The professional services rendered does not fall in the definition of “royalty” in Article 12 of the DTAA. It was purely a professional service for consultancy which were rendered outside India and not for supply of scientific, technical, industrial or commercial knowledge or information. Thus, there was no liability to deduct TDS and consequently no disallowance u/s 40(ia) can be made

Though in Bharati Shipyard 132 ITD 53 (Mum)(SB), it was held that the amendment to s. 40(a)(ia) by the FA 2010 w.e.f. 1.4.2010 cannot be treated to be retrospective, a contrary view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in CIT vs. Virgin Creations. As this is the sole High Court judgement on the point, it has to be followed in preference to the view of the Special Bench. Accordingly, the amendment to s. 40(a)(ia) by the FA 2010 is applicable retrospectively from 1.4.2005 and no disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) can be made if the TDS is paid on or before the due date for filing the ROI (Piyush C. Mehta (Mum) & M.K. Gurumurthy (Bang) followed)

Though a firm and its partners are not different entities in general law, under the Act, they are treated as separate entities. The salary and interest paid by the firm to the partners is deductible in the hands of the firm and taxable in the hands of the partners u/s 28(v). The balance profits are taxed in the hands of the firm and exempt in the hands of the partners u/s 10(2A). As s. 10(2A) provides that the share of profit of the partner shall not be included in his total income, it is not possible to hold that the share income is not excluded from the total income of the partner because the firm has already been taxed thereon. When s. 10(2A) speaks of its exclusion from the total income it means the total income of the person whose case is under consideration i.e. the partner. As the share income is excluded from his total income, s. 14A would apply and any expenditure incurred to earn the share income will have to be disallowed (Dhamasingh M. Popat 127 TTJ 63 (Mum) approved; Sudhir Kapadia & Hitesh Gajaria reversed)

There was no dispute that the assessee had in fact paid Alia. Though the Volker Committee report stated that the amounts paid to Alia were actually kickbacks to Iraqi regime, that fact per se would not attract Explanation to s. 37(1). In order to fall within the Explanation to s. 37(1), the expenditure has to be for “for any purpose which is an offence or which is prohibited by law“. Alia was a Jordanian company and while the transactions between Alia and the Iraqi regime may be contrary to the UN sanctions, the transactions between the assessee and Alia were not hit by the UN sanctions. The Revenue has not pointed out any other specific violation of law. The assessee’s payment accordingly cannot be said to be for a purpose which is an offence or which is prohibited by law. What the recipient of the payment does is not important from this perspective because the assessee has no control over the matter. It is not the case that the assessee knew that the monies would be used for the purposes of kickbacks to the Iraqi regime. The onus of demonstrating that the assessee was aware that the payments were intended for kickbacks is on the AO which has not been discharged. The “purpose” of the expenditure has to be seen. If the payment is for bonafide business purposes, the fact that they end up being used as illegal kickbacks, will not attract Explanation to s. 37(1). The commercial expediency of the payments was not called into question by the AO (TIL Ltd 16 SOT 33 (Kol) referred)