Though s. 92CA enables the AO to refer an international transaction to the TPO if he considers it “necessary or expedient” to do so, Instruction No. 3 dated 25.5.2003 makes it mandatory for the AO to make a reference to the TPO if the aggregate value of the international transaction exceeds Rs. 5 crores. This Circular, having been issued u/s 119, is binding on the AO. The AO ought to have referred the matter to the TPO having regard to the fact that Specialized Cell was created to deal with complicated and complex issues arising out of the transfer mechanism. The AO’s omission to follow the binding Circular amounted to making assessment without conducting proper inquiry and investigation and resulted in the order becoming “erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue”. The observations in Sony India 288 ITR 52 (Del) (while upholding the constitutional validity of the aforesaid Circular) that the said Circular was a “Guideline” which did not take away the discretion of the AO was made in a different context

The question that has to be considered is whether the expenditure is incurred for initiating the business or for removing an obstruction to facilitate an existing business. Expenditure incurred for running the business or working it, with a view to produce profits is in the nature of revenue expenditure. The aim and object of the expenditure determines its character and not the source and manner of its payment. The fact that the expenditure is ‘once and for all’ is not conclusive. While expenditure for acquisition of a source of income would ordinarily be capital expenditure, expenditure which merely enables the profit making structure to work more efficiently would be in the nature of revenue expenditure. Expenditure incurred to fine tune trading operations to enable the management to run the business effectively, efficiently and profitably leaving the fixed assets untouched would be an expenditure of a revenue nature even though the advantage obtained may last for an indefinite period. On facts, the land belonged to the assessee and the amount paid for removal of encroachers was not for acquisition of new assets. The payment was made to facilitate its smooth functioning of the business i.e. in relation to carrying on the business in a profitable manner (Airport Authority of India 303 ITR 433 (Del) reversed; Bikaner Gypsum vs. CIT 187 ITR 39 (SC) followed)

In the books, the assessee treated the non-compete expenditure as capital in nature. Warding off competition in business even to a rival dealer will constitute capital expenditure. It is not necessary that the non-compete fee has to be paid to create monopoly rights. The non-compete agreement was to last for 5 years, which period is sufficient to give enduring benefit (Tecumesh India 132 TTJ 129 (Del) (SB) approved; Eicher Ltd 302 ITR 249 (Del) distinguished; Q whether depreciation is eligible left for determination by AO).

The profits from the supply of equipment were not chargeable to tax in India because the property and risk in goods passed to the buyer outside India. The assessee had not performed installation service in India. The fact that the contracts were signed in India could not by itself create a tax liability. The nomenclature of a “turnkey project” or “works contract” was not relevant. The fact that the assessee took “overall responsibility” was also not material. Though the supply of equipment was subject to the “acceptance test” performed in India, this was not material because the contract made it clear that the “acceptance test” was not a material event for passing of the title and risk in the equipment supplied. If the system did not conform to the specifications, the only consequence was that the assessee had to cure the defect. The position might have been different if the buyer had the right to reject the equipment on the failure of the acceptance test carried out in India. Consequently, the assessee did not have a “business connection” in India. The question whether the assessee had a “Permanent Establishment” was not required to be gone into (Ishikawajma Harima 288 ITR 408 (SC), Skoda 172 ITR 358 (AP) & Mahavir Commercial 86 ITR 147 followed)

U/s 147, it is only the AO’s opinion with respect to the income escaping assessment which is relevant for the purpose of reopening an assessment. While it is true if the audit party brings certain aspects to the notice of the AO and thereupon, the AO forms his own belief, it may be a valid basis for reopening assessment, the mere opinion of the Audit Party cannot form the basis for the AO to reopen an assessment. On facts, the AO had categorically come to the conclusion that the objection of the audit party was not valid and that the assessee’s explanation with respect to non-requirement of collection of TDS was required to be accepted. Accordingly, the AO could have no “reason to believe” that income had escaped assessment and so the s. 148 notice was without jurisdiction (P. V. S. Beedies 237 ITR 13 (SC) & Indian & Eastern Newspaper 119 ITR 996 (SC) distinguished; Lucas TVS 249 ITR 306 (SC) followed)

If the AO does not assess the income in respect of which the s. 148 notice was issued, it means there was no ‘reason to believe’ that income had escaped assessment. If so, the AO has no jurisdiction to assess any other escaped income that comes to his notice during the reassessment proceedings. Though in Sun Engineering 198 ITR 297 (SC), it was held that the AO had jurisdiction to assess other income, it was not a case where the AO had not assessed the income in respect of which the s. 148 notice was issued. Explanation 3 to s. 147 also contemplates that the income in respect of which the s. 148 notice is issued is assessed (Jet Airways 331 ITR 236 (Bom) & Ranbaxy Lab 60 DTR 77 (Del) followed)

The second proviso to s. 153A provides that “assessments relating to any assessment year falling within the period of six assessment years pending on the date of initiation of the search u/s 132 shall abate“. The words “pending on the date of initiation of search” has to be assigned simple and plain meaning. If the assessment is finalized, there are no “pending proceedings” to be abated. The pendency of an appeal does not mean that the assessment proceedings are pending. The word ‘abatement‘ refers to something, which is pending or alive and its suspension or termination. Proceedings which are complete are not liable for abatement (Circular No.7 of 2003 dated 5.9.2003 referred)

The phrase “by way of advance or loan” s. 2(22)(e) must be construed to mean those advances or loans which a shareholder enjoys simply on account of being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares. If such loan or advance is given to such share holder as a consequence of any further consideration received from the shareholder, then such advance or loan cannot be said to be “deemed dividend” u/s 2(22)(e). Thus, while gratuitous loan or advance given by a company to a substantial shareholder comes within the purview of s. 2(22)(e), a case where the loan or advance is given in return to an advantage conferred upon the company by the share holder does not. On facts, as the advance was in lieu of the company being permitted to mortgage the assessee’s falt, it was not “gratuitous” and so not assessable as “deemed dividend” (Creative Dyeing 318 ITR 476 (Del) & Nagindas Kapadia 177 ITR 393 (Bom) followed)

The ACR & the Follow up file are an integral part of the ACR record of the officer. In Arvind Kejriwal vs. CPIO AIR 2010 Delhi 216 it was held that except in cases involving overriding public interest, the ACR record of an officer cannot be disclosed to any person other than the officer himself/herself. As the CIC has not examined whether larger public interest justifies the disclosure of the information sought by the Petitioner in this case, matter remanded with the direction the information should be disclosed if the CIC comes to a conclusion that larger public interest justifies the disclosure

In penalty proceedings, it has to be seen whether the claim was bona fide or it was bogus and result of falsehood. On facts, there was no dispute on the genuineness of the advances. A trading loss has a wider connotation than a bad debt. While a bad debt may also be a trading loss, a trading loss need not necessarily be a bad debt. A bad debt may not fall within the purview of s. 36(1)(vii) but may well be regarded as being eligible for deduction as being a “trading loss”. Accordingly, the claim was neither mala fide nor false but was bona fide and made after disclosure of facts (CIT vs. Reliance Petroproducts 322 ITR 158 (SC) followed)