The AO denied the exemption u/s. 54EC of the Act on the ground that there was delay in investing in Bonds.  The assessee filed a revision petition under section 264 before the Commissioner challenging the levy of tax on capital gains with a prayer to condone the delay of two days in investing Rs. 25 lakhs in bonds contending that he was in Australia at that time and accordingly, there was a short delay for advising the remittance towards the bond. The Commissioner declined to condone the delay of two days in making the investment in specified bonds. The assessee filed an application on May 24, 2011 before the Central Board of Direct Taxes to direct the Assessing Officer to consider the application under section 154 and grant appropriate relief. The Board by an order dated December 13, 2017 rejected the application. The writ petition challenging this order was dismissed by the court mainly referring to clause 8 of the Board’s circular dated June 9, 2015 which stated that the circular would cover all such applications and claims for condonation of delay under section 119(2)(b) pending as on the date of issue of the circular. On appeal

held, that had the Central Board of Direct Taxes considered the application filed by the assessee under section 119(2)(b) on May 24, 2011 before issuance of the circular dated June 9, 2015 it would not have been rejected on the ground of delay, i. e., beyond the period of six years as specified in the Circular. No provisions of the Act and Rules prescribe the period of limitation for filing the application under section 119(2)(b) and it was only by virtue of such circular that the period of limitation of six years had been prescribed for the first time. Though the validity of the circular was not challenged directly by the assessee, that applicability of the circular was the main issue before the court and if the matter was perceived from the angle of delay caused in adjudicating the application filed on May 24, 2011 before the Circular dated June 9, 2015 (2015) 374 ITR 25 (St) came into force, the resultant effect would be different. The assessee should not suffer where no default was committed by him in submitting the application under section 119(2)(b) on May 24, 2011, i. e., when there was no period of limitation prescribed. No application could be denied on technical grounds. The application was not disposed of within a reasonable period. The order in the writ petition was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Board for reconsideration of the application and to take an appropriate decision on the merits in accordance with law. Matter remanded to Central Board of Direct Taxes. (AY.  2003-04)