Dismissing the writ appeals of the Revenue the Court held that   the order of the Transfer Pricing Officer had been challenged on the ground of limitation, which went to the root of jurisdiction. What was called upon to be adjudicated was the interpretation of the provision, which was a pure question of law. Therefore, the writ petitions were maintainable and had been rightly entertained by the judge.  The Assessing Officer had time up to 23 : 59 : 59 hours on December 31, 2019 to pass the assessment orders. However, according to the Department, the time limit expired at 00.00 hours of January 1, 2020. The fallacy in such contention is that 00.00 hours of January 1, 2020 denotes not only the beginning of the next day of the month, but also the fact that it comes after 23 : 59 : 59 hours on December 31, 2019 and by such time, the time limit had already expired. Under section 153, no order can be passed at any time after the expiry of twenty one months implying that the order had to be passed before 23 : 59 : 59 hours on December 31, 2019. The provision cannot be considered ignoring the words “at any time after expiry”. Going by section 9 of the General Clauses Act, when the word “from” is used, that date is to be excluded, and hence that December 31, 2019 must be excluded. After excluding December 31, 2019, if the period of 60 days were calculated, the 60th day would fall on November 1, 2019 and the Transfer Pricing Officer must have passed the order on or before October 31, 2019 as orders were to be passed before the 60th day. The order challenged in the writ petitions were barred by limitation. Decision of single judge affirmed. (AY. 2016-17)