Month: May 2013

Archive for May, 2013


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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 14, 2013 (Date of publication)
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The view taken by the Tribunal and the High Court in Clifford Chance was that if Article 15 of the India-UK Treaty is not applicable because the stay of the partner exceeded 90 days, then the taxability of the income would be determined by s. 9(1)(i) of the Act. It was held that for determination of income u/s 9(1)(i), the territorial nexus doctrine plays an important part and if the income arises out of operations in more than one jurisdiction, it would not be correct to contend that the entire income accrues or arises in each of the jurisdictions. The High Court applied the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the context of s. 9(1)(i) that if all the operations are not carried out in the taxable territories, the profits and gains of business deemed to accrue in India through and from business connection in India shall be only such profits and gains as are reasonably attributable to the operations carried out in the taxable territories. Accordingly, the view expressed in Linklaters LLP that the judgment of the Bombay High Court is based on the premise of s. 9(1)(vii) and that the said premise no longer holds good in view of the retrospective amendment is not correct. The law laid down by the High Court continues to be good law

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 10, 2013 (Date of publication)
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The assessee’s argument that it does not have a PE under Article 5(1) cannot be accepted because its employees frequently visited the premises of CIS to provide supervision, direction and control over the operations of CIS and such employees had a fixed place of business at their disposal. CIS was practically the projection of assessee’s business in India and carried out its business under the control and guidance of the assessee and without assuming any significant risk in relation to such functions. Besides the assessee has also provided certain hardware and software assets on free of cost basis to CIS. However, it does not constitute a dependent agent PE in terms of Article 5(4) and 5(5) of the DTAA

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 10, 2013 (Date of publication)
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The department’s argument that the installation, commissioning & maintenance services were intricately connected with the international transactions of warranty support services and commission income and that their operating cost and operating revenue had to be considered while computing the profit level indicator is not acceptable because the installation/ commissioning and maintenance agreements were independent agreements unconnected with the transactions of warranty support services and commission income. This is shown by the fact that while the equipment was supplied to 40 customers by the AE, only three of them availed of the installation services from the assessee. Also, a corroborative circumstance for construing the transactions of installation/commissioning and maintenance as domestic transactions was that the TPO had made no adjustment in respect of these transactions. The transactions pertaining to the installation/commissioning and maintenance services were also not deemed international transactions u/s 92B(2) because none of the conditions stipulated therein of a prior agreement existing between the customers of the assessee and the AE have been established as a fact. Moreover, there is no finding that the terms of the transaction of installation/commissioning as well as maintenance had been determined in substance between the customers and the assessee by the AE. In the absence of such finding, it cannot be deemed that the transaction of installation/commissioning as well as provision of maintenance services by the assessee to its domestic customers in India were international transactions falling within s. 92B(2)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 10, 2013 (Date of publication)
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It appears that the writ petition is to settle scores which the Petitioner might have raised during the course of his conduct as representative of the assessees. The Petitioner has asserted that he is not able to meet the expectations and illegal demands raised by the Members but there are no details as to when and how the demands were raised. Not only the writ petition is bereft of any material particulars but also the Petitioner has no right to claim mandamus for restraining an authority constituted under the Act from discharging the functions entrusted to it by the Statute. The present writ petition is gross abuse of process of law and, therefore, it is dismissed.

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 9, 2013 (Date of publication)
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In Merilyn Shipping 146 TTJ 1 (Viz) (SB) the majority held that as the Finance Bill proposed the words “amount credited or paid” and as the Finance Act used the words “amounts payable“, s. 40(a)(ia) could only apply to amounts that are outstanding as of 31st March and not to amounts already paid during the year. This view is not correct for two reasons. Firstly, a strict reading of s. 40(a)(ia) shows that all that it requires is that there should be an amount payable of the nature described, which is such on which tax is deductible at source but such tax has not been deducted or if deducted not paid before the due date. The provision nowhere requires that the amount which is payable must remain so payable throughout during the year. If the assessee’s interpretation is accepted, it would lead to a situation where the assessee who though was required to deduct the tax at source but no such deduction was made or more flagrantly deduction though made is not paid to the Government, would escape the consequence only because the amount was already paid over before the end of the year in contrast to another assessee who would otherwise be in similar situation but in whose case the amount remained payable till the end of the year. There is no logic why the legislature would have desired to bring about such irreconcilable and diverse consequences. Secondly, the principle of deliberate or conscious omission is applied mainly when an existing provision is amended and a change is brought about. The Special Bench was wrong in comparing the language used in the draft bill to that used in the final enactment to assign a particular meaning to s. 40(a)(ia). Accordingly, Merilyn Shipping does not lay down correct law. The correct law is that s. 40(a)(ia) covers not only to the amounts which are payable as on 31th March of a particular year but also which are payable at any time during the year

