The objects of the assessee is not for advancement, support or propagation of a particular religion. Worshipping Lord Shiva, Hanumanji, Goddess Durga and maintaining the temple is not advancement, support or propagation of a particular religion. Lord Shiva, Hanumanji & Goddess Durga do not represent any particular religion. They are merely regarded to be the super power of the universe. Further, there is no religion like “Hinduism”. The word “Hindu” is not defined in any of the texts nor in judge made law. The word was given by British administrators to inhabitants of India, who were not Christians, Muslims, Parsis or Jews. Hinduism is a way of life. It consists of a number of communities having different gods who are being worshipped in a different manner, different rituals, different ethical codes. The worship of god is not essential for a person who has adopted Hinduism way of life. Therefore, expenses incurred for worshipping of Lord Shiva, Hanuman, Goddess Durga and for maintenance of temple cannot be regarded to be for religious purpose (Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar 1954 SCJ 335 & T. T. Kuppuswamy Chettiar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1987) 100 LW 1031 followed)

Article 22 (1) provides that items of income of a resident of Switzerland “which are not dealt with” in the foregoing Articles of the DTAA shall be taxable only in that State. The department’s argument that by agreeing to exclude shipping profits from Article 8 as well as Article 7 of DTAA, it has been “dealt with” and, therefore, Article 22(1) shall not apply is not correct. The expression “dealt with” contemplates a positive action and it is necessary that the relevant article must state whether Switzerland or India or both have a right to tax such item of income. Vesting of such jurisdiction must positively and explicitly stated and it cannot be inferred by implication. It is also the view of the Competent Authorities in the letters exchanged that shipping profits would be governed by Article 22 & not s. 44B of the Act (Gearbulk AG 184 Taxman 383 (AAR) not followed)

The scope of proceedings after remand depend on the terms of the remand order. If the appellate authority has set aside the assessment and directed the making of a fresh assessment without imposing any restrictions or limitations, the AO has the same powers in making fresh assessment as he originally had. However, if any restrictions are placed, the AO cannot travel beyond those restrictions. The scope of the remand order has to be determined depending on the subject matter of the appeal and the appellate order read as a whole in its proper context. On facts a perusal of the findings of the CIT (A) shows that he was concerned with the additions made in the original assessment order and it was in the light of the additions made therein, that the assessment was set aside for denovo consideration. This clearly shows that the directions of the CIT (A) for denovo assessment were restricted to the additions made by the AO in the original assessment order and, therefore, the AO had no jurisdiction to look at other issues

S. 115JB (6) does not refer to either s. 10A or s. 10AA but simply provides that the MAT provisions shall not apply to income arising from any business carried on in an unit located in a SEZ. Consequently, despite the fact that an amendment was made in clause (f) of Explanation (1) to s. 115JB(2) to provide that MAT shall apply to units eligible for s. 10A or 10B, a unit which is situated in a SEZ will continue to be exempt from MAT by virtue of s. 115JB(6)

As per Circular No.204 dated 24.7.1976 issued by the CBDT the expression “the sum for which the property might reasonably be expected to let from year to year” used in s. 23(1)(a) means the municipal valuation of the property. In Reclamation Reality, the Tribunal held, after considering the entire law on the subject, including the said Circular & M.V. Sonavala 177 ITR 246 (Bom) that the ALV had to be determined on the basis of either the Municipal rateable value (23(1)(a)) or the actual rent received (23(1)(b)), whichever is the higher. There is no scope for adding the notional interest on the security deposit to the ALV. Judicial propriety and judicial discipline require that this view be followed (CIT vs. Moni Kumar Subba 333 ITR 38 (Del) (FB) noted)

Once the assessee obtained Form No.15-I from the sub-contractors whose contents are not disputed or whose genuineness is not doubted then the assessee is not liable to deduct tax from the payments made to sub-contractors. Once assessee is not liable to deduct tax u/s 194C then disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) cannot be made. The assessee’s breach of the requirement to furnish details to the income tax authority in the prescribed form within prescribed time may attract other consequences but cannot result in a s. 40(a)(ia) disallowance

Once the amount has been disallowed u/s 40(a)(i) for non-deduction of tax, it cannot be subject to TDS provisions again so as to make the assessee liable to pay the tax u/s 201 & interest u/s 201(1A). If the AO’s view was accepted that the assessee was liable to pay the TDS not deducted, then a disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) and 40(a)(ia) cannot be made and those provisions may become otiose