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DATE: November 17, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Interplay between Article 9 of the DTAA and Transfer Pricing law in the Act explained. While Article 9 is an enabling provision, the TP mechanism under the domestic law is the machinery provision. There is no occasion to read Article 9 as confined to enabling ALP adjustment in respect of only domestic entities. The mere fact that the OECD Commentary etc give examples related to economic double taxation situations does not imply that the Article 9 (1) cannot be applied to other situations

Once it is not in dispute that the arms length standards are, therefore, to be applied in computation of taxable profits, as is specific mandate of article 9, it is only axiomatic that the manner in which arm’s length standards are to be applied is something which has not been defined by the treaties and the mechanism provided under the domestic law, therefore, must hold good. Article 9(1) does not, and cannot, provide the basis of the ALP adjustments as tax treaties restrict application of domestic law of taxation rather than create independent rights of taxation. Article 9(1) is thus, in a way, an enabling provision, and the TP mechanism under the domestic law is the machinery provision. The provisions of article 9(1) permit ALP adjustment in all situations in which the arm’s length standards require higher profits in the hands of any “one of the enterprises, but by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued” to be “included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly”. The provisions are clear and unambiguous. There is no occasion to read this provision as confined to enabling ALP adjustment in respect of only domestic entities

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DATE: November 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Taxability of software license fees as royalty: Non-consideration of the verdict of the Tribunal in Solid Works Corporation (51 SOT 34) and misreading of the Delhi High Court's verdict in Ericsson AB constitutes a mistake apparent from the record u/s 254(2) and the orders have to be recalled

In the instant appeals, the Tribunal admittedly did not consider the decision rendered by co-ordinate bench in the case of Solid Works Corporation (supra), even though it was relied upon by the assessees herein. The assessees have contended that the non-consideration of the decision of co-ordinate bench, when it was specifically relied upon by the assessee would result in a mistake apparent from record and would warrant recall of the order. In support of this contention, the assessees have placed their reliance on the decision rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Honda Siel Power Products Ltd (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the Tribunal was justified in exercising its power u/s 254(2) when it was pointed out to the Tribunal that the judgement of co-ordinate bench was placed before the Tribunal when the original order came to be passed but it had committed a mistake in not considering the material which was already on record

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DATE: November 23, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 50C: If the difference between the sale consideration of the property shown by the assessee and the FMV determined by the DVO u/s 50C(2) is less than 10%, the AO is not justified in substituting the value determined by the DVO for the sale consideration disclosed by the assessee. Unregistered sale agreements prior to 01.10.2009 are not subject to s. 50C as per CBDT Circular No.5/10 dated 03.06.2010

We are also inclined to agree with learned AR Mr. Shashank Dandu that in view of the decision of Co-ordinate Bench in case of Rahul Constructions vs. DCIT (Pune) (Trib.) 38 DTR 19 (2010) ITA No.1543/Pn/2007 since the difference between the sale consideration of the property shown by the assessee and the FMV determined by the DVO under Section 50C(2) being less than 10 per cent, AO was not justified in substituting the value determined by the DVO for the sale consideration disclosed by the assessee

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DATE: August 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 14, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Bogus share capital: Interplay between s. 56(2)(viib) and s. 68 explained. Amendment to s. 68 casting onus on assessee and requiring it to explain source of source of share subscription is clarificatory and retrospective. Law in Lovely Exports 299 ITR 268, Sophia Finance 205 ITR 98 etc does not apply as they are prior to the Money Laundering Act 2002

A conjoint reading of proviso to section 68 and section 56(2)(viib) divulges that where a closely held company receives, inter alia, some amount as share premium whose genuineness is not proved by the assessee company or its source etc. is not proved by the shareholder to the satisfaction of the AO, then the entire amount including the fair market value of the shares, is chargeable to tax u/s 68 of the Act. If however, the genuineness of the amount is proved and the shareholder also proves his source, then the hurdle of section 68 stands crossed and the share premium, to the extent stipulated, is chargeable to tax u/s 56(2)(viib) of the Act. It shows that only when source of such share premium in the hands of a shareholder is properly explained to the satisfaction of the AO, that the provisions of section 56(2)(viib) gets triggered

