A person accused of commission of an offence is not expected to prove to the hilt that confession had been obtained from him by any inducement, threat or promise by a person in authority. The burden is on the prosecution to show that the confession is voluntary in nature and not obtained as an outcome of threat, etc. if the same is to be relied upon solely for the purpose of securing a conviction. With a view to arrive at a finding as regards the voluntary nature of statement or otherwise of a confession which has since been retracted, the Court must bear in mind the attending circumstances which would include the time of retraction, the nature thereof, the manner in which such retraction has been made and other relevant factors. Law does not say that the accused has to prove that retraction of confession made by him was because of threat, coercion, etc. but the requirement is that it may appear to the court as such
Where the assessee-employer allowed the employees the benefit of deduction under section 10 (5) of the Act without collecting evidence to show that its employees had actually utilized the amounts paid towards Leave Travel Concessions/Conveyance Allowance and the question arose whether the employer could be said to have wrongly allowed the deduction, HELD:
As the beneficiary of exemption under Section 10(5) is an individual employee and there is no circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) requiring the employer under Section 192 to collect and examine the supporting evidence to the Declaration to be submitted by an employees, the employer was not at fault.
In view of the assessee submitting copies of the agreements (which had not been submitted earlier before the AO or the High Court) and the law laid down in Management of Express Newspapers vs. Workers AIR 1963 SC 569 that the High Court should ordinarily not embark upon deciding questions of fact which require appreciation of evidence, the question in regard to “the jurisdictional issue” should be decided by the AO as a “preliminary issue” and the assessee shall be entitled to question the decision of the AO on that preliminary issue before the High Court. The question of law “to that extent” remains open.
In CIT vs. Suresh N. Gupta 297 ITR 322, the Supreme Court held that the Provio to s. 113 (which imposes surcharge on block assessments), though inserted only with effect from 1.6.2002, was applicable to searches conducted prior to that date as it was ‘clarificatory’ and ‘curative’ in nature.
HELD, however, by another Division bench that as the said proviso was introduced with effect from 1.6.2002, i.e. with prospective effect “we are of the opinion that keeping in view the principles of law that the taxing statute should be construed strictly and a statute, ordinarily, should not be held to have any retrospective effect, it is necessary that the matter be considered by a larger Bench”.
In CCE vs. Punjab Fibres Ltd (223) E.L.T. 337 the Supreme Court held that the High Court has no power to condone delay in filing of a Reference Application u/s 35H(1) of the Excise Act on the ground that where the statute specifies a limitation period, s. 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply. There are doubts about the correctness of this judgment because the power of the High Court to condone delay cannot be circumscribed by the statute. Accordingly, the issue should be referred to a Full Bench.
On facts, though all the members of the collegium including the then Chief Justice of India opposed the appointment of respondent No.2 (Justice Ashok Kumar) as a permanent Judge his term as additional judge was extended from time to time apparently at the behest of the Government. “the then Chief Justice should have stuck to the view expressed by the collegium and should not have been swayed by the views of the government to recommend extension of the term .. as it amounts to surrender of primacy by jugglery of words”. However, the belated challenge to the extensions “cannot put the clock back”.
While the arrears of the State have priority over private debts owed to ordinary or unsecured creditors, this priority does not extend over secured creditors (subject to statutory exception). The fact that the tax arrears are recoverable as arrears of land revenue makes no difference to this principle of common law.
An allotment of shares is a “creation” of shares and not a “transfer” of shares. There is a vital difference between the two. An “allotment” is the creation of shares by appropriation out of the unappropriated share capital to a particular person. A share is a chose in action. A chose in action implies existence of some person entitled to the rights in action in-contradistinction from rights in possession. There is a difference between issue of a share to a subscriber and the purchase of a share from an existing shareholder. The first case is that of creation whereas the second case is that of transfer of chose in action. An allotment is not a transfer and does not attract s. 4(1)(a) of the Gift-tax Act.
The word `production’ or `produce’ when used in juxtaposition with the word `manufacture’ takes in bringing into existence new goods by a process, which may or may not amount to manufacture. It also takes in all the byproducts, intermediate products and residual products, which emerge in the course of manufacture of goods. The conversion of Jumbo rolls of photographic films into small flats and rolls in the desired sizes amounts to manufacture/production for purposes of ss. 32AB, 80HH and 80I.
While merely because in some cases revenue has not preferred an appeal that does not operate as a bar for the revenue to prefer an appeal in another case where there is just cause for doing so or it is in public interest to do so or for a pronouncement by the higher court when divergent views are expressed by the different High Courts, this is NOT SO in a case where the fact situation in all the assessment years is the same. Where the fact situation is the same, the revenue cannot prefer an appeal if they have not done so in the other cases.