Search Results For: Sarang V. Kotwal J


PCIT vs. Binod Kumar Singh (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: April 22, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 26, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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S. 6, 68, 69: Law explained on (i) when an Indian citizen or person of Indian origin can be said to have come on "visit to India" so as to qualify as a "Non Resident" u/s 6(6) r.w. CBDT Circular No. 7 of 2003 & (ii) whether amount found deposited in a foreign bank is taxable in India u/s 68 & 69 if the assessee is a "Not Ordinary Resident"

In that view of the matter, clause (a) of Section 6(1) would not apply. It is true that in absence of clause (b) of Explanation 1 below Section 6(1) of the Act, the assessee would have fulfilled the requirements of clause (c) of Section 6(1). However, as per the explanation, if the assessee comes to a visit in India, the requirement of stay in India in the previous year would be 182 days and not 60 days as contained in clause (c). These facts would demonstrate that the assessee had migrated to a foreign country where he had set up his business interest. He pursued his higher education abroad, engaged himself in various business activities and continued to live there with his family. His whatever travels to India, would be in the nature of visits, unless contrary brought on record

CIT vs. Union Bank Of India (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: April 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 30, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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S. 115JB (pre amendment by Finance Act, 2012) is not applicable to a banking company (also insurance & electricity cos) . The mechanism provided for computing book profit in terms of S. 115JB(2) is wholly unworkable for a banking company. When the machinery provision fails, the charging section also fails. The anomaly was removed by the Finance Act, 2012. However, the amendments are neither declaratory nor clarificatory but make substantive and significant legislative changes which are applicable prospectively (Kerala State Electricity Board 329 ITR 91 (Ker) followed)

These amendments in section 115JB are neither declaratory nor classificatory but make substantive and significant legislative changes which are admittedly applied prospectively. The memorandum explaining the provision of the Finance Bill, 2012 while explaining the amendments under Section 115JB of the Act notes that in case of certain companies such as insurance, banking and electricity companies, they are allowed to prepare the profit and loss account in accordance with the sections specified in their regulatory Acts. To align the Income Tax Act with the Companies Act, 1956 it was decided to amend Section 115JB to provide that the companies which are not required under Section 211 of the Companies Act, to prepare profit and loss account in accordance with Schedule VI of the Companies Act, profit and loss account prepared in accordance with the provisions of their regulatory Act shall be taken as basis for computing book profit under Section 115 JB of the Act.

The Chamber of Tax Consultants vs. CBDT (Bombay High Court) (Final Order)

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DATE: April 11, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 23, 2019 (Date of publication)
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S. 250: The CBDT is empowered to lay down broad guidelines for disposal of appeals by CsIT(A). However, it cannot offer 'incentives' to CsIT(A) for making enhancement and levying penalty. Such policy transgresses the exercise of quasi-judicial powers & is wholly impermissible and invalid u/s 119. The 'Incentives' have the propensity to influence the CsIT(A) and they will be tempted to pass an order in a particular manner so as to achieve a greater target of disposal

All these contingencies necessarily point to circumstances where the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) is in favour of the revenue. For example this policy refers to the enhancement made by the Commissioner or a case where the Commissioner has levied penalty under section 271(1) of the Act. This necessarily refers to enlargement of the assessee’s liability before the Commissioner as compared to what may have been determined by the Assessing Officer. In our opinion, such policy is wholly impermissible and invalid. Any directives by the CBDT which gives additional incentive for an order that the Commissioner (Appeals) may pass having regard to its implication, necessarily transgresses in the Commissioner’s exercise of discretionary quasi judicial powers.

Rajbhushan Omprakash Dixit vs. DCIT (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: April 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 20, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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S. 147/ 148: The fact that the assessee did not disclose the material is not relevant if the AO was otherwise aware of it. If the AO had the information during the assessment proceeding, irrespective of the source, but chooses not to utilize it, he cannot allege that the assessee failed to disclose truly and fully all material facts & reopen the assessment (Scope of Explanation 1 to S. 147 explained)

As per this Explanation thus, production before the Assessing Officer of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered by the Assessing Officer will not necessarily amount to disclosure within the meaning of the first proviso to Section 147. Here is not a case where the Assessee is seeking to rely on a disclosure which the Revenue can seek to bring within the fold of the said Explanation. Here is a case where the Department already had collected certain documents and materials which were before the Assessing Officer at the time of framing assessment. If the Assessing Officer did not, for some reason, advert to such material or did not utilize the same, he surely cannot allege that the Assessee failed to disclose truly and fully all material facts.

