There is no distinction in principle between a slot charter and a voyage charter of a part of a ship. They are both in a sense charterers of a space in a ship. The phrase “operation of ships” in Article 9 must be understood in the context of the phrase “the business of operation of ships” in s. 44B. As income from slot hire agreements falls within s. 44B it must be held to be within the ambit of Article 9(1). Article 9 does not require the ship to be owned by an the assessee. It merely requires the income to be “from the operation of ships in international traffic”. A charter is certainly contemplated by Article 9 and an enterprise that controls the management/operation of the ship would be included in Article 9 even if it does not own the ship (KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 178 Taxman 291 (Del) followed)

In Indian Oil Panipat 315 ITR 255 (Del) it was held that if the interest received was “inextricably linked” with the setting up of the plant, it could not be treated as income from other sources. This reasoning is in line with Bokaro Steel Ltd, Karnataka Power Corp 247 ITR 268 (SC) & Bongaigaon Refinery 251 ITR 329(SC). Though the proviso to s. 36(1)(iii) enacts that any amount of the interest paid towards (“in respect of”) capital borrowed for acquisition of an asset or for extension of existing business regardless of its capitalization in the books or otherwise, “for any period beginning from the date on which the capital was borrowed for acquisition of the asset till the date on which such asset was first put to use” would not qualify as deduction, in all these cases, when the interest was received by the assessee towards interest paid for fixed deposits when the borrowed funds could not be immediately put to use for the purpose for which they were taken, the Courts held that if the receipt is “inextricably linked” to the setting up of the project, it would be capital receipt not liable to tax but ultimately be used to reduce the cost of the project. By the same logic, in the present case too, the funds invested by the assessee and the interest earned were inextricably linked with the setting up of the power plant and, therefore, the interest earned on fixed deposit of amounts borrowed cannot be treated as a revenue receipt

Upon a return of income being filed, the matter is “pending“, in the sense that the AO has the right to take such steps, including issuance of notice. The rationale for the bar in the Proviso to s. 245R(2) is that if the applicant wishes to plan its affairs and transactions in advance, it is free to do but once it proceeds to file a return, the AAR’s jurisdiction to entertain the application for advance ruling is taken away, because the AO would then be seized of the matter, and would possess a multitude of statutory powers to examine and rule on the return. The fact that in the past the AAR followed a different practice in the past is irrelevant because there is no estoppel against a statute

The department’s contention that the assessee ought to have invested in the period that the s. 54EC bonds were available (1.7.2006 to 3.8.2006) after the transfer is not well founded. The assessee was entitled to wait till the last date (21.9.2006) to invest in the bonds. As of that date, the bonds were not available. The fact that they were available in an earlier period after the transfer makes no difference because the assessee right to buy the bonds upto the last date cannot be prejudiced. Lex not cogit impossibila (law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform) and impossibilum nulla oblignto est (law does not expect a party to do the impossible) are well known maxims in law and would squarely apply to the present case

S. 268A was inserted by the Finance Act 2008 w.r.e.f. 1.4.1999 to reduce litigation in small cases and regulate the right of Revenue to file or not to file appeal. Instruction no.3/2011 dated 9.2.2011 has been issued by the CBDT pursuant to this power. Though clause 11 provides that the instruction would apply to appeals filed on or after 9.2.2011 and appeals filed that date would be governed by the instructions operative at the time the appeal was filed, in a number of cases, it has been interpreted to mean that the monetary limits specified in the Instruction would apply to pending appeals as well (Vijaya V. Kavekar (Bom) followed (included in file)