S. 32: Sale & lease transactions by banks are genuine and eligible for depreciation

S. 32 allows depreciation if the asset is “owned, wholly or partly, by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business“. There is no requirement that the asset must be used by the assessee himself. It is sufficient if the asset is utilized for the purpose of business of the assessee. The argument, relying on McDowell 154 ITR 148 (SC), that Sale & Lease Back transactions are a devise for lowering the tax effect cannot be accepted. Sale & Lease Back transactions are genuine and cannot be considered to be sham. By virtue of the judgement in Cosmo Films Ltd 338 ITR 266 (Del), the contrary judgements in MidEast 87 ITD 537 (Mum) (SB) and Induslnd Bank 135 ITD 165 (Mum) (SB) are impliedly reversed (ICDS Ltd 350 ITR 527 (SC) & Development Credit Bank Ltd (ITAT Mum) followed)

The real object of the entering into the sale and lease back transaction so far as Konkan Railway is concerned is to raise funds. The transaction of sale of the asset to the assessee bank and its lease back to Konkan Railway cannot be separated. It was not possible for Konkan Railway to sell out the railway system. Thus, the sale transaction was merely on paper and to facilitate the financial arrangement by the assessee to Konkan Railway without involving any real intention of transfer of the assets. The terms of the lease agreement are only to secure the interest of the bank till the recovery of the full amount along with the interest. The assessee cannot exercise the real and actual ownership over the asset keeping in view the facts and circumstances and nature of the asset in question. Further, under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 read with RBI circular dated 19.2.1994, banking companies can undertake the activities of equipment leasing but these are required to be treated on par with loans and advances. Therefore, the activity of equipment leasing permitted by the RBI is only in the nature of finance lease. The terms and conditions specified by the RBI for income recognition of lease transactions are also on par with the manner in which a loan transaction is treated. In view of the said circular, there is no scope for treating the instant lease agreement as that of an operating lease (IndusInd Bank 135 ITD 165 (Mum) (SB) followed; ICDS 350 ITR 527 (SC) distinguished on the basis that the lease there was not by a Bank but by a NBFC).

There is a distinction between a case where the software is supplied along with hardware as part of the equipment and there is no separate sale of the software and a case where the software is sold separately. Where the software is an integral part of the supply of equipment, the consideration for that is not assessable as “royalty”. However, in a case where the software is sold separately, the consideration for it is assessable as “royalty”. On facts, the assessee had received a license to use the copyright belonging to the non-resident. The non-resident supplier continued to be the owner of the copyright and all other intellectual property rights. As there was a transfer of the right to use the copyright, the payment made by Reliance to Lucent was “for the use of or the right to use copyright” and constituted “royalty” under s. 9(1)(vi) and Article 12(3) of the India-USA DTAA.

Law on non-taxing foreign PE profits no longer good law after insertion of s. 90(3) & Notification dated 28.08.2008 (which has clarificatory effect)

The law laid down by the Courts on the interpretation of the expression “may be taxed” that once the tax is payable or paid in the country of source, then the country of residence is denied of the right to levy tax on would no longer apply after the insertion of s. 90 (3) w.e.f. 1.4.2004, i.e. AY 2004-05 pursuant to which Notification dated 28.08.2008 has been issued. The said Notification is clarificatory in nature and hence the interpretation given by the Central Government through the Notification is effective from 1.4.2004. Also, as the phrase “may be taxed” is not appearing in the statute but is appearing in the DTAA, the interpretation as understood and intended by the negotiating parties should be adopted. Here one of the parties i.e., Government of India has clearly specified the intent and the object of this phrase and the meaning assigned by the Government of India for a phrase or term used in the DTAA notification will prevail. The result is that the business income from the P.E. in Oman and Qatar and also the capital gain from sale of assets in these countries will be chargeable to tax in India

Expl 5 to s. 271(1)(c): Undisclosed income offered in belated return filed u/s 139(4) eligible for immunity from penalty

Explanation 5A to s. 271(1)(c) provides that if during the course of search, the assessee is found to be the owner of any asset or income which has not been shown in the return of income which has been furnished before the date of search and the “due date” for filing the return of income has expired, the assessee is deemed to have concealed the particulars of his income or furnish inaccurate particulars of income and liable for penalty u/s 271(1)(c). In other words, if the income is offered in the return is filed by the “due date”, no penalty can be imposed. The question is whether the “due date” in Explanation 5A encompasses a belated return filed u/s 139(4). The “due date” can be very well inferred as due date of filing of return of income u/s 139(4) because wherever the legislature has provided the consequences of filing of the return of income u/s 139(4), then the same has also been specifically provided. E.g., s. 139(3) which denies the benefit of carry forward of losses u/s 72 to 74A if the return of income is not filed within the time limit provided u/s 139(1). In absence of such a restriction, the limitation of time of “due date” cannot be strictly reckoned with s. 139(1). Even a belated return filed u/s 139(4) will be entitled to the benefit of immunity from penalty (Rajesh Kumar Jalan 286 ITR 276 (Gau) & Jagriti Aggarwal 339 ITR 610 (P&H) & Jagtar Singh Chawla (decisions in the context of s. 54) followed)

