An alternative submission is made on behalf of the Revenue that the obligation to supply reasons on the Assessing Officer was consequent to the decision of the Apex Court that GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. Income-tax Officer (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC) rendered in 2003 while, in the present case, the reopening notice is dated 9 December 1996. Thus it submitted at the time when the notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued and the time when assessment was completed, there was no such requirement to furnish to the assessee a copy of the reasons recorded. This submission is not correct. We find that the impugned order relies upon the decision of this Court in Seista Steel Construction (P.) Ltd.  17 Taxman 122(Bom.) when it is held that in the absence of supply of reasons recorded for issue of reopening notice the assessment order would be without jurisdiction and needs to be quashed. The above view as taken by the Tribunal has also been taken by this Court in CIT vs. Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd.  21 Taxmann 53 (Bombay) viz. non-supply of reasons recorded to issue a reopening notice would make the order of Assessment passed thereon bad as being without jurisdiction
It is hardly required to be stated that, as per the well established principles of interpretation of statute, unless it is expressly provided or impliedly demonstrated, any provision of statute is to be read as having prospective effect and not retrospective effect. Under the circumstances, we find that substitution made by clause (c) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 200A can be read as having prospective effect and not having retroactive character or effect. Resultantly, the demand under Section 200A for computation and intimation for the payment of fee under Section 234E could not be made in purported exercise of power under Section 200A by the respondent for the period of the respective assessment year prior to 1.6.2015. However, we make it clear that, if any deductor has already paid the fee after intimation received under Section 200A, the aforesaid view will not permit the deductor to reopen the said question unless he has made payment under protest.
The Proviso to Section 50C inserted by the Finance Act 2016, with effect from 1st April 2017, on the recommendation of the Income Tax Simplification Committee (Easwar Committee) recognizes the genuine and intended hardship in the cases in which the date of agreement to sell is prior to the date of sale and introduces welcome amendments to the statue to take the remedial measures. However, this brings no relief to the assessee as the amendment is introduced only with prospective effect from 1st April 2017. There cannot be any dispute that this amendment in the scheme of Section 50C has been made to remove an incongruity, resulting in undue hardship to the assessee, as is evident from the observation in Easwar Committee report to the effect that “The (then prevailing) provisions of section 50C do not provide any relief where the seller has entered into an agreement to sell the asset much before the actual date of transfer of the immovable property and the sale consideration has been fixed in such agreement” recognizing the incongruity that the date agreement of sell has been ignored in the statute even though it was crucial as it was at this point of time that the sale consideration is finalized. The incongruity in the statute was glaring and undue hardship not in dispute
The income is offered by appellant on ad hoc basis without co-relating the amount of year wise disclosure without any corroborating evidence. The above disclosure has been accepted by assessing officer without referring to any incriminating material pertaining to respective years. The assessing officer as well as the 1st appellate authority has also not referred to any material based on which disclosure is made and assessed by the assessing officer. In view of this it is apparent that disclosure is without any material but merely on the statement of appellant. In our view, there may be several reasons for making surrender by an assessee and merely on this basis an inference beyond doubt cannot be drawn that there was concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars thereof on the part of the assessee towards the surrendered income to attract penal provisions under sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act
Expenditure incurred for the purchase of the machinery was undoutedly capital expenditure; for it brought in an asset of enduring advantage. But the guarantee commission stands on a different footing. By itself, it does not bring into existence any asset of an enduring nature; nor did it bring in any other advantage of an enduring benefit. The acquisition of the machinery on installment terms was only a business exigency