Search Results For: Piyush Kaushik


ITO vs. Aditya Narain Verma (HUF) (ITAT Delhi)

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DATE: June 7, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 50C: Failure by the AO to refer the valuation of the capital asset to a valuation officer instead of adopting the value taken by the stamp duty authorities is a fatal error and the assessment order has to be annulled. The matter cannot be set aside to the AO for a second chance. The power of the ITAT to set aside cannot be exercised so as to allow the AO to cover up the deficiencies in his case

When the assessee in the present case had claimed before Assessing Officer that the value adopted or assessed by the stamp valuation authority under sub section (1) exceeds the fair market value of the property as on the date of transfer, the Assessing Officer should have referred the valuation of the capital asset to a valuation officer instead of adopting the value taken by the state authority for the purpose of stamp duty. The very purpose of the Legislature behind the provisions laid down under sub section (2) to section 50C of the Act is that a valuation officer is an expert of the subject for such valuation and is certainly in a better position than the Assessing Officer to determine the valuation. Thus, non-compliance of the provisions laid down under sub section (2) by the Assessing Officer cannot be held valid and justified

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Pr CIT vs. Meetu Gutgutia (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: May 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2000-01 to 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 153A: Entire law explained on whether concluded assessments can be reopened u/s 153A even in the absence of incriminating material found during the search in the light of the apparently conflicting verdicts in CIT vs. Kabul Chawla 380 ITR 573 (Del) and Dayawanti Gupta v. CIT 390 ITR 496 (Del)

Section 153A of the Act is titled “Assessment in case of search or requisition”. It is connected to Section 132 which deals with ‘search and seizure’. Both these provisions, therefore, have to be read together. Section 153A is indeed an extremely potent power which enables the Revenue to re-open at least six years of assessments earlier to the year of search. It is not to be exercised lightly. It is only if during the course of search under Section 132 incriminating material justifying the re-opening of the assessments for six previous years is found that the invocation of Section 153A qua each of the AYs would be justified. The question whether unearthing of incriminating material relating to any one of the AYs could justify the re-opening of the assessment for all the earlier AYs was considered both in CIT v. Anil Kumar Bhatia and CIT v. Chetan Das Lachman Das. Incidentally, both these decisions were discussed threadbare in the decision of this Court in Kabul Chawla 380 ITR 573 (Del)

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Pr. CIT vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (P&H High Court)

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DATE: December 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 194C vs. 194J: Law on whether payments for construction, erection & commissioning etc of plants involving inputs from technical personnel constitutes "payments for technical services" and attracts TDS obligations u/s 194J in the light of Bharti Cellular 330 ITR 239 (SC) explained

The contention of the revenue that in accordance with the judgement of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Bharti Cellular Ltd., (2011) 330 ITR 239 (SC), the matter ought to be remanded to the Assessing Officer to examine technical experts on this issue is not well founded. Firstly, the department never made an application for examining an expert. Secondly, it is not the department’s case that there was any material other than the contracts which required consideration. Apart from raising this contention, no such case was made out even before us at the hearing of this appeal. The case before us merely requires a construction of the contract. The extent of human intervention that was relied upon by the department is based on the provisions of the contract itself

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Woodward Governor (India) Ltd vs. ACIT (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: October 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 1, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1997-98
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S. 147: Even if the claim for s. 80-IA deduction is contrary to Pandian Chemicals 262 ITR 278 (SC) and Liberty India 317 ITR 218 (SC), the assessment cannot be reopened (beyond 4 years) in the absence of tangible material. The reasons recorded for the reopening cannot be improved or supplemented later

The rationale furnished by the revenue in its counter affidavit and reiterated in the court during the hearing was that a component of income which was otherwise inadmissible but escaped the notice of the AO, because of the ratio in Liberty India and Pandian (supra) is unpersuasive. Besides, the lack of any reference to objective material, cannot in any way improve the case of the revenue – much less its reference to otherwise binding judgments that could have been the basis of a valid revision by the revenue under Section 264. It goes without saying that statutory orders containing reasons are to be judged on the basis of what is apparent and not what is explained later, as the validity of those orders does not improve with time or on account of better explanations furnished in the course of legal proceedings (refer M.S. Gill and Anr. vs. Chief Election Commissioner AIR 1978 SC 581)

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Silicon Graphics Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd vs. DCIT (ITAT Delhi)

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DATE: August 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 2, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 37(1): Foreign exchange fluctuation loss arising consequent to restatement of current liabilities as per the year end rates in accordance with Accounting Standard-11 (AS-11) is allowable as a deduction

The accounting standard-11 provides that at each balance sheet date the outstanding foreign currency monetary items should be reported using the closing rates. It clarifies that that when the transaction is not settled in the same accounting period in which it had occurred then in all the intervening period till the transaction is settled, the exchange differences have to be duly accounted for