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DATE: August 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 14, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 41(1): Amounts shown as liabilities in the Balance Sheet cannot be deemed to be cases of "cessation of liability" only because the liabilities are outstanding for several years. The AO has to establish with evidence that there has been a cessation of liability with regard to the outstanding creditors

When the Assessing Officer was of the view that there was cessation of liability in the case on hand, it was incumbent upon him to cause necessary enquiries to be made in order to bring on record material evidence to establish the requirement for invoking the provisions of section 41(1) of the Act. The very fact that the assessee reflects these amounts as creditors in his Balance Sheet as on 31/3/2007, is an acknowledgement of his liability to these creditors and this also automatically extends the period of limitation under section18 of the Limitation Act. Once the assessee acknowledges that the debts to creditors are outstanding in his Balance Sheet, that he is liable to pay his creditors, Revenue cannot suo-moto conclude that the creditors have remitted their liability or that the liability has otherwise ceased to exist, without bringing on record any material evidence to the contrary

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DATE: September 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 12, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06 to 2008-09
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CITATION:
The pre-amended Explanation 5A to s. 271(1)(c) applies to non-filer assessees where a ROI is not filed before search and undisclosed income is not offered in the ROI. The amended provision of Explanation 5A, which is applicable to both filers and non-filers of returns, does not apply to searches conducted pre 13.08.2009. Penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) to cases which are covered by s. 271AAA is void

The provisions of explanation 5A to section 271(1)(c) as it stood as on the date of search or filing of the return u/s 153A of the Act, is important to reckon whether the deeming fiction provided in the said provisions is applicable or not. The pre-amended provisions of explanation 5A is applicable to a non filer assessees, where the assessee’s is not filed return of income before the search and also not disclosed the undisclosed income in the return of income. The amended provision of explanation 5A, which is brought into the statute by the Finance Act 2009, (which was received ascent of President on 13.8.2009) is applicable to both filers and non-filers of returns. In the present case on hand, the law applicable as on the date of search, which was pre-amended provisions of explanation 5A, as per which no penalty can be leviable, in case the assessee has filed return of income u/s 139(1) of the Act before the date of search, whether or not undisclosed income is disclosed in the said return. Admittedly in this case, the search is taken place on 16.11.2007. The assessee has filed return of income u/s 1534 of the Act u/s 30.1.2009

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DATE: October 21, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 12, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 35(2AB): The AO is bound to grant deduction if the R&D facility is approved by the competent authority. He has no jurisdiction in sit in judgement over the approval. The fact that the competent authority did not file the report with the department as prescribed is a technical lapse for which the assessee is not liable.

Once, the R&D facility is approved by the competent authority and assessee has complied with the prescribed rules, the A.O. is bound to allow the deductions claimed u/s 35(2AB) of the Act, if he is satisfied that the assessee’s facility is approved by the competent authority. In case the A.O. is having any doubt with regard to the goods manufactured by the assessee or expenditure claimed, the A.O. is bound to refer the matter back to the competent authority through appropriate authority i.e. the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) and seek clarifications. Thus, it would emerge from above analysis that neither the A.O. nor the board was competent to take any decision of any such controversy relating to report and approval granted by the prescribed authority as it involved expert view or opinion. It was prescribed authority alone which would be competent to take decision with regard to the correctness or otherwise and its order of approval granted in form no.3CL as prescribed u/s 35(2AB) of the Act read with rule 7A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. In the present case on hand, on perusal of the facts available on record, we find that the A.O. without following the procedure laid down under rules, simply disallowed the expenditure claimed by the assessee by holding that the goods manufactured by the assessee are mere office machines and apparatus listed in Eleventh schedule. Therefore, we are of the view that the A.O. is not correct in disallowing the claim made by the assessee u/s 35(2AB) of the Act

