Month: September 2016

Archive for September, 2016


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DATE: January 15, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 24, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 80P(2)(d): Interest and dividend earned by a co-op society on investments with other co-operative societies is eligible for deduction. The question whether the co-op society is engaged in the business of banking for providing credit facilities to its members and the head under which the income is assessable is not material (Totagar’s Co-op Society 322 ITR 283 (SC) distinguished)

The Supreme Court in the case of Totagar’s Co-operative Sale Society Ltd held that a society has surplus funds which are invested in short term deposits where the society is engaged in the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members in that case the said income from short term deposits shall be treated and assessed as income from other sources and deduction u/s 80(P)(2)(a)(i) would not be available meaning thereby that deduction u/s 80(P)(2)(a)(i) is available only in respect of income which is assessable as business income and not as income from other sources. Whereas in distinction to this , the provisions of section 80(P)(2)(d) of the Act provides for deduction in respect of income of a coop society by way of interest or dividend from its investments with other coop society if such income is included in the gross total income of the such coop society

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DATE: August 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 24, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 10B: Export of Legal Services by a law firm to its overseas clients by transfer of customized electronic data constitutes export of "computer software" as per Explanation 2 to s. 10B and is eligible for deduction

The assessee has, by use of the legal database compiled by it over a period of more than 60 years (firm is in practice of law since 1943), earned reasonable amount of valuable foreign exchange for our country, thereby fulfilling the most core intention of the law for introduction of EOU Scheme under EXIM Policy and Section 10B of the Act. The assessee has also fulfilled the specific requirements of Section 10B of the Act, by providing Legal Services using Legal database

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DATE: August 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1996-97
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Refundable deposits received by a housing company for allotment of flats and future maintenance is business income. However, share capital received for allotment of flats is a capital receipt and not income. The principles of mutuality does not apply to such transactions

The Karnataka High Court held, following Shree Nirmal Commercial vs. CIT 193 ITR 694 (Bom) and 213 ITR 361 (FB), that share capital and refundable deposits received by a housing company from its shareholders in consideration of allotting area to them is assessable as business profits. It was also held that the principles of mutuality are not applicable. It was also held that deposits received from the shareholders for future maintenance is assessable as business income. On appeal to the Supreme Court HELD

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DATE: August 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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Transfer Pricing: The assessee is obliged to carry out a bench-marking exercise with independent comparables and prove that its transactions with AEs are at arms length. Mere fact that the transaction is approved by the RBI and Govt is not sufficient

The RBI approval/FIPB approval is not determinative of ALP and cannot be considered to be a valid CUP. Automatic route under which FIPB approvals or RBI approvals are granted have been devised for the “ease of doing business”. These approvals emanate from other legislation or policy and are not in relation to determination of Arm’s Length Price. The purpose of the RBI approval/FIPB approval is entirely different and cannot be equated with the arm’s length principle. The approvals of rates given by the DIPP and the RBI are for different purposes, like for promotion of industries, management of foreign exchange etc. and it varies in accordance with the business practices prevalent at different times which are clear from the RBI approvals themselves. Going by the relevant TP provisions as enshrined under the Act and relevant Rules, it is mandatory that the appellant has to independently benchmark its international transaction with independent comparables so as to arrive at arm’s length price

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DATE: September 14, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 271B: Penalty for delay in furnishing tax audit report should not be imposed if there is no mala fide reason for the delay. Dispute with auditor is a reasonable cause u/s 273B for the delay in furnishing the tax audit report

The delay made by the assessee firm in filing the return of income is for the first time i.e. in A.Y. 2008-09 which was on account of dispute of audit fee between the assessee and the auditor. Hence, it appears that the dispute with the statutory auditor is a reasonable cause within the meaning of Section 273B as held in the case of Kripa Industries (I) Ltd. vs. JCIT by ITAT Pune Bench (2002) 76 TTJ 502 (Pune) that there is no mala fide reason for not obtaining the accounts audited in time and penalty u/s 271B should not be imposed

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DATE: August 31, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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S. 153A: Even in a case where only a s. 143(1) assessment is made, additions cannot be made without the backing of incriminating material if the s. 143(1) assessment has not abated

