Kandathil M. Mammen v. ITSC (2022) 446 ITR 595/ 218 DTR 65 /329 CTR 839 / 289 Taxman 347 (Mad.)(HC) Arun Mammen v. ITSC (2022) 446 ITR 595/ 218 DTR 65 /329 CTR 839 / 289 Taxman 347 (Mad.)(HC) Editorial : Decision of the single judge in Arun Mamen v. ITSC (2021) 438 ITR 378 (Mad)(HC) reversed.

S. 245C : Settlement Commission-Settlement of cases-Full disclosure, co-operation with Commission-Disclosing Foreign Bank Accounts and extent of money available in them and filing affidavit narrating transfer of funds-Offer to be treated as true and full disclosure-Not to be treated as non-Co-operation-Mandatory personal hearing was not granted-Violation of principle of natural justice-Matter remanded to Settlement Commission. [S. 245D, 245D(3), Income-Tax Settlement Commission (Procedure) Rules, 1997, R. 6, 8, 9,9A, 15 Art. 226]

The application was rejected by the Settlement Commission. On writ allowing the  petition the Court held that  the applications had been rejected by an order under section 245D(4) on the ground that the assessees had failed truly and fully to disclose the particulars and that they had not co-operated with the Commission. True and full disclosure of the particulars and the manner of derivation of the additional income are the primordial requisites for an application to be entertained. The assessees had, referring to the applications, annexures and other particulars filed before the Commission, contended that they had truly and fully disclosed all the particulars within their knowledge and also the manner in which the additional income had been derived and that satisfied the requirements under sections 245C and 245D of the Act. Upon perusal of applications and the annexures, prima facie, the assessees had disclosed the fact that they had foreign bank accounts and the extent of money available in them. The assessees had also claimed that all available particulars were being furnished and also filed an affidavit as contemplated under rule 8 explaining that the funds in the Dubai bank account were transferred to another account which amount had been disclosed in annexure 4. All materials placed before the Commission were to be considered according to section 245D(5). If the primary and material facts are disclosed and explanations are offered later, that cannot be treated as a new disclosure. Even then, a conjoint reading of section 245D(5) and rules 8 and 15 makes it clear, all disclosures and documents submitted during the course of enquiry, which do not alter the nature or the original claim in the application have to be treated as true and full disclosure and hence the delay, if any, in filing any statement cannot be treated as non-co-operation. Similarly, when the assessees had claimed that the applications were filed with the available documents and that certain documents were not available with them, unless it was proven with evidence that there had been additional income and that it had been deliberately suppressed, the conduct could not be termed as non-co-operation. It is only when the assessee fails to take any step on account of his deliberate intention to withhold the information, that such conduct can be termed non-co-operation. The casual finding that the assessee had filed returns without disclosing the income deposited in foreign banks and that it was the duty of the assessee to disclose the income was not sustainable. Even if the judge disagreed with the contentions, all the contentions ought to have been discussed and specific findings given, more particularly when allegations of violation of principles of natural justice and the procedures, had been made. Court also observed that there was no provision in the rules by which any time was fixed for the assessee to submit his objections to the report under section 245D(3). When no time is prescribed a reasonable time must be granted to the assessee. Under rule 9, the assessee is granted 15 days’ time under rule 9A to submit his objections to a report, which is a reasonable period. The period of 3 days granted by the Commission was not a reasonable period, more particularly when the Commissioner had been allowed to file a report after the statutory period. Further, according to section 245D(4),it is mandatory to grant a personal hearing after receipt of the report under sub-section (3), which was not granted. Hence, the procedure contemplated under the Act had been violated. The date for personal hearing was to be fixed after the objections were filed by the assessee. Therefore, the order had been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and against the procedure prescribed under the Act. The order was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration after giving both parties opportunity. (AY. 2005-06 to 2012-13)