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

CIT vs. Halliburton Export Inc (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: July 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 14, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10, 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi): Though in Infrasoft 220 Taxman 273 (Del) the impact of the amendment to s. 9(1)(vi) on the question whether consideration received for sale of pre-packaged software was “royalty” or “fee for technical services” or "business income" was not examined, it is not required to be examined because u/s 90 (3) provides that the Act prevails only if it is more beneficial compared to the DTAA

The short question considered by the Court in Director of Income Tax v. Infrasoft Limited (2014) 220 Taxman 273 (Del) was whether the term “royalty” covered by Article 12 (3) of the DTAA would apply in the context of sale of pre-packaged copyrighted software. The Court stated that it has not examined the effect of the subsequent amendment to Section 9 (1) (vi) of the Act and also whether the amount received for use of software would be royalty in terms thereof for the reason that the Assessee is covered by the DTAA, the provisions of which are more beneficial

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Inderjeet Singh Sachdeva vs. DCIT (ITAT Delhi)

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DATE: June 3, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148: The AO is duty bound to provide to the assessee the reasons recorded for reopening the assessment within a reasonable time. Failure to do so renders the reassessment order unsustainable in law

On the request of the Assessee, the AO is bound to furnish the reasons recorded for initiation of proceedings under section 147 of the Act within a reasonable period of time so that the assessee could file its objections thereto and the AO was to dispose of the same by passing a speaking order thereon, which the AO has not done. We also note that even as per the rules of natural justice, the assessee is entitled to know the reasons on the basis of which the AO has formed an opinion that income assessable to tax has escaped assessment. The furnishing of reasons to the assessee is to enable/facilitate it to present its defence and objections to the initiation of proceedings under section 147/148 of the Act. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that there was no justifiable reasons for the AO to deprive the assessee of the recorded reasons by him for initiating proceedings under section 147/148 of the Act

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Pr. CIT vs. Lata Jain (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: April 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1998-99, 1999-00
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CITATION:
S. 153A assessment cannot be made for the AYs in which incriminating material is not recovered even though incriminating material may be recovered for other years in the block of 6 years

It has been noticed by the ITAT in the impugned order that for the AYs in question no incriminating material qua the Assessee was found. In that view of the matter, and in light of the decision of this Court in CIT v. Kabul Chawla [2016] 380 ITR 573 (Delhi), the Court is of the view that the impugned order of the ITAT suffers from no legal infirmity and no substantial question of law arises for determination

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Vijay Singh Kadam vs. CCIT (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: April 25, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 27, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 245: Approach of the department of setting off / adjusting refund against demand without serving a prior s. 245 intimation to the assessee and without providing opportunity of hearing to assessee & without arriving at a satisfaction to the effect that such adjustment of refund can only be the mode of recovery of demand is bad in law. Dept directed to refund the amount set off / adjusted together with interest

In our view, the power under Section 245 of the Act, is a discretionary power given to each of the tax officers in the higher echelons to “set off the amount to be refunded or any part of that amount against the same, if any, remaining payable under this Act by the person to whom the refund is due.‟ That this power is discretionary and not mandatory is indicated by the word “may”. Secondly, the set off is in lieu of payment of refund. Thirdly, before invoking the power, the officer is expected to give an intimation in writing to the Assessee to whom the refund is due informing him of the action proposed to be taken under this Section

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd vs. ACIT (ITAT Delhi)

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DATE: February 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 17, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
A Power of Attorney executed by the Head Office in favour of the Liaison Office in India does not create a Permanent Establishment if the powers are specific to the liaison office and are not unfettered powers to enable to Liaison Office to act on behalf of the enterprise

The sole basis on which the AO as well as the DRP came to a conclusion that the assessee had a P.E. in India is the clauses in power of attorney executed by the head office in favour of its employee in the L.O. in India. Reliance was also placed on the permission granted by the RBI to the assessee for setting up the L.O. A plain reading of the clauses in the power of attorney takes us to a conclusion that the powers given therein are L.O. specific. The AO’s conclusion that the power of attorney granted unfettered powers to its L.O. employee, to do all or any acts for and on behalf of the assessee, is incorrect. In our view the finding of the AO that the power of attorney is an open ended document, which is clearly outside the scope of initial permission granted by the RBI is also perverse. No doubt the AO can investigate, call for evidences and come to a conclusion where any income earning activity has been carried out by the L.O. so as to construe it as fixed P.E. but, in our view it is beyond the jurisdiction of the AO to adjudicate and conclude that the assessee has filed false declarations before the RBI. At best, he can bring his findings to the notice of the RBI which may consider the same in accordance with law. The RBI has not found any violation of conditions laid down by it while permitting the assessee to have an L.O. In such circumstances, no adverse inference can be drawn

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal