Held that  the appeals were fresh appeals, which had been fixed for disposal by a single Member following due process keeping in view the monetary limit under section 255(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The preliminary objection of the Department that the appeals having initially been heard by the Tribunal by a Division Bench, ought to be heard by a Division Bench of the Tribunal, was not tenable. That the fact that the assessee’s appeal before the High Court for the assessment year 2005-06 was pending was no ground for the Tribunal not to decide the appeals for the assessment years 2007-08 and 2009-10 pending disposal before it or to keep them in abeyance. A court or Tribunal is not obliged to keep a matter in abeyance for the reason that one of the parties before it is in appeal on the same issue for another year or in another case. That in the earlier orders of the Tribunal there was no finding as to when the right to receive accrued to or vested in the assessee nor was there a reference to the terms of the contract. There had been no statement of the general principles of law nor of the issue or the legal problem arising and even the relevant facts material to the decision were not as presented before the Tribunal on the earlier occasions, which orders were thus sub silentio the relevant aspects. Thus, its orders were distinguishable, and could not per se be regarded as binding precedents. There was no ratio decidendi for being followed. Under these circumstances the principle of res judicata was not applicable to the proceedings. (AY.2007-08, 2009-10)