The assessee’s claim that the effect of the assignment of the work of customs clearance and installation by Tellabs Denmark to the assessee is that an independent contract came into existence between the assessee and Power Grid and that as both parties were residents, the transfer pricing provisions cannot apply is not acceptable because it is clear from the various agreements that there has been only an assignment of the portion of an onshore contract by Tellabs Denmark to the assessee and not a novation of the portion of the onshore contract between Tellabs Denmark and PGCIL. The consequences in the event of an assignment and novation are different. Since there has only been an assignment and not novation of the contract in the present case, the transaction of assignment between the assessee and Tellabs Denmark cannot be said to be a transaction between two persons either or both of them were not non-residents. It is a very strange situation because if Tellabs Denmark had not assigned the portion of the onshore contract, the transfer pricing provisions would not have been applicable because Tellabs Denmark and PGCIL are not Associated Enterprises. Though the assignment of the portion of the onshore contract has taken place exactly at the same consideration for which Tellabs Denmark agreed to render services to PGCIL, nevertheless, the assignment agreement between Tellabs Denmark and the assessee has all the ingredients of an international transaction within the meaning of s.92 of the Act. However, the ALP will have to be determined afresh because the international transaction is the assignment between Tellabs Denmark and the assessee and not the agreement between the assessee and PGCIL. The TPO should also consider whether as the assignment of the contract had taken place due to business restructuring and on the same terms as agreed between Tellabs Denmark and PGCIL, it could be said that this transaction itself would constitute a comparable uncontrolled transaction (Swarnandhra IJMII Integrated Township (ITAT Hyd) distinguished).

Law on s. 192 TDS obligation on medical reimbursement & LTC explained

Though TDS has to be effected at the time of payment of salary, s. 192(3) permits the employer to increase or reduce the amount of TDS for any excess or deficiency. Even assuming that the case of the AO that at the time of payment the assessee ought to have deducted tax at source is sustainable, the assessee, on a review of the taxes deducted during the earlier months of the previous year, is entitled to give effect to the deductions permissible under proviso (iv) to s.17(2) or exemption u/s10(5) of the Act in the later months of the previous year. What has to be seen is the taxes to be deducted on income under the head ‘salaries’ as on the last date of the previous year. The case of the AO that LTC and Medical reimbursement should be paid at the time the expenditure is incurred or after the expenditure is incurred by way of reimbursement and not at an earlier point of time and that if it is so paid, then, even though the payment would not form part of taxable salary of an employee, the employer has to deduct tax at source treating it as part of salary, is contrary to s.192(3) and cannot be sustained. The reliance placed by the AO on the expression “actually incurred” in s.10(5) & Proviso (iv) to s.17(2) cannot be sustained. In any event, the interpretation of the word “actually paid” is not relevant while ascertaining the quantum of tax that has to be deducted at source u/s192. As far as the assessee is concerned, his obligation is only to make an ”estimate” of the income under the head “salaries” and such estimate has to be a bona fide estimate. The primary liability of the payee to pay tax remains. In a situation of honest difference of opinion, it is not the deductor that is to be proceeded against but the payees of the sums. On facts, as the assessee had granted exemption towards medical expenditure and leave travel after verifying the details and evidence furnished by the employees, it could not be treated as an assessee-in-default.

S. 32: A finance lease designed as a sale-and-lease back has to be treated as a sham transaction

A distinction between an ‘operating lease’ and a ‘finance lease’ has been made by the Special Bench in IndusInd Bank 135 ITD 165 (Mum) (SB) on the basis of which it can be said that a ‘finance lease’ is a ‘sale’ which is given the colour of a ‘lease’ by the parties for their mutual benefit and to avoid tax. In such transactions, it has to be seen whether the sale transaction is a real transaction or a sham transaction with the object of enabling the alleged purchaser to claim himself as the owner of the goods, which are further claimed to be leased back to the original owner of the goods. In a sham transaction of sale and lease back the ownership of the goods is not transferred to the alleged lessor, but is shown to be done, so as to enable the purchaser to claim ownership for the goods for the purpose of tax relief. On facts, the ‘sale and lease back’ transaction is a sham transaction done with the object to facilitate the benefits of depreciation to a person who otherwise is not eligible to claim the same. The intention of the parties was not that of sale or lease but was a loan transaction. The rates of interest/ rental have been fixed taking into consideration that the equipments are eligible for 100% depreciation and it is provided that if the claim of depreciation is changed, the rental in the shape of interest will accordingly change. Such clauses cannot be a part of any lease agreement but finance agreement only because in a normal lease agreement, the lessee is not concerned as to what benefits are available to the owner/ lessor under the Income-tax Act. The contention that as the transaction is with a State Government undertaking, it would be highly improper to impute any collusiveness or colourable nature of the transaction is misconceived. The argument that there is no bar for the assessee for making tax planning so as to reduce its taxes, provided it is within the framework of the law, is also not acceptable as u/s 23 of the Indian Contract Act, even if the consideration or object of an agreement may not be expressly forbidden by law, but if it is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of law, the same will not be lawful. Engaging in sham transactions with the object of reducing tax liability cannot be said to be a case of tax avoidance but is one of tax evasion (ICDS 350 ITR 527 (SC), IndusInd Bank 135 ITD 165 (Mum)(SB) & Development Credit Bank referred)