{"id":7971,"date":"2020-06-26T10:10:36","date_gmt":"2020-06-26T04:40:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/?p=7971"},"modified":"2020-06-26T10:10:36","modified_gmt":"2020-06-26T04:40:36","slug":"arbitrariness-and-income-tax","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/arbitrariness-and-income-tax\/","title":{"rendered":"Arbitrariness And Income Tax"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-content\/uploads\/dharen-gandhi.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"74\" height=\"100\" class=\"alignleft size-full wp-image-6000\" \/><strong> Advocate Dharan V. Gandhi has deliberated on the interesting topic of what is &#8220;<em>arbitrariness<\/em>&#8221; in a legislation and the extent to which it can make a legislation vulnerable to challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution. He has referred to several provisions in the Income-tax Act, 1961, such as sections 50CA, 56(2)(x), Rule 11UA, 194N, and explained why they suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and stand a risk of being declared invalid<\/strong> <\/p>\n<p><em>&ldquo;From a positivistic  point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and  arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic  while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is  arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political  logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Art. 14&rdquo;. <\/em>These were the famous words of Justice  Bhagwati in the case of <strong>E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3<\/strong>,  which laid the foundation stone of the doctrine of arbitrariness. This doctrine  of arbitrariness has had its fair share of ups and down. <\/p>\n<p><!--more--><\/p>\n<p>\n  Before delving into  the controversy, let us first understand the meaning of the term &lsquo;arbitrary&rsquo;.  The Courts have held that there cannot be any exact definition of the term  arbitrariness. The term arbitrary describes a course of action or a decision  that is not based on reason or judgment but on personal will or discretion  without regard to rules or standards. The Courts have described arbitrary as  one that is irrational and not based on sound reason and one that is  unreasonable (See <strong>Om Kumar and Ors. vs. UOI (2001) 2 SCC 386<\/strong>). <u><\/u><\/p>\n<p>\n  <u>Arbitrariness and  Article 14<\/u><\/p>\n<p>\n  Article 14 of the  Constitution of India deals with &ldquo;Equality before law&rdquo; and it states that &ldquo;<em>The  State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal  protection of the laws within the territory of India&rdquo;. <\/em>Prior to Justice  Bhagwati&rsquo;s disposition in the Royappas case, to test whether any provision is  falling foul of Article 14, the Apex Court had initially laid down the test of  reasonable classification. Under this test, if unequal treatment was provided  to different persons or things, based on some intelligible differentia or  reasonable classification, then the same was not considered as  unconstitutional. Though there were some judicial voices which had spoken  against this being the only basis. In 1974, Justice Bhagwati laid down this  theory of arbitrariness which had the concurrence of Justice Y. V. Chandrachud  and Justice Krishna Iyer. This theory was further concretised in the judgement <strong>Maneka  Gandhi v. UOI, (1978) 1 SCC 248<\/strong>, wherein J. Bhagwati had laid down &ldquo;<em>Article  14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality  of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as  philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness  pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated  by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in  conformity with Article 14.<\/em>&rdquo; This view of J. Bhagwati had concurrence of  five other judges. Further, this principle was once again reiterated in <strong>Ajay  Hasiya vs. Khalid Mujib 1981 (2) SCR 79<\/strong>. <\/p>\n<p>\n  The only confusion  which remained was whether this doctrine of arbitrariness or reasonableness was  in itself sufficient to answer the question of validity under Article 14 or it  was only an added argument to the classification theory. This was essential  because, critics of this doctrine were wary of the fact that this theory would  confer subjective powers in the judiciary to deal with the issue of legislative  competence of the Parliament. However, this confusion is now no longer res  integra, being answered by majority judges in a five bench judgment in case of <strong>Shayara  Bano vs. UOI (the triple talaq case) reported in 2017 (9) SCC 1<\/strong>. In this  judgment, Justice R. F. Nariman speaking for himself and Justice U. U. Lalit  and having concurrence of Justice Kurian Joseph, quashed the practice of triple  talaq on the ground of it being arbitrary and therefore violative of Article  14. Further, it may be noted that this was the only ground based on which the judgment  was delivered.