The assessee challenged the order passed under section 148A(d) of the Act, pursuant to the order of the Division Bench but a single judge dismissed it on the ground that it was open to the assessee to raise all contentions in the reopening proceedings, which are to follow under section 148 of the Act. On appeal allowing the appeal, the Court held that the direction issued by the court to the Assessing Officer had clearly set out as to what he was required to do. Pursuant to the liberty granted, the assessee had submitted a detailed reply to the show-cause notice issued under section 148A(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 specifically stating that the permanent account number mentioned in the notice did not belong to him, that the notice was issued to him on a wrong identity, and denying allegations of the loan transactions. Therefore, in terms of the direction issued earlier by the Division Bench of the court, the Assessing Officer should have conducted an enquiry and then passed an order. But the Assessing Officer had abdicated his powers and had verbatim extracted several portions of the earlier order. The Assessing Officer could not have done so for more than one reason. Firstly, the earlier order could not have been referred to as it had been set aside by the Division Bench. Secondly, by passing a non-speaking order under section 148A(d), the Assessing Officer had violated the directions issued by the Division Bench and had indirectly interfered with the administration of justice thereby exposing himself to proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The order passed under section 148A(d) was liable to be quashed. That the reopening of the assessment under section 147 was bad since it was based on certain alleged “potential” cash borrowings and certain alleged “possible” financial transactions. It was based upon information given by the Deputy Director of Income-tax (Investigation) and the report was vague since it stated that possible financial transactions could be deduced and decoded from hard copies obtained from the Deputy Director and was without any particulars. Assuming that material was available such documents should have been made known to the assessee so as to enable him to give an effective reply. In more than one place the authority had used the word “potential” and also the word “probable”. The Assessing Officer did not independently apply his mind to the information furnished by the Deputy Director which he was required to have done while exercising the power to reopen an assessment. Despite directions issued earlier, only copies of two statements had been given to the assessee and the assessee had replied taking note of the veracity of the allegations in those documents which were supplied. The reopening proceedings could not have been done based on assumptions and presumptions. The entire reopening proceedings commencing from issuance of the notice under section 148A(b) and culminating in the order under section 148A(d) dated August 25, 2022 were an abuse of the process of law and therefore quashed. Referred  Sir Kikabhai Premcahnd v.CIT (1953) 24 ITR 506 (SC), wherein the Court held that the State has no power to tax the potential future advantage and all it can tax is income, profits and gains made in the relevant year.  Lucknow Development Authority  v. M.K. Gupta  (1994) 80 Comp Cas 714 (SC)/ AIR 1994 SC 787. (AY. 2018-19)