While considering Civil Appeal the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed its doubt in relation to the period of limitation for filing the written statement or giving version of the opponent as per the provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The question was, whether the said issue was governed by the law laid down by this Court in Dr. J.J. Merchant and Ors. v. Shrinath Chaturvedi  (2002) 6 SCC 635] or Kailash v. Nanhku and Ors.: (2005) 4 SCC 480].

The learned Counsel appearing for the complainant submitted that the view expressed by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) is absolutely just and proper and is on the subject, with which facts of the present case are concerned. The said case also deals with the provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act, whereas case of Kailash (supra) pertains to an Election trial and under a different Act.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the judgment delivered in the case of Kailash (supra) is later in point of time and while considering the said judgment, judgment delivered in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant(supra) had also been considered by this Court.

The court observed that there is one more reason to follow the law laid down in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra). Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) was decided in 2002, whereas Kailash (supra) was decided in 2005. As per law laid down by this Court, while deciding the case of Kailash (supra), this Court ought to have respected the view expressed in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) as the judgment delivered in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) was earlier in point of time. The aforestated legal position cannot be ignored  and therefore, the Hon’ble Court was  of the opinion that the view expressed in Dr. J.J. Merchant (supra) should be followed.

Our aforestated view has also been buttressed by the view expressed by this Court in the case of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. [MANU/SC/1069/2004 : (2005) 2 SCC 673], wherein a question had arisen whether the law laid down by a Bench of a larger strength is binding on a subsequent Bench of lesser or equal strength. After considering a number of judgments, a five-Judge Bench of this Court, finally opined as under:

“12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned senior Counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms:

(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength.

(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted.

(3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i) The abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and

(ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh and Hansoli Devi.

In view of the aforestated clear legal position depicted by a five-Judge Bench, the subject is no more res integra. Not only this three-Judge Bench, but even a Bench of coordinate strength of this Court, which had decided the case of Kailash (supra), was bound by the view taken by a three-Judge Bench in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant(supra).