Month: September 2011

Archive for September, 2011


COURT:
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SECTION(S):
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COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 8, 2011 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

While in principle it is correct that if a fair price is paid by the assessee to the agent for the activities of the assessee in India through the DAPE and the said price is taxed in India at the hands of the agent, then no question of taxing the assessee again would arise, this is subject to a Transfer Pricing Analysis being undertaken u/s 92. The facts showed that the manner in which the commission/ remuneration had been fixed was usually not done between independent parties in an uncontrolled transaction. The assessee was in a position to dictate terms to the agent and so it could not be said that the commission was at “arms length” within the meaning of Article 7 (2) of the DTAA. The Transfer Pricing analysis to determine the “arms length” price has to be done by taking the “Functions, Assets used and Risk involved” (FAR). As this has not been done, the assessee’s argument on “arms length” price is not acceptable (Morgan Stanley 292 ITR 416 (SC) & Set Satellite (Singapore) 307 ITR 205 (Bom) distinguished)

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COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 8, 2011 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

In Universal Plast Ltd 237 ITR 454 (SC) tests were laid down as to when income from property is assessable as “business profits” and as “income from house property”. Applying these tests, the rental income has to be assessed as “business profits” because (i) all assets of the business were not rented out by the assessee and it continued the main business of dealing in scientific apparatus etc, (ii) the property was being used for the Regional Office and was let out by way of exploitation of business assets for making profit, (iii) the assessee had not sold away the properties or abandoned its business activities. The transaction was a “commercial venture” taken in order to exploit business assets and for receiving higher income from commercial assets

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 5, 2011 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

While the license to use the “shrink wrapped” or “off the shelf” software does not involve transfer of intellectual property, it constitutes “royalty” u/s 9(1)(vi) and Article 12(3) of the DTAA because it is for “the use of and the right to use of intellectual property such as copyright of a literary, artistic or scientific work or any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan etc“. Thus, the consideration received by Oracle for use of its software constitutes “royalty” and the assessee ought to have deducted tax at source

COURT:
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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 2, 2011 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

The mere fact that a person is an agent or is to be treated as an agent u/s 163 and is assessable as “representative assessee” does not automatically mean that he is liable to pay taxes on behalf of the non-resident. U/s 161, a representative assessee is liable only “as regards the income in respect of which he is a representative assessee“. This means that there must be some connection or concern between the representative assessee and the income. On facts, even assuming that Genpact India was the “agent” and so “representative assessee” of General Electric, there was no connection between Genpact India and the capital gains alleged to have arisen to General Electric (from the sale of shares of Genpact India). Consequently, the s. 163 proceedings seeking to assess Genpact India for the capital gains of General Electric were without jurisdiction

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 2, 2011 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

S. 40A(9) provides that no deduction shall be allowed in respect of “any sum paid by the assessee as an employer … as contribution to any fund … except where such sum is so paid … as required by or under any other law for the time being in force“. In the case of statutory corporations, the regulations providing for the terms and conditions of employment and conditions of service have the force of law. There is no distinction in principle between a person directly under the employment of the Government and a person under the employment of a statutory corporation. Consequently, the service regulations framed by the assessee by which it agreed to make payment to the Fund carried statutory force and fell within the expression “as required by or under any other law for purposes of s. 40A(9). (U. P. Warehousing Corporation 1980 3 SCC 459 followed)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 1, 2011 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

Liberty is given to the Department to move the High Court pointing out that the Circular dated 9th February, 2011, should not be applied ipso facto, particularly, when the matter has a cascading effect. There are cases under the Income – Tax Act, 1961, in which a common principle may be involved in subsequent group of matters or large number of matters. In our view, in such cases if attention of the High Court is drawn, the High Court will not apply the Circular ipso facto. For that purpose, liberty is granted to the Department to move the High Court in two weeks

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 1, 2011 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

Hyundai Heavy Industries 291 ITR 482 (SC) is not applicable because there (a) the project office was to work only as a liaison office and was not authorized to carry on any business activity and (b) the contract was divisible into two parts and so the argument that the PE does not come into existence till the fabrication work is done was accepted