<\/p>\n<p>\n  The above discussion  drives home the point that any provision of law which is arbitrary in nature,  will not satisfy the requirements of Article 14 and therefore, would be quashed  as being unconstitutional. How far does the above principle apply in so far as  tax laws are concerned? <\/p>\n<p>\n  <u>Constitutionality of  tax laws<\/u><\/p>\n<p>\n  When one comes to the  constitutional validity of tax laws, it is deciphered that the Courts are  cautious before striking down any provisions of tax law on the ground of  unconstitutionality. The Apex Court in case of <strong>R K Garg vs. UOI [133 ITR 239  (SC)]<\/strong> has held that &ldquo;<em>Another rule of equal importance is that laws  relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than  laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc.&rdquo;<\/em> In  para 18, while dealing with the aspect of morality, the Court also held that &ldquo;<em>the  test in every such case would be not whether the provisions of the statute  offend against morality but whether they are arbitrary and irrational having  regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case<\/em>&rdquo;. <\/p>\n<p>\n  Thus, tax laws enjoy  greater flexibility when it comes to its constitutional validity, though, the  Court can strike down a law if the same is found to be arbitrary and  irrational. Further, after the judgment in the triple talaq case, one can  always argue that any law which is proved to be arbitrary would run afoul of  Article 14 and therefore, be struck down, including tax laws. However, because  of greater latitude granted by the Apex Court in case of R. K. Garg, it appears  that standards to determine whether the tax law is arbitrary or irrational  would be much more stringent. We have witnessed the same in context of section  50C, Rule 8D etc. Nevertheless, if a person is able to demonstrate that a  particular provision is arbitrary then, the Courts can interfere with the same  by either striking it down or reading it down. <\/p>\n<p>\n  <u>Instances under the  Income-tax Act, 1961 which can be termed as arbitrary<\/u><\/p>\n<p>\n  Let us understand,  some instances under the Income-tax Act, 1961, wherein there is a scope to  argue arbitrariness.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li><span dir=\"ltr\">Section 50CA provides that where the consideration  received or accruing on transfer of a capital asset, being unquoted share of a  company, is less than the fair market value (FMV) of such share determined in  such manner as may be prescribed, then such FMV shall be deemed to be the full  value of consideration. There are no exceptions to this section. Thus, where  the unquoted shares are transferred at less than the fair market value, there  is an automatic addition of difference between the FMV and the actual  consideration. There may be varied reasons for getting consideration less than  the prescribed FMV, however, without factoring such reasons, straightaway the  FMV is taken as full value of consideration. There is not even an opportunity  available to assessee to explain the reasons or to justify his consideration.  Shouldn&rsquo;t such a provision fall within the ambit of &lsquo;arbitrariness&rsquo;?&nbsp; <\/span><\/li>\n<p><\/p>\n<li><span dir=\"ltr\">Similarly, section 56(2)(x) taxes receipt of any  immovable or movable property either without consideration or for inadequate  consideration as compared to the FMV or receipt of any sum of money without  consideration. The whole purpose behind this section is to tackle the bogus  capital building and money laundering transactions. However, the wordings of  section 56(2)(x) are so open-ended that such purpose is nowhere getting  reflected and even the genuine transactions are getting caught within its  ambit. There are certain exceptions provided for in the section though the same  are in no manner sufficient to take care of genuine transactions. Most  importantly, there is no opportunity either to the assessee or any requirement  on the part of the Department to prove whether any transaction is genuine or  bogus. Isn&rsquo;t this &lsquo;arbitrary&rsquo;? Merely because there is a difference between the  actual consideration and FMV does not call for an addition by treating the same  to be bogus transaction. It may not be out of context to mention that the  Courts have held that the Legislature has wide ancillary powers particularly  dealing with black money.&nbsp; However, in my  humble understanding, under the guise of such wide powers, Legislature cannot  enact arbitrary provisions. Therefore, even the purpose behind insertion of a  provision is noble in as much as the same is to get hold of undisclosed income,  the same cannot be arbitrary by putting the taxpayer in a position so as to be  defenceless and that any presumption that may be made by the Legislature should  be a rebuttable one.&nbsp; <\/span><\/li>\n<p><\/p>\n<li><span dir=\"ltr\">The common thread running between section 56(2)(x) and  50CA is the valuation method prescribed to derive the FMV i.e. Rule 11UA. In so  far as unquoted equity shares are concerned, a method is prescribed in Rule  11UA(1)(c)(b) to determine the FMV. Such method is the only method prescribed  and there are no other methods which can be followed by the assessee. This  itself is arbitrary. If one refers to section 56(2)(viib) which deals with  taxability in the hands of company, the Legislature itself has prescribed three  methods for valuation of unquoted equity shares. Also, the method prescribed by  Rule 11UA(1)(c)(b) is not even a recognized method under any other law or used  or applied by any institute or any recognized valuer for finding out value of  equity shares and such unrecognised method is used to judge the bonafide of a  transaction. To top it, no opportunity is granted to the assessee to justify  its consideration as against the arbitrary method prescribed under Rule 11UA. A  classic example of &lsquo;arbitrariness&rsquo;? Should it be declared unconstitutional?