Once Parliament has legislated both in regard to the nature of the exclusion and the extent of the exclusion, it would not be open to the Court to order otherwise by rewriting the legislative provision. The task of interpretation is to find out the true intent of a legislative provision and it is clearly not open to the Court to legislate by substituting a formula or provision other than what has been legislated by Parliament. It is not open to say that something more than the 10% statutorily provided should also be allowed. In Shri Ram Honda Power Equip 289 ITR 475 the Delhi High Court has not adequately emphasized the entire rationale for confining the deduction only to the extent of ninety per cent of the excludible receipts and it cannot be followed

In KEC International it was noted that in a large number of matters orders are passed perfunctorily by the department only with an idea of effecting recovery before March 31, though such orders could have been passed earlier in detail and after recording proper reasons. The law laid down by the Division Bench has not led the authorities to act in compliance. This is an unfortunate state of affairs

To decide whether an institution exists solely for education and not to earn profit the predominant object of the activity has to be seen. The mere fact that an educational institution generates surplus after meeting the expenditure over a period of time does not mean that it ceases to exist ‘solely’ for educational. The test to be applied is whether the predominant object of the activity is to sub-serve the educational purpose or to earn profit. It should be seen whether profit-making is the predominant object of the activity or whether profit is incidental to the carrying of the activity. There is no requirement that the activity must be carried on in such a manner that it does not result in any profit. It would indeed be difficult for persons in charge of a trust or institution to so carry on the activity that the expenditure balances the income and there is no resulting profit. That would not only be difficult of practical realization but would also reflect unsound principle of management

The view taken by the Tribunal is not the correct approach. If the Tribunal wanted to differ to the earlier view taken by the Tribunal in the identical set of facts, judicial discipline required reference to the larger bench. One co-ordinate bench finding fault with another co-ordinate bench is not a healthy way of dealing with the matters

The observations of the Supreme Court in Transmission Corporation of AP 239 ITR 387 have to be read in the context of the question before the Court i.e. whether tax was deductible on the gross trading receipts or only on the “pure income profits”. The Court was not concerned with a case where the receipt was not chargeable to tax in the hands of the recipient at all. On the other hand the observations of the Court make it clear that the liability to deduct tax at source arises only when the sum payable to the non-resident is chargeable to tax. Even the plain language of s. 195 shows that the tax at source is to be deducted on the “sum chargeable under the provisions of the Act”. One can, therefore, reasonably say that the obligation to deduct tax at source is attracted only when the payment is chargeable to tax in India.

The retrospective amendment to s. 115JB was of no avail because it was enacted after the issue of the s. 148 notice. In Max India, the SC held in the context of s. 263 that the validity of the revision order had to be determined on the basis of the law on the date the order was passed. This principle is applicable to s. 147 as well and the validity of the reopening has to be determined on the basis of the law as it stands on the date of issue of the s. 148 notice. As the retrospective amendment to s. 115JB was not and could not have formed the basis for reopening the assessment, the same could not be relied upon to justify the reopening. The validity of the s. 148 notice must be determined with reference to the recorded reasons and the same cannot be allowed to be supplemented on a basis which was not present to the mind of the AO and could not have been so present on the date on which the power to reopen the assessment was exercised.

The power u/s 254(2) is confined to a rectification of a mistake apparent on record. S. 254(2) is not a carte blanche for the Tribunal to change its own view by substituting a view which it believes should have been taken in the first instance. S. 254(2) is not a mandate to unsettle decisions taken after due reflection. It is not an avenue to revive a proceeding by recourse to a disingenuous argument nor does it contemplate a fresh look at a decision recorded on merits, however appealing an alternate view may seem. Unless a sense of restraint is observed, judicial discipline would be the casualty. That is not what Parliament envisaged.