A return was filed on May 28, 2010, describing the assessee as MRPL. In the return, the permanent account number disclosed was that of MRPL and its date of incorporation was the date of incorporation of MRPL. In the “Business Reorganization” column it mentioned “not applicable” in the amalgamation section. A special audit was directed after notice under section 142(2A) to which objections were filed in respect of portions relatable to MRPL. The Assessing Officer issued the assessment order showing the assessee as “MRPL, represented by MIPL”. An appeal was preferred to the Commissioner (Appeals) showing the appellant’s name as “MRPL (represented by MIPL after amalgamation)”. The Commissioner (Appeals) set aside some amounts brought to tax by the Assessing Officer. The Department appealed against this order before the Tribunal; simultaneously, the assessee filed a cross-objection to the Tribunal in which an additional ground was urged that the assessment order was a nullity because it was in the name of MRPL which was not in existence. The Department’s appeal was dismissed and the assessee’s cross-objection was allowed on a single point, i.e., that MRPL was not in existence when the assessment order was made, as it had amalgamated with MIPL. The Department appealed to the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal. On further appeal allowing the appeal, that for AY. 2006-07, there was no intimation by the assessee regarding amalgamation of the company. The original return of income was not revised even though the assessment proceedings were pending. The last date for filing the revised returns was March 31, 2008, after the amalgamation order. A return was filed, pursuant to notice, which suppressed the fact of amalgamation; on the contrary, the return was of MRPL and contained its permanent account number. Appeals were filed to the Commissioner (Appeals) and a cross-objection to the Tribunal by MRPL “represented by MIPL”. After fully participating in the proceedings which were specifically in respect of the business of the erstwhile MRPL for the year ending March 31, 2006, for the first time (in the appeal preferred by the Revenue), an additional ground was urged that the assessment order was a nullity because MRPL was not in existence. At no point in time, the earliest being at the time of search, and subsequently, on receipt of notice, was it plainly stated that MRPL was not in existence, and its business assets and liabilities had been taken over by MIPL. Furthermore, the assessment order painstakingly attributed specific amounts surrendered by MRPL, and after considering the special auditor’s report, brought specific amounts to tax, in the search assessment order. That order was expressed to be of MRPL (as the assessee) represented by the transferee, MIPL. The mere choice of the Assessing Officer in issuing a separate order in respect of MRPL, in these circumstances, could not nullify it. The conduct of the assessee, commencing from the date the search took place, and before all forums, reflected that it consistently held itself out as the assessee. Even the affidavit before the court was on behalf of the director of MRPL. The approach and order of the Assessing Officer was valid. The order of the High Court was not sustainable and was to be set aside. Since the appeal of the Department against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was not heard on the merits, the matter was restored to the Tribunal, to hear the parties on the merits of the appeal as well as the cross-objections, on issues other than the nullity of the assessment order, on the merits. Court held that whether the corporate death of an entity upon amalgamation per se invalidates an assessment order ordinarily cannot be determined on a bare application of section 481 of the Companies Act, 1956 (and its equivalent in the 2013 Act), but would depend on the terms of the amalgamation and the facts of each case. (AY. 2006-07)