Where an assessee is assessed to a loss, it may be said either that he has been assessed to a nil income and is permitted to carry forward the loss or that he is assessed to the loss figure. Whichever way one looks at it the assessed income is “less” than Rs. I lakh and s. 253 (a) would apply. If, on the other hand, one takes the view that to an assessee assessed to a loss clauses (a) or (b) or (c) of s. 253 cannot apply as they postulate assessment out of a positive figure than, it is only clause (d) which applies and, even so, the fee payable would be Rs.500/.
A debenture, when issued, is a loan. The fact that it is convertible does not militate against it being a loan. In accordance with India Cement 60 ITR 52 (SC), expenditure on a loan is always revenue in nature even if the loan is taken for capital purposes. Consequently, the expenditure on convertible debentures is admissible as revenue expenditure.
The fixing of the cut-off date u/s 245 D (4A) (1), the abatement of proceedings u/s 245HA (1)(iv) & the making available of confidential information u/s 245HA (3) for no fault of the applicant are ultra vires the Constitution. In order to save these provisions from being struck down as being unconstitutional, they will have to be read down as applying only to cases where the Settlement Commission is unable to pass an order on or before 31.3.2008 for any reason attributable on the part of the applicant. The expression “reasons attributable” should be reasonably construed. If in the writ petition, the applicant has urged that it was not responsible for the non-disposal of the application and the same is not denied by the revenue, the circumstance should be considered in favour of the applicant;
It could not be the intention of the legislature that the benefit of s. 10 (10C) should be restricted in the case of employees who retired before 1.4.2004 only to the sum actually received while employees who retired subsequently will get the benefit also in respect of amounts payable in subsequent financial years. Accordingly, the amendment is was clarificatory and curative in nature and applies even to employees who retired prior to 1.4.2004 and received VRS in installments.
The Income-tax Act is a special law. The nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. The scheme of the Income-tax Act supports the conclusion that the time limit prescribed u/s 260A to file an appeal before the High Court is absolute and unextendable by court u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and the limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of s. 5 of the Limitation Act. Since the appeals were filed beyond the prescribed period of 120 days they had to be dismissed on the ground of limitation.
The Revenue’s submission that prima facie satisfaction of the AO need not be reflected at the stage of initiation is not acceptable. The presence of prima facie satisfaction for initiation of penalty proceedings was and remains a jurisdictional fact which cannot be wished away even post amendment. If an interpretation such as the one proposed by the Revenue is accepted then s. 271 (1B) will fall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution as it will then be impregnated with the vice of arbitrariness. The AO would then be in a position to pick a case for initiation of penalty merely because there is an addition or disallowance without arriving at a prima facie satisfaction with respect to infraction of s. 271 (1)(c).
The effect of Vinod Solanki vs. UOI (233) ELT 157 (S.C.) is that in criminal or quasi criminal proceedings, a person accused of commission of offence under FERA has not to prove to the hilt that confession has been obtained from him by inducement or threat by the person in authority. However, when confession had been retracted, the Court must bear in mind the attending circumstances and other relevant factors to come to conclusion whether the confession was voluntary and was not obtained by any inducement, threat or force. At the same time, mere retraction of the confession may not be sufficient to make confessional statement irrelevant for the purpose of quasi criminal proceedings and the Court is obligated to take into consideration the pros and cons of confession and retraction made by the accused.
Sale & Lease back transactions are not a “sham” The assessee, a State Electricity Board, sold energy saving devices on which 100% depreciation was permitted and took the same assets on lease and claimed a deduction for the lease rent.…
A Co-op housing society is a mutual association and even transfer fees received from transferee members is exempt on the ground of mutuality because the fee can be appropriated only if the transferee is admitted to membership. If the transferee is not admitted, the moneys will have to be refunded. However, if an amount is received more than what is chargeable under the Bye-laws or Government directions, the society is bound to repay the same and if it retains the same it will be in the nature of profit-making and that amount will be chargeable to tax.
The judgment in Dharmendra Textile cannot be read as laying down that in every case where particulars of income are inaccurate, penalty must follow. What has been laid down is that qualitative difference between criminal liability u/s 276C and penalty u/s 271(1) ( c) had to be kept in mind and approach adopted to the trial of a criminal case need not be adopted while considering the levy of penalty. Even so, the concept of penalty has not undergone change by virtue of the said judgment. Penalty is imposed only when there is some element of deliberate default and not a mere mistake. In view of the finding that the furnishing of inaccurate particulars was simply a mistake and not a deliberate attempt to evade tax, penalty was not leviable.