The making of an addition in an assessment under section 153A of the Act, without the backing of incriminating material, is unsustainable even in a case where the original assessment on the date of search stood completed under section 143(1) of the Act, thereby resulting in non-abatement of such assessment in terms of the Second Proviso to section 153A(1) of the Act

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DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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S. 234E: Prior to the amendment to s. 200A w.e.f. 01.06.2015, the fee for default in filing TDS statements cannot be recovered from the assessee-deductor

The issue is whether such a levy could be effected in the course of intimation under section 200A. The answer is clearly in negative. No other provision enabling a demand in respect of this levy has been pointed out to us and it is thus an admitted position that in the absence of the enabling provision under section 200A, no such levy could be effected. As intimation under section 200A, raising a demand or directing a refund to the tax deductor, can only be passed within one year from he end of the financial year within which the related TDS statement is filed, and as the related TDS statement was filed on 19th February 2014, such a levy could only have been made at best within 31st March 2015. That time has already elapsed and the defect is thus not curable even at this stage

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DATE: August 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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Entire law on whether consideration for alienation of rights under a "Call Option agreement" for shares is taxable as "capital gains" or as "income from other sources" in the context of the India-Singapore DTAA explained

In common parlance, a call option is reckoned as a contract in which the holder (buyer) has the right (but not an obligation) to buy a specified quantity of a security/shares at a specified price (strike price) within a fixed period of time. For the writer (seller) of a call option, it represents an obligation to sell the underlying security at the strike price if the option is exercised. The call option writer is paid a premium for taking on the risk associated with the obligation. Here in the present case, there is very peculiar agreement/ arrangement, where the strike price has been mentioned as US $ 1 and the fixed period of time for exercising the call option has been fixed for 150 years. This factum itself means that the call option in the shares have been given for perpetuity. Not only that, an irrevocable power of attorney has also been executed in favour of the ING Bank in respect of all the shares in PHIL confirming that, assessee will not at any time purport to revoke the same, which inter-alia shows that assessee has alienated a substantive and valuable rights as an owner of the shares in perpetuity, albeit without dejure alienating the shares itself

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DATE: July 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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The fact that the Finance Minster announced a concession in Parliament does not entitle the assessee to relief if the same is not set out in the Finance Act

The whole thrust of the appellant is that the proposals of the Finance Minister were duly approved by the Parliament. No doubt, the appellant has placed before this Court the proposals of the Finance Minister which discloses the intention of the Government but there is no material placed before us to demonstrate that the budget proposals are duly accepted by the Parliament. We are unable to agree with the argument advanced by the appellant for the reason that he is unable to make note of the difference between a proposal moved before the Parliament and a statutory provision enacted by the Parliament, because the process of Taxation involves various considerations and criteria

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DATE: August 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1996-97
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CITATION:
S. 54F(4): Failure to deposit the amount of consideration not utilized towards the purchase of new flat in the specified bank account before the due date of filing return of Income u/s 139(1) is fatal to the claim for exemption. The fact that the entire amount has been paid to the developer/builder before the last date to file the ROI is irrelevant. Contrary view in K. Ramchandra Rao 277 CTR 0522 (Kar) is sub-silentio and is not good law

The sale of capital asset took place on 29th April, 1995 for a consideration of Rs.85.33 lakhs. The agreement for purchase of construction of flat for consideration of Rs.69.90 lakhs was entered into by the appellant on 16th July, 1996. An amount of Rs.35 lakhs were utilized by the Appellant in purchase of flat before the return of income was filed on 4th November, 1996 under Section 139 of the Act. However, the mandate under sub Section (4) of Section 54F of the Act is that the amount not utilized towards the purchase of the flat has to be deposited before the due date of filing return of Income under Section 139(1) of the Act in the specified bank account. In this case admittedly the entire amount of capital gains on sale of asset which is not utilized has not been deposited in a specified bank account before due date of filing of return under Section 139(1) of the Act. Therefore where the amounts of capital gains is utilized before filing of the return of income in purchase / construction of a residential house, then the benefit of exemption under Section 54F of the Act is available. Before us it is an undisputed position that except Rs.35 lakhs, the balance of the amounts subject to capital gains tax has not been utilized before date of furnishing of return of income i.e. 4th November, 1996 under Section 139 of the Act. Therefore, on plain interpretation of Section 54F of the Act, it appears that the impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be faulted