In the present facts it is undisputed that the respondent assessee is in the business of development of real estate projects and letting of property is not the business of the respondent assessee. In both the decisions relied upon by Mr. Pinto i.e. Chennai Properties (supra) and Rayala Corporation (supra), the Supreme Court on facts found that the appellant was in the business of letting out its property on lease and earning rent therefrom. Clearly it is not so in this case.
Though intangible and incorporeal, it has an existence and its situs also has to be pinned down to a particular place with reference to the owner. The situs of the principal place of business, from where the owner of such trademark exercises his right to sell specified goods, under the trademark or enforces his patent rights, which has been obtained by them as a statutory right, is the place where the goods exist.
We share the anguish of the learned counsel. The sequence of events, as set out above, does clearly shows inordinate delay in the special bench case being taken up. It appears that despite specific requisition by the learned Judicial Member and for the reasons best known to the persons concerned, the Registry has not taken care to do the necessary follow up and ensure that the matter is listed for hearing expeditiously, so as to ensure timely disposal of appeals referred to the special benches. The importance of timely disposal of special bench cases and Third Member cases can hardly be over-emphasised. These cases deserve to be taken up on top priority basis. We are of the view that such an inordinate delay in fixation of hearing of special benches cases, particularly when stay is granted, is not only inappropriate and contrary to the scheme of the Act, but it does reduce the efficacy and utility of the mechanism of special benches to deal with important matters on which there is divergence of views by the division benches or which are otherwise of wider ramifications and national importance. Similarly, inordinate delays in disposal of Third Member cases, by itself, makes the expression of dissenting opinion less effective and useful. We, therefore, deem it fit and proper to formulate the following guidelines with a view to ensure the expeditious hearing of cases referred to Special Benches and Third Members
If we allow such oral routine explanation to be tendered and accepted, we do not think that the state of affairs will ever improve. The superiors in the hierarchy have never bothered as to whether the discipline demanded from these officers is indeed in place. Though there is lack of discipline and there is gross insubordination, still, the acts of omission and commission are overlooked
The assessee can be taxed only on the gain which is oozing out from the sale consideration, thus, no adverse inference can be drawn while invoking the provision of section 50C of the Act. No evidence has been produced by the Revenue at any stage that the assessee actually received the value which was adopted by the stamp valuation authority.
I reckon the petitioner has exercised on time its statutory remedy of filing an appeal. It appears that it has also filed a stay petition. Procedural fairness demands that the authorities may wait, before taking further steps, until the appellate authority decides on the stay petition
We cannot, and the law does not permit us, to hold that HDFC Ltd. is the beneficial owner of 22.64% of the shares in the Petitioner by clubbing the share holding of HDFC Investments Ltd. with the shareholding of HDFC Ltd. If we were to do this, we would be effectively holding that HDFC Ltd., being a shareholder of HDFC Investments Ltd., is the beneficial owner of the shares which HDFC Investments Ltd. holds in the Petitioner. This, in law, is clearly impermissible because a shareholder of a company can never have any beneficial interest in the assets (movable or immovable) of that company. In the present case, if we were to accept the contention of the Revenue, it would mean that HDFC Ltd. is the beneficial owner of the shares which HDFC Investments Ltd. holds in the Petitioner. This would be contrary to all canons of Company Law. It is well settled that a shareholder of a company can never be construed either the legal or beneficial owner of the properties and assets of the company in which it holds the shares. This being the position in law, we find that the Revenue is incorrect in trying to club the shareholding of HDFC Investments Ltd. in the Petitioner along with the shareholding of HDFC Ltd. in the Petitioner, to cross the threshold of 20% as required in explanation (a) to section 40A(2)(b). We are supported in the view that we take by a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bacha F. Guzdar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [(1955) 27 ITR 1].
The reopening of assessment u/s 147 on the basis of information in the form of observations of ITAT is on sound footing and which constitutes a tangible material for the purpose of reopening as the assessee did not file her return of income as required u/s 139(1) of the Act explaining the source of investment. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the reopening of assessment is on sound basis and there is no merits in the arguments of the assessee that the AO has reopened the assessment without any tangible material which suggests escapement of income within the meaning of section 147 of the Act
It is an admitted fact that during the course of search nothing adverse was found from the premises of the assessee regarding the purchases made from the four parties concerned. Only during post search enquiry it was found that those four parties are not available at the given address. However, it is a fact that the payments have been made through banking channel and the assessee had substantiated the purchases by providing documents such as purchase invoices, copy of the ledger accounts, evidences for having made payments through banking channels, C Form issued to the suppliers, copy of VAT return duly reflecting the said purchases, etc