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DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 234E: Prior to the amendment to s. 200A w.e.f. 01.06.2015, the fee for default in filing TDS statements cannot be recovered from the assessee-deductor

The issue is whether such a levy could be effected in the course of intimation under section 200A. The answer is clearly in negative. No other provision enabling a demand in respect of this levy has been pointed out to us and it is thus an admitted position that in the absence of the enabling provision under section 200A, no such levy could be effected. As intimation under section 200A, raising a demand or directing a refund to the tax deductor, can only be passed within one year from he end of the financial year within which the related TDS statement is filed, and as the related TDS statement was filed on 19th February 2014, such a levy could only have been made at best within 31st March 2015. That time has already elapsed and the defect is thus not curable even at this stage

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DATE: August 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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CITATION:
Entire law on whether consideration for alienation of rights under a "Call Option agreement" for shares is taxable as "capital gains" or as "income from other sources" in the context of the India-Singapore DTAA explained

In common parlance, a call option is reckoned as a contract in which the holder (buyer) has the right (but not an obligation) to buy a specified quantity of a security/shares at a specified price (strike price) within a fixed period of time. For the writer (seller) of a call option, it represents an obligation to sell the underlying security at the strike price if the option is exercised. The call option writer is paid a premium for taking on the risk associated with the obligation. Here in the present case, there is very peculiar agreement/ arrangement, where the strike price has been mentioned as US $ 1 and the fixed period of time for exercising the call option has been fixed for 150 years. This factum itself means that the call option in the shares have been given for perpetuity. Not only that, an irrevocable power of attorney has also been executed in favour of the ING Bank in respect of all the shares in PHIL confirming that, assessee will not at any time purport to revoke the same, which inter-alia shows that assessee has alienated a substantive and valuable rights as an owner of the shares in perpetuity, albeit without dejure alienating the shares itself

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DATE: July 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
The fact that the Finance Minster announced a concession in Parliament does not entitle the assessee to relief if the same is not set out in the Finance Act

The whole thrust of the appellant is that the proposals of the Finance Minister were duly approved by the Parliament. No doubt, the appellant has placed before this Court the proposals of the Finance Minister which discloses the intention of the Government but there is no material placed before us to demonstrate that the budget proposals are duly accepted by the Parliament. We are unable to agree with the argument advanced by the appellant for the reason that he is unable to make note of the difference between a proposal moved before the Parliament and a statutory provision enacted by the Parliament, because the process of Taxation involves various considerations and criteria

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DATE: August 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1996-97
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CITATION:
S. 54F(4): Failure to deposit the amount of consideration not utilized towards the purchase of new flat in the specified bank account before the due date of filing return of Income u/s 139(1) is fatal to the claim for exemption. The fact that the entire amount has been paid to the developer/builder before the last date to file the ROI is irrelevant. Contrary view in K. Ramchandra Rao 277 CTR 0522 (Kar) is sub-silentio and is not good law

The sale of capital asset took place on 29th April, 1995 for a consideration of Rs.85.33 lakhs. The agreement for purchase of construction of flat for consideration of Rs.69.90 lakhs was entered into by the appellant on 16th July, 1996. An amount of Rs.35 lakhs were utilized by the Appellant in purchase of flat before the return of income was filed on 4th November, 1996 under Section 139 of the Act. However, the mandate under sub Section (4) of Section 54F of the Act is that the amount not utilized towards the purchase of the flat has to be deposited before the due date of filing return of Income under Section 139(1) of the Act in the specified bank account. In this case admittedly the entire amount of capital gains on sale of asset which is not utilized has not been deposited in a specified bank account before due date of filing of return under Section 139(1) of the Act. Therefore where the amounts of capital gains is utilized before filing of the return of income in purchase / construction of a residential house, then the benefit of exemption under Section 54F of the Act is available. Before us it is an undisputed position that except Rs.35 lakhs, the balance of the amounts subject to capital gains tax has not been utilized before date of furnishing of return of income i.e. 4th November, 1996 under Section 139 of the Act. Therefore, on plain interpretation of Section 54F of the Act, it appears that the impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be faulted

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DATE: September 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 80-IB: Fact that the AO allowed s. 80-IB deduction in the year of setting up does not disentitle him from examining the eligibility in subsequent years. As per the CBDT’s low tax effect circular, the tax effect has to be seen each year irrespective of the fact that a common issue arises over several years

An assessee must fulfill each of the conditions stipulated in Section 80-IB in each of the years in which the deduction thereunder is sought. The Assessing Officer would be entitled to ascertain in each of the assessment years whether or not the conditions of Section 80-IB remained fulfilled. In other words, even where an assessee is found to have fulfilled all the conditions of Section 80-IB in the initial assessment year and has on account thereof been granted the deduction thereunder, an Assessing Officer assessing the assessee’s income in subsequent years would be entitled to ascertain whether in that assessment year the conditions in Section 80-IB remained fulfilled or not. If not, he is bound to deny the deduction

