments clearly quashes  the actions of AO in exceeding his jurisdiction to reopen the assessment beyond  4 years without bringing on record as to which material fact was not disclosed  by the Assessee in the previous assessment.A specific burden has been casted on  the AO by first proviso to Section 147, which has to be proved by the AO before  validly assuming jurisdiction u\/s 147 beyond a period of 4 years.<\/p>\n<p>13. Further, it would be interesting to see  whether the onus of the AO is to be interpreted in the  very same manner in the cases of the Penalty u\/s 271(1)(c) default for &ldquo;<strong><em>furnished inaccurate particulars of such income&rdquo;. <\/em><\/strong>The analogy appears to be similar and the  author is of the view that above judgments through in the context of the  reopening and first proviso to Section 147, can be equally applied and argued  in the cases of penalties u\/s 271(1)(c) for furnishing inaccurate particulars  of such income<strong>, where the AO has not pinpointed as to which particular  furnished by the Assessee is found to be INACCURATE.<\/strong> <\/p>\n<table width=\"103%\" border=\"1\" cellpadding=\"5\" cellspacing=\"0\" bgcolor=\"#FFFFCC\">\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Disclaimer: <\/strong>The  contents of this document are solely for informational purpose. It does not  constitute professional advice or a formal recommendation. While due care has  been taken in preparing this document, the existence of mistakes and omissions  herein is not ruled out. Neither the author nor itatonline.org and its  affiliates accepts any liabilities for any loss or damage of any kind arising  out of any inaccurate or incomplete information in this document nor for any  actions taken in reliance thereon. No part of this document should be  distributed or copied (except for personal, non-commercial use) without  express written permission of itatonline.org<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>CA Sunil Maloo has pointed out that under the First Proviso to Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, a burden is cast upon the AO, in cases relating to reopening after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year, to show that income has escaped assessment due to a failure on the part of the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of the material facts. The ld. author has referred to all the important judgements and submitted that the AO has to give particulars of what facts were omitted to be disclosed for valid exercise of jurisdiction and a mere bald assertion by him is not sufficient<\/p>\n<div class=\"read-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/mere-bald-assertions-by-the-ao-in-the-reasons-for-reopening-would-confer-valid-jurisdiction-to-the-ao-to-reopen\/\">Read more &#8250;<\/a><\/div>\n<p><!-- end of .read-more --><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7684","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-articles"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7684","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7684"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7684\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7684"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7684"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7684"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}