On writ allowing the petition the Court held that  S.  119(2)(b) only empowers the Board to admit an application or claim for exemption, deduction, refund or any other relief under the Act, after the expiry of the period specified by or under the Act for making such application or claim and deal with the same on merits, in accordance with law. The Circular No. 9 of 2015, dt. 9th June, 2015, empowers the Principal Chief CIT/the Principal CIT to consider the merits of the refund claim while exercising the delegated power under S. 119(2)(b), which would amount to circumvent the provisions of the Act. The PCCIT or the PCIT  has no power to consider the merits of the refund application and what is required to be considered is the merits of the application for condonation of delay only. The order is held to be  unsustainable and  is set aside. The matter is remitted back to the file of the Principal CIT to pass fresh orders on the application of the assessee for condonation of delay in filing the return. While considering the application for condonation of delay, the Principal CIT is not required to go into the merits of the claim of the assessee. Matter is remanded back for reconsideration.   followed, Daisy v. PCIT (2024) 336 CTR  335 (Ker)(HC)   (AY. 2021-22)