The assessee is  engaged in the business of hiring, operation and maintenance of construction equipment. It claimed depreciation at the rate of 30 per cent. on various types of cranes, viz., telescopic cranes, rail for tower cranes, tower cranes, mobile tower cranes, crawler cranes, tower crane masts and hydra cranes for the assessment year 2011-12. The Assessing Officer took the view that hiring out construction equipment was an ancillary activity of the assessee and there was every possibility that the cranes were used for the assessee’s own construction business.  Accordingly disallowance restricting the depreciation to 15 per cent. On appeal the CIT (A)  held that only the hydra cranes can be termed as “motor cranes” and accordingly allowed depreciation at the rate of 30 per cent. The Commissioner (Appeals), however, confirmed the disallowance on all other types of cranes. This was confirmed by the Tribunal.   The Court held that   a similar issue had cropped up in the assessment year 2007-08, and after due consideration of all the relevant aspects of the matter, the Assessing Officer had granted depreciation at the rate of 30 per cent. The very same cranes were involved in the present tax appeal which were the subject matter of consideration in the assessment year 2007-08. Registration under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act was not a sine qua non for claiming depreciation. There was evidence on record to indicate that the assessee was involved in the business of hiring cranes. It might be using the cranes for personal construction business too, but that would not disentitle the assessee to claim higher depreciation once it is was shown that the assessee was in the business of hiring the cranes. The assessee was entitled to depreciation at the rate of 30 per cent. on the various types of cranes. Court also held that  although the doctrine of res judicata does not strictly apply to Income-tax proceedings, yet in order to maintain consistency, the Revenue cannot be permitted to rake up stale issues again merely because the scope of appeal is wider than the scope of reference. ( AY.2011-12)