The Recent Two Verdicts Of Apex Court: Guiding Star For High Courts & Advocates Fraternity

Shri. Akhilesh Kumar Sah, Advocate, has dealt with two landmark judgements of the Supreme Court on the rights, duties and privileges of advocates and explained the entire issue in the proper perspective in the context of the rules of the Bar Council of India and the Code of Ethics

The recent two judgments, one Himalayan Cooperative Group Housing Society vs. Balwan Singh [decided on April 29, 2015] and another, AG vs. Shiv Kumar Yadav & Anr., decided on September 10, 2015] are very important in respect of workings of the High Courts as well as of Advocates.

Here, in brief, some of the points/ decision in these two judgments are given below:
Himalayan Cooperative Group Housing Society vs. Balwan Singh (supra):

1. Lawyers are perceived to be their client’s agents. The law of agency may not strictly apply to the client – lawyer’s relationship as lawyers or agents, lawyers have certain authority and certain duties. Because lawyers are also fiduciaries, their duties will sometimes more demanding than those imposed on other agents. The authority-agency status affords the lawyers to act for the client on the subject matter of the retainer. One of the most basic principles of the lawyer-client relationships is that lawyers owe fiduciary duties to their clients. As part of those duties, lawyers assume all the traditional duties that agents owe their principals and, thus, have to respect the client’s autonomy to make decisions at a minimum, as to the objectives of the representation. Thus, according to generally accepted notions of professional responsibility, lawyers should follow the client’s instructions rather than substitute their judgment for that of the client. The law is now well settled that a lawyer must be specifically authorized to settle and compromise a claim, that merely on the basis of his employment he has no implied or ostensible authority to bind his client to a compromise/ settlement. To put it alternatively that a lawyer by virtue of retention, has the authority to choose the means for achieving the client’s legal goal, while the client has the right to decide on what the goal will be. If the decision in question falls within those that clearly belong to the client, the lawyers conduct in failing to consult the client or in making the decision for the client, is more likely to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

2. The Bar Council of India Rules, 1975 (for short, “the BCI Rules”), in Part VI, Chapter II provide for the ‘Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette’ to be observed by all the advocates under the Advocates Act, 1972 (for short, “the Act, 1972”). In the preamble to Chapter II, the BCI Rules provide as follows:

“An advocate shall, at all times, comport himself in a manner befitting his status as an officer of the Court, a privileged member of the community, and a gentleman, bearing in mind that what may be lawful and moral for a person who is not a member of the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in his non-professional capacity may still be improper for an advocate. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing obligation, an advocate shall fearlessly uphold the interests of his client and in his conduct conform to the rules hereinafter mentioned both in letter and in spirit. The rules hereinafter mentioned contain canons of conduct and etiquette adopted as general guides; yet the specific mention thereof shall not be construed as a denial of the existence of others equally imperative though not specifically mentioned.”

3. The Preamble makes it imperative that an advocate has to conduct himself and his duties in an extremely responsible manner. They must bear in mind that what may be appropriate and lawful for a person who is not a member of the Bar, or for a member of the Bar in his non-professional capacity, may be improper for an advocate in his professional capacity.

4. Section II of the said Chapter II provides for duties of an advocate towards his client. Rules 15 and 19 of the BCI Rules, has relevance to the subject matter and therefore, they are extracted below:

“15. It shall be the duty of an advocate fearlessly to uphold the interests of his client by all fair and honourable means without regard to any unpleasant consequences to himself or any other. He shall defend a person accused of a crime regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, bearing in mind that his loyalty is to the law which requires that no man should be convicted without adequate evidence.

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19. An advocate shall not act on the instructions of any person other than his client or his authorised agent.”

5. While Rule 15 mandates that the advocate must uphold the interest of his clients by fair and honourable means without regard to any unpleasant consequences to himself or any other. Rule 19 prescribes that an advocate shall only act on the instructions of his client or his authorized agent. Further, The BCI Rules in Chapter I of the said Section II provide that the Senior advocates in the matter of their practice of the profession of law mentioned in Section 30 of the Act, 1972 would be subject to certain restrictions. One of such restrictions contained in clause (cc) reads as under:

“(cc) A Senior Advocate shall, however, be free to make concessions or give undertaking in the course of arguments on behalf of his clients on instructions from the junior advocate.”

