The word ‘month’ is not defined in the Customs Act. We therefore
take recourse to the definition of the said word as provided in the General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 3 of the said act provides for various definitions and says that after commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the meaning given to the expressions contained in various sub-sections of section 3 would be applicable to all central acts and regulations unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.

As per sub-section (35) of section 3, the word ‘month’ has been defined to mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar.

In the case of In re: V. S. Metha, AIR 1970 AP 234, Andhra Pradesh High Court was considering the provisions of section 106 of the
Factories Act, 1948 as per which no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the said act unless complaint thereof is made within three months from the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the inspector. In that context, Andhra Pradesh High Court examined the meaning of the word ‘month’ : whether it would mean 30 days in which case the complaint should be filed within 90 days from the date of knowledge. After referring to section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it was held that the word ‘month’ would mean a calendar month and by extension the term ‘three months’ as appearing in section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948 would only mean a period of three calendar months.

Again, in Bibi Salma Khatoon Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 3596, Supreme Court dealt with provisions of section 16(3) of the Bihar
Land Reforms Act, 1961 which provided that benefits under the said act could be availed of if an application is made within three months of the date of registration of the documents of transfer. Posing the question as to what was meant by the word ‘month’, Supreme Court held that British calendar would mean Gregorian calendar. It was held that when the period prescribed is a calendar month running from any arbitrary date, the period of one month would expire upon the day in the succeeding month corresponding to the date upon which the period starts.

Supreme Court in State of H. P. Vs. M/s. Himachal Techno Engineers, 2010 AIR SCW 5088 considered the period of limitation
prescribed under sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. While section 34 relates to application for setting aside arbitral award, sub-section (3) thereof prescribes the period of limitation for such application which is three months. In that context, Supreme Court examined the meaning of the word ‘month’ and held that a month does not refer to a period of 30 days but refers to the actual period of a calendar month.

It was clarified that if the month is April, June, September or November, the period comprising the month will be 30 days; if the month is January, March, May, July, August, October or December, the month will comprise of 31 days; but if the month is February, the period will be 29 days or 28 days depending upon whether it is a leap year or not. After referring to section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it was held that the general rule is that the period ends on the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month irrespective of some months being longer than the rest.

Therefore, it was held that when the period prescribed is three months (as contrasted from 90 days) from a specific date, the said period would expire in the third month on the date corresponding to the date upon which the period starts. As a result, depending on the months, it may mean 90 days or 91 days or 92 days or 89 days.

The moot point to be noted is that the period of limitation of three months commences from the date on which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated and not from the date of decision of the Committee of Commissioners. This aspect was examined by this Court in the recent decision of in Ganesh Benzoplast Limited Vs. Union of India, decided on 02.09.2020, where it was held as under:-

“27.5. What is crucial from the above is that an appeal to
CESTAT has to be filed within three months from the date of
communication of the order sought to be appealed against with
the period of limitation extendable on sufficient cause being
shown. Therefore what is of relevance is that the limitation of
three months commences from the date on which the order
sought to be appealed against is communicated and not from
the date of decision or opinion rendered by the Committee of
Commissioners under sub-section (2).”

In M/s. Mangalnath Developers and another Vs. Union of India and others the order-in-appeal dated 29.11.2019 was received by the respondents on 18.12.2019. It was held that the limitation period of three months therefore commences from this date.

It was held that it is evident that the limitation period of three months which commenced on 18.12.2019 had expired on 18.03.2020.

Posted on: October 4th, 2020