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DATE: July 4, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 133A: While an assessment cannot be made on the basis of a statement recorded u/s 133A, if the maker of the statement has re-affirmed the statement and nothing has been produced to show that the contents of the statement are incorrect, the assessment is valid

Whatever statement is recorded under Section 133A of the Income-tax Act it is not given any evidentiary value obviously for the reason that the officer is not authorised to administer oath and to take any sworn statement which alone has evidentiary value as contemplated under law. Therefore, there is much force in the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the statement elicited during the survey operation has not evidentiary value and the Income-tax Officer was well aware of this

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DATE: August 31, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Prosecution: Important law relating to the territorial jurisdiction and competence of the Deputy Director of Income-tax to lodge a complaint for evasion of tax explained

The Parliament has unmistakably designated the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) to be the appellate forum from the orders as enumerated under Section 246(1) of the Act. This however, in our view, as observed hereinabove does not detract from the recognition of this authority to be the appellate forum before whom appeals from the decisions of an assessing officer or of an officer of the same rank thereto would generally and ordinarily lie even in the contingencies not referred to in particular in sub section 1 of Section 246. This is more so, to reiterate, in absence of any provision under the Act envisaging the Deputy Director of Income Tax to be an appellate forum in any eventuality beyond those contemplated in Section 246(1) of the Act. Neither the hierarchy of the income tax authorities as listed in Section 116 of the Act nor in the notification issued under Section 118 thereof, nor their duties, functions, jurisdictions as prescribed by the cognate provisions alluded heretobefore, permit a deduction that in the scheme of the legislation, the Deputy Director of Income Tax has been conceived also to be an appellate forum to which appeals from the orders/decisions of the I.T.Os./assessing officers would ordinarily lie within the meaning of Section 195(4) of the Code. The Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation)-I Bhopal, (M.P.), in our unhesitant opinion, therefore cannot be construed to be an authority to whom appeal would ordinarily lie from the decisions/orders of the I.T.Os. involved in the search proceedings in the case in hand so as to empower him to lodge the complaint in view of the restrictive preconditions imposed by Section 195 of the Code. The complaint filed by the Deputy Director of Income Tax, (Investigation)-I, Bhopal (M.P.), thus on an overall analysis of the facts of the case and the law involved has to be held as incompetent

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DATE: June 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 37(1): Expenditure incurred by a director in engaging lawyers to defend himself against cases filed for violation of the law by the Company of which he is a director is not personal expenditure but is allowable as business expenditure

Mr. Nimesh Kampani has been mentioned as one of the accused among several others, for non-payment of these fixed deposits by Nagarjuna Finance Limited. The Andhra Pradesh Government had since filed suit against directors of Nagarjuna Finance Limited including Mr. Kampani. To defend himself, Mr. Kampani has appointed various advocates to represent his case before various courts viz, District Court, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Supreme Court of India. As the expenditure is incurred to protect his business interest the same is required to be allowed u/s. 37(1) of the Act. Accordingly we direct the A.O. to allow legal expenses of Rs.40,72,750/-

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DATE: June 21, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
As per CBDT Instruction No. 9/2013 dated 22.07.2013, appeals against imposition of penalty or levy of interest in which the aggregate of penalty imposed or interest levied by the AO is more than Rs. 3 crore in the cities of Mumbai and Delhi are to be argued by the CIT(DR) and matters other than this are to be argued by the Senior DR

As per CBDT Instruction No. 9/2013 dated 22.07.2013, appeals against imposition of penalty or levy of interest in which the aggregate of penalty imposed or interest levied by the AO is more than Rs. 3 crore in the cities of Mumbai and Delhi are to be argued by the CIT(DR) and matters other than this are to be argued by the Senior DR

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DATE: August 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 5, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Order of the Tribunal in refusing to follow judgement of the co-ordinate bench in the assessee’s own case (holding that transfer fees and TDR premium received by a cooperative society is not taxable on principles of mutuality) without giving reasons is not justified and is breach of principles of judicial discipline

We are of the view that when an identical issue, which had earlier arisen before the Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal on identical facts and a view has been taken on the issue then judicial discipline would demand that a subsequent bench of the Tribunal hearing the same issue should follow the view taken by its earlier Coordinate Bench. No doubt this discipline is subject to the well settled exceptions of the earlier order being passed per incurim or sub silentio or in the meantime, there has been any change in law, either statutory or by virtue of judicial pronouncement. If the earlier order does not fall within the exception which affects its binding character before a coordinate bench of the Tribunal, then it has to follow it. However, if the Tribunal has a view different then the view taken by its Coordinate Bench on an identical issue, then the order taking such a different view must record its reasons as to why it does not follow the earlier order of the Tribunal on an identical issue, which could only be on one of the well settled exceptions which affect the binding nature of the earlier order. It could also depart from the earlier view of the Tribunal if there is difference in facts from the earlier order of Coordinate Bench but the same must be recorded in the order. The impugned order is blissfully silent about the reason why it chooses to ignore the earlier decision of the Tribunal rendered after consideration of Sind Co. Op. Hsg. Society (supra), and take a view contrary to that taken by its earlier Coordinate Bench

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