22. However, the moot point to be noted is that the period of
limitation of three months commences from the date on which the order
sought to be appealed against is communicated and not from the date of
decision of the Committee of Commissioners. This aspect was examined
by this Court in the recent decision of Ganesh Benzoplast Limited Vs.
Union of India, decided on 02.09.2020, wherein it was held as under:-
“27.5. What is crucial from the above is that an appeal to
CESTAT has to be filed within three months from the date of
communication of the order sought to be appealed against with
the period of limitation extendable on sufficient cause being
shown. Therefore what is of relevance is that the limitation of
three months commences from the date on which the order
sought to be appealed against is communicated and not from
the date of decision or opinion rendered by the Committee of
Commissioners under sub-section (2).”
23. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, according to the
respondents themselves the order-in-appeal dated 29.11.2019 was
received by the respondents on 18.12.2019. The limitation period of
three months therefore commences from this date.
23.1. The word ‘month’ is not defined in the Customs Act. We therefore
take recourse to the definition of the said word as provided in the
General Clauses Act, 1897. Section 3 of the said act provides for various
definitions and says that after commencement of the General Clauses
Act, 1897, the meaning given to the expressions contained in various
sub-sections of section 3 would be applicable to all central acts and
regulations unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.
As per sub-section (35) of section 3, the word ‘month’ has been defined
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to mean a month reckoned according to the British calendar.
23.2. In the case of In re: V. S. Metha, AIR 1970 AP 234, Andhra
Pradesh High Court was considering the provisions of section 106 of the
Factories Act, 1948 as per which no court shall take cognizance of any
offence punishable under the said act unless complaint thereof is made
within three months from the date on which the alleged commission of
the offence came to the knowledge of the inspector. In that context,
Andhra Pradesh High Court examined the meaning of the word
‘month’ : whether it would mean 30 days in which case the complaint
should be filed within 90 days from the date of knowledge. After
referring to section 3(35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it was held
that the word ‘month’ would mean a calendar month and by extension
the term ‘three months’ as appearing in section 106 of the Factories Act,
1948 would only mean a period of three calendar months.
23.3. Again, in Bibi Salma Khatoon Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC
3596, Supreme Court dealt with provisions of section 16(3) of the Bihar
Land Reforms Act, 1961 which provided that benefits under the said act
could be availed of if an application is made within three months of the
date of registration of the documents of transfer. Posing the question as
to what was meant by the word ‘month’, Supreme Court held that British
calendar would mean Gregorian calendar. It was held that when the
period prescribed is a calendar month running from any arbitrary date,
the period of one month would expire upon the day in the succeeding
month corresponding to the date upon which the period starts.
23.4. Supreme Court in State of H. P. Vs. M/s. Himachal Techno
Engineers, 2010 AIR SCW 5088 considered the period of limitation
prescribed under sub-section (3) of section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. While section 34 relates to application for setting
aside arbitral award, sub-section (3) thereof prescribes the period of
limitation for such application which is three months. In that context,
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Supreme Court examined the meaning of the word ‘month’ and held that
a month does not refer to a period of 30 days but refers to the actual
period of a calendar month. It was clarified that if the month is April,
June, September or November, the period comprising the month will be
30 days; if the month is January, March, May, July, August, October or
December, the month will comprise of 31 days; but if the month is
February, the period will be 29 days or 28 days depending upon whether
it is a leap year or not. After referring to section 3(35) of the General
Clauses Act, 1897, it was held that the general rule is that the period
ends on the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month
irrespective of some months being longer than the rest. Therefore, it was
held that when the period prescribed is three months (as contrasted from
90 days) from a specific date, the said period would expire in the third
month on the date corresponding to the date upon which the period
starts. As a result, depending on the months, it may mean 90 days or 91
days or 92 days or 89 days.
23.5. Therefore, following the above discussion, it is evident that in the
present case the limitation period of three months which commenced on
18.12.2019 had expired on 18.03.2020.