Month: June 2014

Archive for June, 2014


COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 5, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY:
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CITATION:


S. 271(1)(c)/ 271(1B): If, in the assessment order, AO directs initiation of penalty on specific issues but not on others, he is not entitled to levy penalty on the other issues

S. 271(1)(c) empowers the AO, where he is satisfied in the course of any proceedings under the Act that the assessee had concealed the particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, to direct the payment of penalty. Sub-section (1B) was inserted with retrospective effect from 01.04.1989 to provide that where any amount is added or disallowed in computing the total income or loss of an assessee and the assessment order contains a direction for initiation of penalty proceedings, such an order of assessment shall be deemed to constitute satisfaction of the AO for initiation of penalty proceedings under s. 271(1)(c). In order that the deeming fiction in sub-section (1B) must apply, two requirements must be fulfilled. The first requirement is that an amount must have been added or disallowed in computing the total income or loss of an assessee in any order of assessment or reassessment. The second is that the order of assessment must contain a direction for the initiation of penalty proceedings under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of s. 271. Where both the conditions as aforesaid are fulfilled, the order of assessment must be deemed to constitute satisfaction of the AO for initiating penalty proceedings. In the present case, it is abundantly clear that in respect of those heads where the AO considered it appropriate to initiate penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c), he made a specific direction to that effect. In respect of the claim of interest on the SDF loan, there is no direction by the AO. The absence of a reference to the initiation of proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) is not an inadvertent omission since it is clear that in respect of several other heads, where the AO did consider it appropriate to initiate penalty proceedings, he made an observation to that effect. In fact, even in the concluding part of his order, the AO issued a direction for initiating penalty notice u/s 271(1)(c) “as discussed above”. The expression “as discussed above” is material because it refers to those heads in respect of which a specific direction was issued by him for initiating steps u/s 271(1)(c). Undoubtedly, as held in Mak Data 358 ITR 593 (SC), the AO has to satisfy himself whether penalty proceedings should be initiated or not during the course of assessment proceedings and he is not required to record his satisfaction in a particular manner or reduce it into writing. However, in the present case there is no direction whatsoever by the AO in respect of the specific head of interest on the SDF loan, on which the penalty was deleted by the Tribunal. This omission in the case of the SDF loan stands in sharp contrast to those items where the AO has specifically directed the initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c). Consequently, the Tribunal was justified in deleting the penalty u/s 271(1)(c) in respect of the SDF loan

COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 5, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY:
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CITATION:


S. 254: If a legal issue is raised (even for the first time) ITAT has the duty to deal with it and cannot remand it to lower authorities

The Tribunal should have answered the legal issue itself. The Tribunal was not prevented in any manner and in law from considering a purely legal issue for the first time, more so, if this legal issue goes to the root of the matter. The issue was an impact and legal effect of a order of amalgamation and winding up of the assessee thereto on the penalty proceedings have been initiated and were continuing. If they were initiated prior to the order of the winding up passed or the scheme of amalgamation being sanctioned, then, whether the subsequent act of a order sanctioning the scheme would permit continuation of the proceedings against an entity or company which is wound up and in terms of the provisions contained in the Act was, thus, a clear legal issue. It should have been answered by the Tribunal, particularly when it had admitted the question or ground and also the additional evidence filed by the assessee. The only two documents which required to be looked into were the scheme of amalgamation and the order passed in pursuance thereof by this Court. If that was the admitted factual position and based on which the legal issue was raised, then, the Tribunal was obliged to answer the legal question. Its omission to answer it, therefore, is vitiated in law. The Tribunal is a last fact finding Court and equally if it could have been approached by the assessee both on law and fact, then, in the given circumstances, the Tribunal should have answered this issue and its failure to do so can safely be termed as not performing its duty in law. The direction to remit and to remand it to the AO is not justified and in the peculiar facts and circumstances noted above

COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 2, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY:
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CITATION:

Assessee cannot be denied credit for TDS on the ground of Form 26AS mismatch because he is not at fault. Non-grant of TDS credit causes harassment, inconvenience & makes the assessee feel cheated. Dept to pay interest + costs of Rs. 25,000

(ii) On facts, no effort has been made by the AO to verify whether the deductor had made the payment of the TDS in the government account. On the other hand, the Income-tax department has shown helplessness in not refunding the amount on the sole ground that the details of the TDS did not match with the details shown in Form 26AS. There is a presumption that the deductor has deposited TDS amount in the government account especially when the deductor is a government department. By denying the benefit of TDS to the Petitioner because of the fault of the deductor causes not only harassment and inconvenience, but also makes the assessee feel cheated. There is no fault on the part of the Petitioner. The fault, if any, lay with the deductor. The mismatching is not attributable to the assessee. The department must refund the amount within 3 weeks with interest. The department must also pay costs of Rs. 25,000 to the Petitioner

COURT:
CORAM:
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 2, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY:
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:

No s. 40(a)(ia) disallowance for failure to deduct TDS on payment if payee has offered amount to tax. Second Proviso to s. 40(a)(ia) inserted by Finance Act 2013 w.e.f. 1.4.2013 should be treated as curative and to have retrospective effect from 1.4.2005

The second proviso to s. 40(a)(ia), introduced by the Finance Act 2013 w.e.f. 01.04.2013, read with s. 201, provides that despite failure to deduct TDS, disallowance of the expenditure shall not be made if the resident payee has (i) furnished his return of income u/s 139, (ii) taken into account such sum for computing income in such ROI, (iii) paid the tax due on the income declared by him in such return of income and (iv) furnishes a certificate to this effect from an accountant in the prescribed form. The scheme of s. 40(a)(ia) is aimed at ensuring that an expenditure should not be allowed as deduction in the hands of an assessee in a situation in which income embedded in such expenditure has remained untaxed due to tax withholding lapses by the assessee. It is not a penalty for tax withholding lapse but it is a sort of compensatory deduction restriction for an income going untaxed due to tax withholding lapse. S. 40(a)(ia), as it existed prior to insertion of second proviso thereto, went much beyond the obvious intentions of the lawmakers and created undue hardships even in cases in which the assessee’s tax withholding lapses did not result in any loss to the exchequer. Now that the legislature has been compassionate enough to cure these shortcomings of provision, and thus obviate the unintended hardships, such an amendment in law, in view of the well settled legal position to the effect that a curative amendment to avoid unintended consequences is to be treated as retrospective in nature even though it may not state so specifically, the insertion of second proviso must be given retrospective effect from the point of time when the related legal provision was introduced. Accordingly, it is held that the insertion of second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia) is declaratory and curative in nature and it has retrospective effect from 1st April, 2005, being the date from which sub clause (ia) of section 40(a) was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 (Bharati Shipyard 141 TTJ 129 (SB) applied/ distinguished, Rajinder Kumar 362 ITR 241 (Del) applied)