The expression, “any other business or commercial rights of similar nature” in the definition of “intangible asset” in s. 32 (1)(i) shows that the initial part, i.e. know how, patents, copyrights, trademarks, license, franchises, has been disjointed by the conjunction ‘or. The use of the disjunction ‘or’ has a very relevant role, because, the legislature accepts the difference and distinction of intangibles and rights. The legislature has used ‘or’ in the provision for explaining the distinction of application of like nature with that of the unlike nature, which is an accepted principle i.e. doctrine of ejusdem generis. Taking note of the word ‘or’, used as a disjunction is essential to carve out a meaningful genus. The argument whether non compete rights constitute is a right in rem or a right in personam is a matter to be decided by an appropriate higher judicial forum. The judgement of the Supreme Court in Smifs Securities 348 ITR 302 (SC) that goodwill is an intangible asset eligible for depreciation is not applicable to a non-compete right. Non-compete fee does not fall within the ambit of any other commercial or business rights. As regards the claim of amortization, since the payment of Rs. 18 crores is a capital expenditure, it cannot be allowed as an expense and also can(not) be amortized (Sharp Business System 254 CTR 233(Del) followed. Real Image Tech 120 TTJ 983)(Che), Medicorp Technologies 30 SOT 506 (Che), Bunge Agribusiness 132 lTD 549)(Mum), Serum Institute 135 ITD 69)(Pune) treated as not good law).

Share application money or share application advance is distinct from ‘loan or advance’. Although share application money is one kind of advance given with the intention to obtain the allotment of shares/equity/preference shares etc, such advances are innately different form the normal loan or advances specified both in section 269SS or 2(22)(e) of the Act. Unless the mala fide is demonstrated by the AO with evidence, the book entries or resolution of the Board of the assessee become relevant and credible, which should not be dismissed without bringing any adverse material to demonstrate the contrary. It is also evident that share application money when partly returned without any allotment of shares, such refunds should not be classified as ‘loan or advance’ merely because share application advance is returned without allotment of share. In the instant case, the refund of the amount was done for commercial reasons and also in the best interest of the prospective share applicant. Further, it is self explanatory that the assessee being a ‘beneficial share holder’, derives no benefit whatsoever, when the impugned ‘share application money/advance’ is finally returned without any allotment of shares for commercial reasons. In this kind of situations, the books entries become really relevant as they show the initial intentions of the parties into the transactions. It is undisputed that the books entries suggest clearly the ‘share application’ nature of the advance and not the ‘loan or advance’. As such the revenue has merely suspected the transactions without containing any material to support the suspicion. Therefore, the share application money may be an advance but they are not advances which are referred to in section 2(22)(e) of the Act. Such advances, when returned without any allotment or part allotment of shares to the applicant/subscriber, will not take a nature of the loan merely because the same is repaid or returned or refunded in the same year or later years after keeping the money for some time with the company. So long as the original intention of payment of share application money is towards the allotment of shares of any kind, the same cannot be deemed as ‘loan or advance’ unless the mala fide intentions are exposed by the AO with evidence

U/s 5(2)(b) income accruing or arising in India is chargeable to tax in India. A website does not constitute a ‘permanent establishment’ unless the servers on which websites are hosted are also located in the same jurisdiction. As the servers of Google and Yahoo are not located in India, there is no PE in India. As regards the second limb of s. 5(2)(b) of “income deemed to accrue or arise in India”, on heas to consider s. 9. S. 9(1)(i) does not apply as there is no “business connection” in India nor are the online advertising revenues generated in India serviced by any entity based in India. As regards s. 9(1)(vi), it is held in Yahoo and Pinstorm that the advertising revenues are not assessable as “royalty”. As regards s. 9(1)(vii), the services are not “managerial” or “consultancy” in nature as both these words involve a human element. Applying the rule of noscitur a sociis, even the word “technical” in Explanation 2 to s. 9 (1) (vii) would have to be construed as involving a human element. If there is no human intervention in a technical service, it cannot be treated as a technical service u/s 9(1)(vii). On facts, the service rendered by Google & Yahoo is generation of certain text on the search engine result page. This is a wholly automated process. In the services rendered by the search engines, which provide these advertising opportunities, there is no human touch at all. The results are completely automated. Consequently, the whole process of actual advertising service provided by Google & Yahoo, even if it be a technical service, is not covered by the limited scope of s. 9(1)(vii). Consequently, the receipts in respect of online advertising on Google and Yahoo cannot be brought to tax in India under the provisions of the Act or the India US and India Ireland tax treaty.

