The Appropriate Authority passed the order compulsory purchase of the property order dated September 12, 2002. However the Central Government did not deposit the apparent consideration after the third compulsory purchase order was passed on September 12, 2002. The original purchaser also called upon the Appropriate Authority to issue a declaration under the Act to the effect that the third compulsory purchase order dated September 12, 2002 stood abrogated under section 269UH(2). However, no such declaration was issued by the Appropriate Authority. Thereafter, the parties terminated the agreement dated July 13, 1991, and the plaintiff purchased the suit property by a registered deed of conveyance dated May 16, 2006. The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a declaration that the third compulsory purchase order, dated September 12, 2002, stood abrogated on and from October 31, 2002, and on and from that date, all the rights, title and interest in the suit property and all rights to the floor space index thereto, stood re-vested in the owners, and that on and from May 16, 2006, the plaintiff was the absolute owner of the suit property. The single judge dismissed the suit filed on the ground that it was barred under the provisions of section 269UN and/or section 293 of the Act. On appeal:

Held, allowing the appeal, the Court held that seeking a declaration that the order passed under section 269UD(1) stood abrogated could not mean that the order was being challenged or being “called in question” as referred to in section 269UN. The declaration sought in the suit that the third compulsory purchase order dated September 12, 2002 stood abrogated on and from October 31, 2002, and from that date the suit property re-vested in the vendors, did not in any way “call in question” the order dated September 12, 2002. In fact, the plaintiff proceeded on the basis that the order was valid, and because the consideration was not paid within the time stipulated in section 269UG, it stood abrogated as provided in section 269UH of the Act. The abrogation took place by operation of law as stipulated in section 269UH(1) as the consideration was not paid within the time frame as stipulated in section 269UG. This by no stretch of imagination could mean that the third compulsory purchase order passed under section 269UD(1) was being “called in question” in the suit.

.That any suit which had the effect of setting aside or modifying any proceeding taken under the Act, or to set aside or modify any order made under the Act, it would be barred under section 293. The declarations sought for by the plaintiff did not have any such effect. What was sought in the suit was that the third compulsory purchase order passed by the Appropriate Authority under section 269UD(1) stood abrogated. This declaration was sought on the basis that the consideration payable for the purchase of the immovable property by the Central Government was not paid within the time stipulated in section 269UG. Seeking such a declaration would neither set aside nor modify any proceeding taken or order made under the 1961 Act. If the plaintiff filed to establish this fact at the trial, it would not be entitled to the declaration. This would not mean that this court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The jurisdiction of civil courts is all embracing except to the extent it is excluded by an express provision of law or by clear intendment arising from such law. This is the purport of section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.Order of single judge holding suit barred set aside and suit restored.