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DATE: October 21, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Strictures: Department's recalcitrance to release the assessee's seized jewellery, even though it is so small as to constitute "stridhan" and even though no addition was sustained in the assessee's hands, is not "mere inaction" but is one of "deliberate harassment"

This court is of opinion that the respondent’s recalcitrance is not mere inaction; it is one of deliberate harassment. Unarguably, the first round of assessment proceedings culminated in no addition of the jewellery or its value in the hands of the petitioner’s husband. The matter ought to have rested there, because the further proceedings were at the behest of the petitioner’s husband who was aggrieved by the additions made (and not aggrieved by the decision on issues in his favour). The ITAT’s decision to proceed de novo, nevertheless strengthened the respondents’ obduracy and hardened their resolve not to release the jewellery. The de novo order did not result in any addition on that aspect at all; still the respondents cling to another ingenious argument- that till the petitioners’ husband’s tax demands are satisfied, they can detain the jewellery

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DATE: August 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
Article 5 DTAA: Law explained as to when a "power of attorney" holder of a non-resident can constitute a "dependent agent", "fixed place of business" and a "permanent establishment" under Article 5 of the DTAA. The fact that the physical presence of the non-resident in India is nominal is irrelevant

While business constitutes continuous activity in organized manner it is often a question of fact & law. “Place of business” usually means a premises of the enterprise used for carrying on the business, whether or not exclusively used for business. The residence of the country Manager was held to be a fixed place of business as the same was used as an office address in Sutron Corporation In re 268 ITR 156 AAR. Similarly an office space of 3 x 6 metres in Motorola Inc & Ors 95 ITD 269 (Del). To constitute a PE, the business must be located at a single place for a reasonable length of time. The activity need not be permanent, endless or without interruptions. It may not be out of place to mention that functions performed by Sri V. Subramanian or the Indian subsidiary could not be classified as preparatory or auxiliary in character. The facts strongly indicate towards Sri V. Subramanian constituting a dependent agent / PE for reasons brought on record by the AO and as discussed in foregoing paragraphs. There were no presence of a number of principals who exercised legal and or economic control over the agent Sri V. Subramanian. The principal i.e. the assessee has failed to demonstrate this aspect when confronted by the AO. The principal i.e. the assessee was relying on the special skills and knowledge of the agent Sri V. Subramanian the Managing Director of the Indian entity by the same name and rendering similar functions. Sri V. Subramanian was acting exclusively or almost exclusively for and on behalf of the assessee during the currency of the contracts in question. To that extent it was not in furtherance of his ordinary course of business. Finally the refuge taken of Article 5(2)(j) on the short period of contracts and the interregnum does not offer any solace to the assessee either. The assessee has not demonstrated it was a mere passing, transient or casual presence for its activity in India

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DATE: September 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 7, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 279(2) Compounding of offenses: The fact that the assessee has been convicted of an offense does not mean that the application for compounding of the offense is not maintainable. Under the guidelines, the competent authority has to examine the merits of the case and decide whether there is a case for compounding. There are no fetters on the powers of the competent authority under the guidelines. An appeal filed against a conviction is a "proceeding" for s. 279(2).

The power of compounding is exercisable when proceedings are pending. In the case on hand, the sentence imposed on the petitioner has been suspended by the Appellate Court and the appeal is still pending. Therefore, it has to be seen as to whether that conviction by the Criminal Court should be the only reason for rejecting the petitioner’s application for compounding the offence. Clause 4.4 of the guidelines states that cases not to be compounded. It commences with a non obstante clause stating that notwithstanding anything contained in the guidelines, the category of cases mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) should normally not be compounded. Thus, the guidelines does not specifically place an embargo on the competent authority to consider the application for compounding merely on the ground when the assessee has been convicted by a court of law

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