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 9, 2013 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:

Though the assessee is not a dealer in foreign exchange, it entered into forward contracts with banks for the purpose of hedging the loss due to fluctuation in foreign exchange while implementing the export contracts. The transactions in foreign exchanges were incidental to the assessee’s regular course of business and the loss was thus not a speculative loss u/s 43(5) but was incidental to the assessee’s business and allowable as such. The fact that there may have been no direct co-relation between the exchange document and the precise export contract cannot be seen in isolation if there are in fact several separate contracts with the bankers (Soorajmull Nagarmull 129 ITR 169 (Cal) & Badridas Gauridu 261 ITR 256 (Bom) followed; M. G. Brothers 154 ITR 695 (AP) distinguished)

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 9, 2013 (Date of publication)
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The question whether a particular activity of the assessee such as the interest generating activity should be taken into consideration in the determination of the ALP is a question which needs to be decided considering the nature of the business of the assessee and its’ “business model”. The Tribunal rightly held that as the earning of interest income was only the result of investment of surplus funds and was not a primary income-generating activity, the interest income had to be excluded from the “operating profit” for purposes of determination of ALP

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 8, 2013 (Date of publication)
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The argument that the ITES/BPO industry has several segments starting from low end segment such ‘call centre’, ‘customer care’ to high end segments such as ‘KPO’, ‘content development’ etc. in which there is wide variation in the billing rates and that high end services are not comparable to the low end services is not acceptable because under Rule 10B(2) the comparability of an international transaction with an uncontrolled transaction has to be judged with the reference to the services provided, functions performed, asset employed and risk assumed. All companies which are in the ITES segment are providing similar services and difference is in the internal working which is reflected through difference in qualifications and skills of the employees. The difference in skill/ qualification of the employees and their payment structure and the difference in billing rate does not affect the comparability in any significant manner under TNMM

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 7, 2013 (Date of publication)
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There is a difference between a “speculative transaction” and a “hedging transaction”. S. 43(5) defines a “speculative transaction” to mean a transaction in which a contract for the purchase or sale of any commodity, including stocks and shares, is periodically or ultimately settled otherwise than by the actual delivery or transfer of the commodity or scrips. Proviso (a) to s. 43(5) refers to a “hedging transaction” as a contract in respect of raw materials or merchandise entered into by a person in the course of his manufacturing or merchandising business to guard against loss through future price fluctuations in respect of his contracts for actual delivery of goods manufactured by him or merchandise sold by him. In order for a transaction to be a “hedging transaction”, the commodity dealt in should be the same. If the subject matter of the transaction is different, it cannot be termed a hedging transaction. Also, the merchandise in respect of which the forward transactions have been entered into by the assessee must have a direct connection with the goods sold by him. On facts, as the assessee was not dealing in Foreign Exchange, the forward transactions entered into by it cannot be held to be hedging transactions. As the assessee is dealing in diamonds, only the forward contracts entered into for diamonds would be covered by Proviso (a) to s. 43(5). Consequently, the loss suffered by the assessee is a speculative loss

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DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 6, 2013 (Date of publication)
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The condition precedent for the AO to invoke Rule 8D is that he first must examine the accounts of assessee and then record by giving cogent reasons why he is not satisfied with the correctness of the assessee’s claim. In the absence of an examination of accounts and the recording of satisfaction, Rule 8D cannot be invoked. On facts, the assessee had itself disallowed interest, Demat charges and administrative expenses. The AO had not examined the accounts or given a finding how the assessee’s computation was wrong. Consequently, the invocation of Rule 8D was improper and the disallowance was not permissible (Godrej & Boyce 328 ITR 81 (Bom), Maxopp Investment 247 CTR 162 (Del), Walfort Share 326 ITR 1 (SC), Hero Cycles 323 ITR 518 (P&H), Justice Sam P Bharucha & Pawan Kumar Parameshwar Lal followed)