The view of the Larger Bench that the assessee had to be directly engaged in developing, maintaining and operating the facility and that there had to be a complete development of the facility and not just a part of it is contrary to the law laid down in ABG Heavy Industries 322 ITR 323 (Bom). The High Court held that the effect of the amendment by the Finance Act of 1999 is that the benefit of s. 80IA(4) is available to any enterprise carrying on the business of (i) developing, (ii) maintaining & operating, or (iii) developing, maintaining and operating an infrastructure facility. It was also held that the assessee did not have to develop the entire project in order to qualify for deduction u/s 80-IA and that Parliament did not legislate a condition impossible of compliance. The Explanation below 80-IA (13) inserted by FA 2007 & 2009 w.r.e.f 1.4.2000 which provides that s. 80-IA(4) shall not apply to a person executing a “works contract” does not apply to a case where the assessee executes the work by shouldering Investment & technical risk by employing team of technically & administratively qualified persons and it is liable for liquidated damages if failed to fulfill the obligation laid down in the agreement and also securing by Bank guarantee. On facts, the assessee had shouldered the investment & technical risk in respect of the work executed and it was liable for liquidated damages if failed to fulfill the obligation laid down in the agreement. The liability which had been assumed by the assessee were obligations involving the development of an infrastructure facility. Consequently, it is not correct to say that the assessee is merely a contractor & not a developer. The assessee is eligible for benefit u/s 80-1A even if only part of the Infrastructural Project work is executed by it

Press Note no.9 of 2000 issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in respect of FDI policy and prescribing the percentage of royalty to the sales allowed under automatic route cannot substitute as ALP to be determined under the provisions of the Act and Rules. FDI policy permitting certain percentage of payment of royalty is only for remittance of the amount in foreign exchange and therefore, such permission given in an entirely different context and purpose cannot be considered as relevant for determination of the ALP under I. T. Act. The RBI is only concerned with the foreign exchange and, therefore, would look into the matter from that point of view. The RBI, at the time of giving such permission would not keep in mind the provisions of the I T Act and that is the function of the income tax authorities and, cannot be validly go into such an issue. When a proper mechanism is provided under the provisions of the I. T. Act and Rules for determination of the ALP, then the approval by other than the I. T. Authorities, for the purpose of remittance/outflow of the foreign exchange, does not ipso facto, partake the character of ALP, which has to be determined as per TP regulations (Nestle India Ltd 337 ITR 103 (Del) followed)

The assessee’s collaboration agreement with its AE for payment of 2% of contract value for manufacturing, drawing and engineering services and 5% of the selling price as royalty falls under the “automatic approval scheme” of the RBI. When the rate of royalty payment and fee for drawings etc. has been approved or deemed to have been approved by the RBI, then such payment has to be considered at ALP

As the assessee’s operates in four different & independent segments and it submitted segmental accounts for each of its operation, the correct approach under TNMM should be to determine the ALP of each of the segments by comparing with the corresponding comparables involved in similar lines of functioning after proper FAR analysis. As the TPO had details of each segment-wise profit margin of the comparables, he ought to have compared the relevant profit margins with that of the assessee’s profit margins in each segment. His approach of taking the weighted average method of arriving at entity based profit margin is not correct. Also, his approach of making the adjustment on the entire turnover of the assessee including transactions with non-AEs instead of restricting it to the AEs’ transactions is not supported by the transfer pricing provisions. Further, in arriving at the segment-wise profit margin, the TPO should carry out an analysis of each company’s business activity, why they are selected as comparable and what are the functions of the company, operating margins, etc. He should adopt proper parameters/filters in respect of each segment. If the assessee opposes the selection of comparables by the TPO, it is the responsibility of the TPO to furnish necessary details. The onus cannot be shifted to the assessee when it is contending that proper data is not available in public domain in this regard

CUP is the most appropriate method for ascertaining the arms length price of an international transaction of lending money. Where the transaction is of lending money in foreign currency to its foreign subsidiaries, the comparable transactions have to be of foreign currency lent by unrelated parties. The financial position and credit rating of the subsidiaries will be broadly the same as the holding company. In such a situation, domestic prime lending rate would have no applicability and the international rate fixed being LIBOR should be taken as the benchmark rate for international transactions. On facts, the assessee had an arrangement for loan with CitiBank for less than 4% and on the loan provided to its AE’s it had charged 4% interest. Hence, the adjustment made by the TPO was not warranted (Siva Industries 59 DTR 182 (Che), Four Soft 62 DTR 308 (Hyd), Tech Mahindra 46 SOT 141 (Mum) & Tata Autocomp Systems 73 DTR 220 (Mum) followed)