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DATE: August 22, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 5, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1987-88
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c) Penalty: The requirement to obtain previous approval of the IAC is mandatory as it is to safeguard the interests of the assessee against arbitrary exercise of power by the AO. Non-compliance may vitiate the penalty order. However, the requirement in s. 274 that the assessee must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard cannot be stretched to the extent of framing a specific charge or asking the assessee an explanation in respect of the quantum of penalty proposed to be imposed

The provision of Section 271(1)(c)(iii) of the Income Tax does not attract the rule of presumption of mens rea and it cannot be equated with the provision in the Criminal Statute. The penalty is for default in complying with the provision, i.e. of furnishing true and correct particulars of the income in the return. The penalty is imposable for breach of the civil obligation. It is only the reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter, which is required to be provided to the assessee. The enquiry seems to be of summary in nature, which does not even call for issuance of show cause notice in respect of the quantum of penalty proposed to be imposed. While exercising the discretion in respect of the quantum of penalty, the explanation furnished by the assessee to mitigate the rigour of penalty has to be considered, having regard to the intention of the assessee, if any, to evade the tax, as one of the factors

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DATE: August 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1998-99, 1999-00, 2000-01, 2001-02
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CITATION:
Interest on interim compensation received pending final disposal by the High Court is income if there is no direction given by the Court. The source of funds to earn income cannot determine the taxability of the income. The fact that the assessee may have to return the compensation and interest on the principle of restitution as provided under S. 144 of the Civil Procedure Code is not relevant because restitution is not a certainty. Paragon Construction 274 ITR 413 (Del) distinguished

The source of funds to earn income cannot determine the taxability of the income earned on the capital amount which has been invested. This in the absence of any statutory mandate otherwise. The income earned would be chargeable to tax irrespective of the source of the funds from which the income has been earned. In the mercantile system of accounting, income accrues when the right to receive the same arises, even though the actual receipt could be at a later date. In the present case it is an accepted position that the right to receive the interest from the fixed deposits already accrued to the assessee. In such circumstances, the interest on the fixed deposit would be chargeable to tax, as sought to be done by the Assessing Officer under the head income from other sources

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DATE: June 29, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 158BFA(1): If the delay in filing the return is completely attributable to the revenue for non-furnishing of copies of the documents and not giving inspection of the documents seized within a reasonable time after making the demand, the interest has to waived. Though s. 158BFA(1) does not (pre 2002) confer the power to waive interest, it has to be read in on equitable construction because the subject cannot be made to pay for the negligence of the Officers of the State (J. H. Gotla 4 SCC 343 followed)

This now takes us to the final issue viz. is it open under the provisions of Section 158-BFA(1) of the Act to the Assessing Officer to waive interest imposable thereunder even in the absence of any discretion provided to waive interest under Section 158-BFA(1) of the Act. There can be no dispute that bare reading of the section does not provide for any discretion to waive and/or reduce the interest imposable on account of the late filing of the return of income. It is a settled position in law that a fiscal statute has to be strictly interpreted, particularly when there is no ambiguity in the statute. The normal rule of interpreting a fiscal statute is the literal rule of interpretation. However, when the Parliament makes a law, it proceeds on the basis that the Executive i.e. the State will act fairly and not cause unjustified burden upon the subject. The provisions of Section 158BFA(1) of the Act proceeds on the above premise and it was expected of the State to grant copies of the documents seized and/or inspection of the record as expeditiously as possible, so as to enable the appellant to file his return of income. This particularly so, as to delay in filing of return, leads to levy of interest. This not having been done, as was expected under the Statute, the subject cannot be made to pay for the negligence of the Officers of the State. Therefore, in a case like this where strict construction may result in injustice, an equitable construction may be preferred

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DATE: June 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 21, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1995-96
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CITATION:
Capital Gains: While a family arrangement/settlement does not amount to a "transfer" u/s 2(47) as it only recognizes "pre-existing rights" between the parties, the same applies only to members of the families and not to transfers made by corporate entities. The corporate veil can never be lifted at the instance of the company itself because that would amount to its denying its own corporate existence. The fact that the Company is wholly owned by the members of the family is irrelevant

There is no dispute before us that a family arrangement/settlement would not amount to a transfer. So far as the members of Mohota family are concerned, who are parties to the family settlement, any transfer inter se between them on account of family settlement would not result in a transfer so as to attract the provisions of the Capital gain tax under the Act. However, in the present case, we are not concerned with the members of Mohota family who were parties to the family settlement, but with transfer of share done by the Company incorporated under the Companies Act having separate/independent corporate existence, perpetual succession and common seal. This Company is independent and distinct from it’s members

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