Rupa Shyamsundar Dhumatkar vs. ACIT (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: April 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 20, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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S. 148 Reopening: As per settled law, notice for reopening of assessment against a dead person is invalid. The fact that the AO was not informed of the death before issue of notice is irrelevant. Consequently, the s. 148 notice is set aside and order of assessment stands annulled (Alamelu Veerappan 257 TM 72 (Mad) followed)

There are several judgments of different High Courts holding that the notice or reopening of assessment is invalid in law. It is not necessary to refer to all the judgments on the point. Suffice it to say, as per the settled law, notice for reopening of assessment against a dead person is invalid

Jagdish C. Dhabalia vs. ITO (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: March 12, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 13, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 50C Capital Gains: The assessee cannot avoid the impact of s. 50C by claiming that his s. 54EC investment is large enough to cover the deemed consideration based on stamp duty valuation. Such interpretation renders s. 50C redundant

The deeming fiction under section 50C of the Act, must be given its full effect and the Court should not allow to boggle the mind while giving full effect to such fiction. We are not opposing the proposition canvassed by the Counsel of the Assessee that deeming fiction must be applied in relation to the situation for which it is created. However, while giving full effect to the deeming fiction contained under section 50C of the Act for the purpose of computation of the capital gain under section 48, for which section 50C is specifically enacted, the automatic fallout thereof would be that the computation of the assessee’s capital gain and consequently the computation of exemption under section 54EC, shall have to be worked out on the basis of substituted deemed sale consideration of transfer of capital asset in terms of section 50C of the Act

PCIT vs. Bajaj Finance Limited (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: April 2, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 43D Interest on NPAs: Even though the special provision in s. 43D for taxing interest income on NPAs on receipt basis does not apply to NBFCs, it does not mean that NBFCs have to offer interest on bad or doubtful debts to tax on accrual basis. Such interest is not taxable on the real income theory

Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that the assessee had to offer the interest income to tax on accrual basis. The special provision for taxing interest income on NPAs on the basis of receipt has been made under Section 43D of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“the Act” for short) which does not apply to NBFC. By necessary implication, therefore, the legislature desired that such benefit would be restricted only to such of the entities as are referred to in Section 43D of the Act

PCIT vs. Electroplast Engineers (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 3, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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S. 45(4): If new partners come into the partnership and bring cash by way of capital contribution and the retiring partners take cash and retire, the retiring partners are not relinquishing their interest in the immovable property. What they relinquish is their share in the partnership. As there is no transfer of a capital asset, no capital gains or profit can arise & s. 45(4) has no application (A. N. Naik 265 ITR 346 (Bom) distinguished, Dynamic Enterprises 359 ITR 83 (Karn) [FB] followed)

The property belongs to the partnership firm. It did not belong to the partners. The partners only had a share in the partnership asset. When the five partners came into the partnership and brought cash by way of capital contribution to the extent of their contribution, they were entitled to the proportionate share in the interest in the partnership firm. When the retiring partners took cash and retired, they were not relinquishing their interest in the immovable property. What they relinquished is their share in the partnership. Therefore, there is no transfer of a capital asset, as such, no capital gains or profit arises in the facts of this case. In that view of the matter, Section 45(4) has no application to the facts of this case

PCIT vs. Aditya Birla Telecom Ltd (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: March 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 29, 2019 (Date of publication)
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S. 68 Bogus Share Capital: Merely because the investment was considerably large and several corporate structures were either created or came into play in routing the investment in the assessee through a Mauritius entity would not be sufficient to brand the transaction as colourable device. The assessee cannot be asked to prove the source of source (PCIT Vs. NRA Iron & Steel 103 TM.com 48 (SC) referred)

As is well known in the context of Section 68 of the Act, the basic duty would be on the assessee to establish the genuineness of the transaction, credit worthiness of the investor and the source of funds. Equally well settled principle through series of judgments is that the Department cannot insist on the assessee establishing source of the source.

PCIT vs. Rasiklal M. Parikh (Bombay High Court)

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DATE: March 19, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 29, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c) Penalty: Merely because the High Court has admitted the Appeal and framed substantial questions of law, it cannot be said that the entire issue is debatable one and under no circumstances, penalty could be imposed (CIT vs. Dharamshi B. Shah 366 ITR 140 (Guj) followed)

Admission of a tax appeal by the High Court, in majority cases, is ex parte and without recording even prima facie reasons. Whether ex parte or after by-parte hearing, unless some other intention clearly emerges from the order itself, admission of a tax appeal by the High Court only indicates the court’s opinion that the issue presented before it required further consideration. It is an indication of the opinion of the High Court that there is a prima facie case made out and the questions are required to be decided after admission. Mere admission of an appeal by the High Court cannot without there being anything further, be an indication that the issue is debatable one so as to delete the penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Act

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