Year: 2013

Archive for 2013


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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 14, 2013 (Date of publication)
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S. 10A/10B (when an “exemption” provision): Unabsorbed depreciation (and business loss) of same (s. 10A/10B) unit brought forward from earlier years have to be set off against the profits before computing exempt profits

The assessee set up a 100% EOU in AY 1988-89. For want of profits it did not claim benefits u/s 10B in AYs 1988-89 to 1990-91. From AY 1992-93 it claimed the said benefits for a connective period of 5 years. In AY 1994-95, the assessee computed the profits of the EOU without adjusting the brought forward unabsorbed depreciation of AY 1988-89. It claimed that as s. 10B conferred “exemption” for the profits of the EOU, the said brought forward depreciation could not be set-off from the profits of the EOU but was available to be set-off against income from other sources. It was also claimed that the profits had to be computed on a “commercial” basis. The AO accepted the claim though the CIT revised his order u/s 263 and directed that the exemption be computed after set-off. On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal reversed the CIT. On appeal by the department, the High Court (CIT vs. Himatasingike Seide Ltd 286 ITR 255 (Kar)) reversed the Tribunal and held that the brought forward depreciation had to be adjusted against the profits of the EOU before computing the exemption allowable u/s 10B. On appeal by the assessee to the Supreme Court HELD dismissing the appeal

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 11, 2013 (Date of publication)
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Non-residents are eligible for the benefit of 10% tax rate on long-term capital gains under the Proviso to s. 112. The AAR should avoid giving conflicting rulings

It is not possible to decipher the exact legislative purpose behind the proviso to s. 112(1) in a categorical and unambiguous manner. However, if one squarely focuses on the words used in the proviso and interprets them without extracting or subtracting any phrase or word, a non-resident assessee is entitled to benefit of the said provision. The proviso to s. 112(1) does not state that an assessee, who avails benefits of the first proviso to s. 48, is not entitled to benefit of lower rate of tax @ 10%. The said benefit cannot be denied because the second proviso to s. 48 is not applicable. In case the Legislature wanted to deny the said benefit where the assessee had taken benefit of the first proviso to s. 48, it was easy and this would have been specifically stipulated. The fact that by this interpretation, a non-resident becomes entitled to double deductions by way of computation of gains in foreign currency under the first proviso to s. 48 and then the benefit of lower rate of tax under the proviso to s. 112(1) is no reason to interpret the proviso differently. Further, as the AAR had taken a view in Timkin France SAS which was followed in several cases over several years, it ought not to have taken an opposite view and brought about uncertainty in understanding the effect of the proviso to s. 112(1). There should be consistency and uniformity in interpretation of provisions as uncertainties can disable and harm governance of tax laws. The AAR should follow its’ earlier view, unless there are strong grounds and reasons to take a contrary view.

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 9, 2013 (Date of publication)
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(i) Q whether income has accrued must be considered from a realistic & practical angle (ii) If Dept has accepted adverse verdict in some years, it cannot be allowed to challenge verdict in other years (iii) disputes as to the year of taxability with no/ minor tax effect should not be raised by Dept

Three tests have been laid down by various decisions of the Supreme Court to determine when income can be said to have accrued: (a) whether the income is real or hypothetical; (b) whether there is a corresponding liability of the other party to pay the amount to the assessee & (c) the probability or improbability of realisation of the income by the assessee has to be considered from a realistic and practical point of view. Applying these tests, on facts, even if it is assumed that the assessee was entitled to the benefits under the advance licences as well as under the duty entitlement pass book, there was no corresponding liability on the customs authorities to pass on the benefit of duty free imports to the assessee until the goods are actually imported and made available for clearance. The benefits represent, at best, a hypothetical income which may or may not materialise and its money value is therefore not the income of the assessee. Also, from a realistic and practical point of view (the assessee may not have made imports), no real income accrued to the assessee in the year of exports and s. 28(iv) would be inapplicable. Essentially, the AO is required to be pragmatic and not pedantic (Shoorji Vallabhdas 46 ITR 144 (SC), Morvi Industries 82 ITR 835 (SC) & Godhra Electricity Co 225 ITR 746 (SC) followed)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 3, 2013 (Date of publication)
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S. 234D does not apply to an assessment year commencing pre 1.6.2003 if the assessment order is passed prior to that date

Explanation 2 to s. 234D makes it clear that the provisions of the section shall not apply to an assessment year commencing before the 1st day of June, 2003 if the proceedings in respect of such assessment year is completed before the said date. As the assessment order in the present case was passed before 1.6.2003, the question of retrospectivity of s. 234D does not arise.

