Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in a batch of appeals filed by the revenue against the order of Tribunal came to the conclusion that prior to insertion of the expression “suo motu” with effect from 1 April 2008 in Section 142(2C) , the assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to extend time for the submission of the report of an auditor appointed under  sub section (2A) of his own accord .As a consequence, it was held that that the assesement which was made under Section 153A, in respect of the assessment in question was barred by limitation. The assessee. Contended that the Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction or authority under section 142(2C), as it stood prior to 1 April 2008 to extend time for the submission of the audit report of the auditor appointed under the provisions of sub section (2A) .In essence, the submission is that the assessing officer was authorised to extend time (Not exceeding 180 days) from the date on which a direction under sub section (2A) was received by the assessee, only on an application made by the assessee and for any good and  sufficient reason .If the assessee made an application, the assessing Officer would no jurisdiction to extend time .Revenue adopted a contrary position submitting that even before 1 April 2008, the jurisdiction of the assessing Officer to extend time for submission of audit  report was not confined to a situation  in which the assessee had made an application for extension. Consequently, the incorporation of a provision for a suo motu exercise of power by the assessing Officer, with effect from 1 April 2008 by the Finance Act 2008 was only intended to remove an  ambiguity  and was clarificatory in nature. Allowing the appeal of the revenue the Court held that, the AO who has fixed the time in the first instance must necessarily, as an incident of the authority to fix time, be entitled to suo motu extend time without an application by the assessee. The amendment by FA 2008 was intended to remove an ambiguity and is clarificatory in nature. There exists a presumption of retrospective application in regard to amendments which are of a procedural nature. Order of High Courts was set aside and matter restored to the file of Appellate Tribunal to decide on merits. (CA No 3211 of 2019, dt. 26.03.2019)