As the undertaking was transferred as a going concern and there was no evidence on record to show that the compensation had been arrived at on an item-wise allocation of the various assets of the undertaking and there was no “cost of acquisition” of the undertaking, capital gains was not chargeable.
In view of the Proviso to s. 147, merely having a reason to believe that income had escaped assessment is not sufficient to reopen assessments but it must be specifically alleged by the AO in the recorded reasons that the escapement was on account of the failure of the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of material facts. In the absence of such allegation, the reopening is without jurisdiction;
Where the assessee was a company incorporated in the Netherlands and its main activity was operation of aircrafts in international traffic both for transport of passengers and cargo and its income was exempt under the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and the Netherlands and it recovered charges from an Indian company which on facts was found to be arising from the activity of cargo handling and was directly and inextricably linked to such activity, held the same was exempt. Also held in the alternative that even if the recovery of rent was to be treated as an income from other sources at the hands of the assessee, since an identical amount was paid to the Airport Authority of India, the same would be entirely offset u/s 57 (iii) against each other because there was a direct nexus between the receipt and the payment.
The words “in relation to” in s. 14A encompass not only the direct expense but also the indirect expense which has any relation to the exempt income. The argument that the words contemplate a “direct and immediate connection” between the expenditure and the exempt income cannot be accepted. Accordingly, the argument that s. 14A cannot apply to shares held as stock-in-trade cannot be accepted. The fact that the dividend income is “incidental” to the purchase of shares is also irrelevant. The question as to whether the onus is on the assessee or the AO for bringing an item of expenditure within s. 14A is also irrelevant in view of Rule 8D;
Where the assessee entered into an agreement for transfer of its industrial undertaking under which the buyer agreed to pay it interest on the unpaid consideration w.e.f 1.3.1977 and subsequently on 30.6.1978 the parties agreed to defer the date of commencement of interest to 1.7.1979 and the question arose whether the interest foregone by the assessee could be assessed for the AYs 1979-80 and 1980-81 under the accrual system of accounting, HELD:
Where the Tribunal did not pass an order on the appeal despite considerable delay and instead fixed the matter repeatedly for ‘clarifications’ and thereafter closed the matter for orders on the basis of written submissions and without hearing the assessee, HELD the procedure followed by the Tribunal was not in compliance with the principles of natural justice. The Tribunal should decide the matter within a reasonable time of the hearing and in case they are not in a position to pass the order within a reasonable period, they should fix the matter for rehearing and not only for calling for clarification on certain points.
The object behind enactment of s. 271 (1) (c) read with Explanations indicate that the said section has been enacted to provide for a remedy for loss of revenue and they create the element of strict liability on the assessee for concealment or for giving inaccurate particulars while filing return. The penalty under that provision is a civil liability. Wilful concealment is not an essential ingredient for attracting civil liability unlike the matter of prosecution under Section 276C.
While circulars and instructions issued by the Board are binding on the authorities under the respective statutes, but when the Supreme Court or the High Court declares the law on the question arising for consideration, it would not be appropriate for the Court to direct that the circular should be given effect to and not the view expressed in a decision of the SC or the High Court.
During the days when the golf tournament is conducted, the Golf Course can be regarded as a “place of business” because the center of income earning activities was at that particular place and the Golf Course was at the disposal of the applicant for the stipulated time frame and it could exercise some limited rights. The fact that the duration is short is not relevant.
Though the assessee was following the mercantile system and was entitled to royalty under an agreement, the royalty was not assessable in accordance with the principles of real income, in view of the dispute pending in arbitration.