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 3, 2013 (Date of publication)
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TDS Credit must be given even if TDS Certificate is not available/ entry is not shown in Form 26AS

The AO is not justified in denying credit for TDS on the ground that the TDS is not reflected in the computer generated Form 26AS. In Yashpal Sahwney 293 ITR 539the Bombay High Court has noted the difficulty faced by taxpayers in the matter of credit of TDS and held that even if the deductor had not issued a TDS certificate, still the claim of the assessee has to be considered on the basis of the evidence produced for deduction of tax at source. The Revenue is empowered to recover tax from the person responsible if he had not deducted tax at source or after deducting failed to deposit with Central Government. The Delhi High Court has in Court On Its Own Motion Vs. CIT 352 ITR 273 directed the department to ensure that credit is given to the assessee even where the deductor had failed to upload the correct details in Form 26AS on the basis of evidence produced before the department. Therefore, the department is required to give credit for TDS once valid TDS certificate had been produced or even where the deductor had not issued TDS certificates on the basis of evidence produced by assessee regarding deduction of tax at source and on the basis of indemnity bond.

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 1, 2013 (Date of publication)
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S. 244A: The department is not obliged to pay interest on interest as that is not provided in the law. Sandvik Asia 280 ITR 643 (SC) awarded compensation for inordinate delay on its facts

The judgment in Sandvik Asia 280 ITR 643 (SC) has been misquoted and misinterpreted by the assessees and also by the Revenue. Their view that in Sandvik case this Court had directed the Revenue to pay interest on the statutory interest in case of delay in the payment and that the Revenue is obliged to pay an interest on interest in the event of its failure to refund the interest payable within the statutory period is not correct. In Sandvik Asia, the Court was considering the issue whether an assessee who is made to wait for refund of interest for decades be compensated for the great prejudice caused to it due to the delay in its payment after the lapse of statutory period. In the facts of that case, this Court came to the conclusion that there was an inordinate delay on the part of the Revenue in refunding certain amount which included the statutory interest and therefore, directed the Revenue to pay compensation for the same but not an interest on interest. S. 244A provides for interest on refunds under various contingencies. It is clarified that it is only that interest provided for under the statute which may be claimed by an assessee from the Revenue and no other interest on such statutory interest.

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 1, 2013 (Date of publication)
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S. 40(a)(ia) TDS: Amendment by Finance Act 2010 permitting TDS payment till due date of ROI is retrospective. Bharati Shipyard 132 ITD 53 (Mum)(SB) disapproved

The intention behind s. 40(a)(ia) is to ensure that TDS is deducted and paid. The object of introduction of s. 40(a)(ia) is to ensure that TDS provisions are scrupulously implemented without default in order to augment recoveries. It is not to penalise an assessee when payment has been made within the time stated. Failure to deduct TDS or deposit TDS results in loss of revenue and may deprive the Government of the tax due and payable. The provision should be interpreted in a fair, just and equitable manner. It should not be interpreted in a manner which results in injustice and creates tax liabilities when TDS has been deposited/ paid and the respondent who is following cash system of accountancy has made actual payment to the third party for services rendered. Also, s. 40(a)(ia), prior to the insertion of the proviso by the Finance Act 2010, was not free from interpretative difficulties and problems. The amended provisions are clear and free from any ambiguity and doubt and will help curtail litigation. The amended provision clearly support the view that the expression “said due date” used in clause A of proviso to the un-amended section refers to the time specified in s. 139(1) of the Act. The amended s. 40(a)(ia) expands and further liberalises the statue when it stipulates that deductions made in the first eleven months of the previous year but paid before the due date of filing of the return, will constitute sufficient compliance. Consequently, the proviso to s. 40(a)(ia) must be treated as retrospective in operation (Virgin Creations referred/ followed; Bharati Shipyard 132 ITD 53 (Mum)(SB) disapproved)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 20, 2013 (Date of publication)
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S. 50B: Transfer of assets via amalgamation without monetary consideration is not a “slump sale”

