Tribunal held that  that the ruling of the Authority for Advance Rulings clearly gave the mandate to the authorities to examine the factual situation in appropriate proceedings because it did not have information or material to show or examine what services were actually rendered by the employees. The Authority on the services rendered by the vice-president was a general non-conclusive finding, rather the power was given to the authorities to examine the transaction and actual conduct of parties. Once the ruling had not given any categorical finding or conclusion, the finding could not have binding effect on the Department or on the Tribunal. The assessee was called upon by the authorities to produce the evidence by way of service agreement with the vice-president but the assessee had not produced it. It was the responsibility of the assessee, in terms of the covenants in the management provision agreement, to make available the executive personnel for marketing and assembly and manufacturing activities. The technology and expertise lies in the technical mind of an employee not in the company and if the key employee having the requisite knowledge, experience and expertise of technology were transferred from one tax jurisdiction to the another tax jurisdiction, it was transfer of technology and not transfer of employees. The execution and implementation of technology in India could be possible even if the person knowing the technology was transferred to India or there was a technological transfer agreement for which the royalties were paid by the Indian counterpart to the assessee. In the garb of sending the technical experts in India, the assessee could not be permitted to say that they were merely employees and the cost was reimbursed by the Indian counterpart to the assessee for the services rendered by such employee. In fact, the technology was transferred through the expert experienced technocrat by the assessee to the Indian counterpart and therefore, the assessee was liable to tax on fees for included services. Tribunal held that  the benefit of article 7(3) of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement was subject to the limitation provided under the domestic law. Section 44D of the Income-tax Act, 1961 clearly provided that for the purpose of computation of income by way of royalty, fees for included services, the assessee was not entitled to any deduction. Once the domestic law prohibited allowing any deduction for the purpose of calculating fees for technical services or fees for included services, then, the same was not an allowable deduction and, therefore, the assessee was liable to be taxed on gross basis rather than on net basis. There was no contradiction between the treaty provision or domestic law, rather the treaty provisions provided by incorporation the applicability of domestic laws for computing the profit of the assessee. The assessee was not entitled to deduction  That the Transfer Pricing Officer for the subsequent years had not computed the profit marking-up 10 per cent. on the amount received by the assessee. Further, the analysis of the Transfer Pricing Officer was not premised on the applicability or otherwise of the method provided under the rules framed under Chapter X of the Act. The authorities had not benchmarked the transactions on the basis of any comparable instances or otherwise. The benchmarking of transactions needed to be done using any of the prescribed methods in rule 10B of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 which in the instant case was admittedly not done by the authorities. ( AY.2004-05, 2008-09 to 2010-11)