6. The ‘Code of Ethics’ prescribed by the Bar Council of India, in recognition of the evolution in professional and ethical standards within the legal community, provides for certain rules which contain canons of conduct and etiquette which ought to serve as general guide to the practice and profession. Chapter of the said Code provides for an ‘Advocate’s duty to the Client’. Rule 26 thereunder mandates that an “advocate shall not make any compromise or concession without the proper and specific instructions of his/her client.” It is pertinent to notice that an advocate under the Code expressly includes a group of advocates and a law firm whose partner or associate acts for the client.

7. The BCI Rules make it necessary that despite the specific legal stream of practice, seniority at the Bar or designation of an advocate as a Senior advocate, the ethical duty and the professional standards in so far as making concessions before the Court remain the same. It is expected of the lawyers to obtain necessary instructions from the clients or the authorized agent before making any concession/ statement before the Court for and on behalf of the client.

8. While the BCI Rules and the Act, does not draw any exception to the necessity of an advocate obtaining instructions before making any concession on behalf of the client before the Court, Supreme Court in Periyar & Pareekanni Rubber Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (1991) 4 SCC 195 has noticed the sui generis status and the position of responsibility enjoyed by the Advocate General in regards to the statements made by him before the Courts. The said observation is as under:

“19. …Any concession made by the government pleader in the trial court cannot bind the government as it is obviously, always, unsafe to rely on the wrong or erroneous or wanton concession made by the counsel appearing for the State unless it is in writing on instructions from the responsible officer. Otherwise it would place undue and needless heavy burden on the public exchequer. But the same yardstick cannot be applied when the Advocate General has made a statement across the bar since the Advocate General makes the statement with all responsibility.”

(See: Joginder Singh Wasu vs. State Of Punjab, 1994 SCC (1) 184).

9. The Privy Council in the case of Sourendra Nath Mitra vs. Tarubala Dasi, AIR 1930 PC 158 has made the following two observations which hold relevance to the present discussion:

“Two observations may be added. First, the implied authority of counsel is not an appendage of office, a dignity added by the Courts to the status of barrister or advocate at law. It is implied in the interests of the client, to give the fullest beneficial effect to his employment of the advocate. Secondly, the implied authority can always be countermanded by the express directions of the client. No advocate has actual authority to settle a case against the express instructions of his client. If he considers such express instructions contrary to the interests of his client, his remedy is to return his brief.”

(See: Jamilabai Abdul Kadar vs.. Shankarlal Gulabchand, (1975) 2 SCC 609, Svenska Handelsbanken vs. Indian Charge Chrome Ltd, 1994 SCC (2) 155)

10. It is the solemn duty of an advocate not to transgress the authority conferred him by the client. It is always better to seek appropriate instructions from the client or his authorized agent before making any concession which may, directly or remotely, affect the rightful legal right of the client. The advocate represents the client before the Court and conducts proceedings on behalf of the client. He is the only link between the Court and the client. Therefore his responsibility is onerous. He is expected to follow the instructions of his client rather than substitute his judgment.

11. Generally, admissions of fact made by a counsel is binding upon their principals as long as they are unequivocal; where, however, doubt exists as to a purported admission, the Court should be wary to accept such admissions until and unless the counsel or the advocate is authorised by his principal to make such admissions. Furthermore, a client is not bound by a statement or admission which he or his lawyer was not authorised to make. Lawyer generally has no implied or apparent authority to make an admission or statement which would directly surrender or conclude the substantial legal rights of the client unless such an admission or statement is clearly a proper step in accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer was employed. We hasten to add neither the client nor the Court is bound by the lawyer’s statements or admissions as to matters of law or legal conclusions. Thus, according to generally accepted notions of professional responsibility, lawyers should follow the client’s instructions rather than substitute their judgment for that of the client. The learned hon’ble judges the Supreme Court held that we may add that in some cases, lawyers can make decisions without consulting client. While in others, the decision is reserved for the client. It is often said that the lawyer can make decisions as to tactics without consulting the client, while the client has a right to make decisions that can affect his rights. We do not intend to prolong this discussion. We may conclude by noticing a famous statement of Lord Brougham:

“an advocate, in the discharge of his duty knows but one person in the world and that person is his client.”