S. 2(42C) defines a ‘slump sale’ to mean the transfer of one or more undertakings as a result of the sale for a lump sum consideration without values being assigned to the individual assets and liabilities in such sales. A plain reading of s. 2(42C) makes it clear that to qualify as a slump sale, two conditions have to be satisfied viz., (i) there must be transfer of one or more undertakings as a result of sale and (ii) the sale should be for a lump sum consideration without values being assigned to the individual assets and liabilities. The presence of money consideration is an essential element to a transaction of sale. If the consideration is not money but some other valuable consideration it may be an exchange or barter but not a sale. In the present case, as no monetary consideration was received by the assessee for transfer of the assets and liabilities of the manufacturing division to Novapan Industries Ltd, the transaction is not a “slump sale” and does not attract s. 50B (Motors and General Stores 66 ITR 692 (SC), R.R. Ramakrishna Pillai 66 ITR 725 & Avaya Global Connect 26 SOT 397 (Mum) followed)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 20, 2013 (Date of publication)
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Occupancy rights in flat conferred by Articles of Association confer ownership rights in flat. Restriction in Articles on transferability is void

The right, title & interest over a flat conveyed is a species of property, whether that right has accrued under the provisions of the Articles of Association of a Company or through the bye-laws of a Cooperative Society. Flat owners’ right to dispose of its flat is also well recognized, and one can sell, donate, leave by will or let out or hypothecate his right. By purchasing the flat, the purchaser, over and above his species of right over the flat, will also have undivided interest in the common areas and facilities, in the percentage as prescribed. Flat owners will also have the right to use the common areas and facilities in accordance with the purpose for which they are intended. It is too late in the day to contend that flat owners cannot sell, let, hypothecate or mortgage their flat for availing of loan without permission of the builder, Society or the Company. Neither the Companies Act nor any other statute make any provision prohibiting the transfer of species of interest to third parties or to avail of loan for the flat owners’ benefit. A legal bar on the saleability or transferability of such a species of interest will create chaos and confusion. The right or interest to occupy any such flat is a species of property and hence has a stamp of transferability. The Articles of Association of a Company have no force of a Statute and the right of the shareholder to mortgage could not have been restricted by the Articles of Association (Ramesh Himatlal Shah Vs. Harsukh Jadhavji Joshi (1975) 2 SCC 105 followed).

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 18, 2013 (Date of publication)
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S. 147/ 151: Merely writing “approved” in the sanction form without recording satisfaction renders the reopening void

S. 147 and 148 are a charter to the Revenue to reopen earlier assessments and are, therefore protected by safeguards against unnecessary harassment of the assessee. They are sword for the Revenue and shield for the assessee. S. 151 guards that the sword of S. 147 may not be used unless a superior officer is satisfied that the AO has good and adequate reasons to invoke the provisions of S. 147. The superior authority has to examine the reasons, material or grounds and to judge whether they are sufficient and adequate to the formation of the necessary belief on the part of the assessing officer. If, after applying his mind and also recording his reasons, howsoever briefly, the Commissioner is of the opinion that the AO’s belief is well reasoned and bona fide, he is to accord his sanction to the issue of notice u/s 148 of the Act. In the instant case, we find from the perusal of the order sheet which is on record, the Commissioner has simply put “approved” and signed the report thereby giving sanction to the AO. Nowhere the Commissioner has recorded a satisfaction note not even in brief. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Commissioner has accorded sanction after applying his mind and after recording his satisfaction (Chhugamal Rajpal 79 ITR 603 (SC) & United Electrical Co 258 ITR 317 (Del) followed)