<\/span><\/li>\n<p><\/p>\n<li><span dir=\"ltr\">Notification No. 87\/2016 issued by the Central Board of  Direct Taxes (&lsquo;CBDT&rsquo;) prescribed Income Computation and Disclosure Standards  (&lsquo;ICDS&rsquo;). ICDS IX deals with borrowing cost to be capitalised as a part of  qualifying asset. Para 6 of this ICDS prescribes a formula for determining the  borrowing cost on general borrowings which can be attributed to a qualifying  asset. This formula is the only method which an assessee is compelled to follow  coupled with the fact that there are number of issues arising as a result of  application of this formula. Another instance of arbitrary provision? <\/span><\/li>\n<p><\/p>\n<li><span dir=\"ltr\">When one comes of the recent amendments brought out by  Finance Act, 2020, deduction of tax at source on cash withdrawal u\/s 194N of  the Act smells of arbitrariness. TDS is a mechanism to ensure tax in advance to  the Government as well as tracking of income earned by any person. The <em>sine  qua non<\/em> for TDS to apply is that the payment should constitute or should be  in the nature of income. Section 199 provides credit of TDS to the person in  the year in which the corresponding income is offered to tax. Cash withdrawal  from one&rsquo;s own account does not constitute income in any sense and therefore,  applying TDS provision is certainly arbitrary. To keep a track on cash  withdrawals, the Legislature can ask the Banks to file a report of all cash  withdrawals above a particular limit.&nbsp; On  similar logic, levy of TCS on transfer of money under Liberalised Remittance  Scheme of the Foreign Exchange Regulations appears to be arbitrary as there is  no link of tax collected and the income earned by the remitter. <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The above instances  points toward arbitrariness either on the ground that the provision has no real  connection with the purpose behind the insertion or on the ground that an adhoc  method has been prescribed without any opportunity to contend otherwise, etc.  It may be noted that merely because the provisions are inequitable or that the  provisions tax something which is not income cannot be a ground to treat such provisions  as arbitrary and therefore, unconstitutional. The powers of Legislature in this  regard are held to be wide by Courts. However, if such provisions are proved to  be otherwise arbitrary and vague then the Courts can interfere.&nbsp; <\/p>\n<p>\n  Constitutional  validity of a provision under tax law can be challenged on various reasons, but  in the present article only the aspect of arbitrariness and Article 14 has been  dealt with. The point which is sought to be conveyed is that if a particular  provision can be demonstrated to be arbitrary then that itself should be  sufficient to invalidate a particular provision.<\/p>\n<table width=\"103%\" border=\"1\" cellpadding=\"5\" cellspacing=\"0\" bgcolor=\"#FFFFCC\">\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Disclaimer: <\/strong>The  contents of this document are solely for informational purpose. It does not  constitute professional advice or a formal recommendation. While due care has  been taken in preparing this document, the existence of mistakes and omissions  herein is not ruled out. Neither the author nor itatonline.org and its  affiliates accepts any liabilities for any loss or damage of any kind arising  out of any inaccurate or incomplete information in this document nor for any  actions taken in reliance thereon. No part of this document should be  distributed or copied (except for personal, non-commercial use) without  express written permission of itatonline.org<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Advocate Dharan V. Gandhi has deliberated on the interesting topic of what is &#8220;<em>arbitrariness<\/em>&#8221; in a legislation and the extent to which it can make a legislation vulnerable to challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution. He has referred to several provisions in the Income-tax Act, 1961, such as sections 50CA, 56(2)(x), Rule 11UA, 194N, and explained why they suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and stand a risk of being declared invalid<\/p>\n<div class=\"read-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/arbitrariness-and-income-tax\/\">Read more &#8250;<\/a><\/div>\n<p><!-- end of .read-more --><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7971","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-articles"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7971","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7971"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7971\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7971"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7971"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/itatonline.org\/articles_new\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7971"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}