12. Hon’ble judges of the Supreme Court in the above case (supra) have observed the case of Jaisingh and Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Anr. (2010) 9 SCC 385, wherein the Court has stated:

“13….., we may notice certain well recognized principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 227of the Constitution of India. Undoubtedly the High Court, under this Article, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts as well as statutory or quasi judicial tribunals, exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with well established principles of law. The High Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction under this Article is, in some ways, wider than the power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognized constraints. It can not be exercised like a `bull in a china shop’, to correct all errors of judgment of a court, or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. The High Court cannot lightly or liberally act as an appellate court and re-appreciate the evidence. Generally, it can not substitute its own conclusions for the conclusions reached by the courts below or the statutory/quasi judicial tribunals. The power to re-appreciate evidence would only be justified in rare and exceptional situations where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. The exercise of such discretionary power would depend on the peculiar facts of each case, with the sole objective of ensuring that there is no miscarriage of justice.”

AG vs. Shiv Kumar Yadav & Anr.(supra):

The issue raised for consideration in the above appeals before Supreme Court was whether recall of witnesses, at the stage when statement of accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“Cr.P.C.”) has been recorded, could be allowed on the plea that the defence counsel was not competent and had not effectively cross-examined the witnesses, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case.

The Supreme Court observed that it can hardly be gainsaid that fair trial is a part of guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Its content has primarily to be determined from the statutory provisions for conduct of trial, though in some matters where statutory provisions may be silent, the court may evolve a principle of law to meet a situation which has not been provided for. It is also true that principle of fair trial has to be kept in mind for interpreting the statutory provisions.

In the name of fair trial, the system cannot be held to ransom. The accused is entitled to be represented by a counsel of his choice, to be provided all relevant documents, to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and to lead evidence in his defence. The object of provision for recall is to reserve the power with the court to prevent any injustice in the conduct of the trial at any stage. The power available with the court to prevent injustice has to be exercised only if the Court, for valid reasons, feels that injustice is caused to a party. Such a finding, with reasons, must be specifically recorded by the court before the power is exercised. It is not possible to lay down precise situations when such power can be exercised. The Legislature in its wisdom has left the power undefined. Thus, the scope of the power has to be considered from case to case.

The interest of justice may suffer if the counsel conducting the trial is physically or mentally unfit on account of any disability. The interest of the society is paramount and instead of trials being conducted again on account of unfitness of the counsel, reform may appear to be necessary so that such a situation does not arise. Perhaps time has come to review the Advocates Act and the relevant Rules to examine the continued fitness of an advocate to conduct a criminal trial on account of advanced age or other mental or physical infirmity, to avoid grievance that an Advocate who conducted trial was unfit or incompetent. This is an aspect which needs to be looked into by the concerned authorities including the Law Commission and the Bar Council of India.

The learned judges of the Supreme Court summarized reasons for disapproving the view of the High Court in the above-mentioned case:

(i) The trial court and the High Court held that the accused had appointed counsel of his choice. He was facing trial in other cases also. The earlier counsel were given due opportunity and had duly conducted cross-examination. They were under no handicap;

(ii) No finding could be recorded that the counsel appointed by the accused were incompetent particularly at back of such counsel;

(iii) Expeditious trial in a heinous offence as is alleged in the present case is in the interests of justice;

(iv) The trial Court as well as the High Court rejected the reasons for recall of the witnesses;

(v) The Court has to keep in mind not only the need for giving fair opportunity to the accused but also the need for ensuring that the victim of the crime is not unduly harassed;

(vi) Mere fact that the accused was in custody and that he will suffer by the delay could be no consideration for allowing recall of witnesses, particularly at the fag end of the trial;

(vii) Mere change of counsel cannot be ground to recall the witnesses;

(viii) There is no basis for holding that any prejudice will be caused to the accused unless the witnesses are recalled;

(ix) The High Court has not rejected the reasons given by the trial court nor given any justification for permitting recall of the witnesses except for making general observations that recall was necessary for ensuring fair trial. This observation is contrary to the reasoning of the High Court in dealing with the grounds for recall, i.e., denial of fair opportunity on account of incompetence of earlier counsel or on account of expeditious proceedings; Crl. Appeal No…… of 2015 Etc. @ SLP (Crl.) No.1899-1900 of 2015 Etc.

(x) There is neither any patent error in the approach adopted by the trial court rejecting the prayer for recall nor any clear injustice if such prayer is not granted.