On examining the terms and conditions, invoices, purchase orders and challans indicating payment of excise duty, there is no material on record to indicate that the transaction in question is a “contract for carrying out works“. Hence, s. 194C is not attracted. S. 194C has been amended by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2009, w.e.f. 1.10.2009 to provide that “work” includes manufacturing or supplying a product according to the requirement or specification of a customer by using material purchased from such customer. It is clarified that the definition of the word “work” will not include manufacturing or supplying a product according to the requirement or specification of a customer by using material purchased from a person other than such customer

As regards the allegation that the removal was motivated by “malice and personal vendetta“, the exchange of correspondence between the President and the Law Ministry regarding the transfers of the Members took place after the passing of the order dated 5.5.2012 curtailing the tenure of the Applicant till 31.8.2012. There is some merit in the contention of the Respondents that the Applicant is trying to create a “smoke screen” by unnecessarily dragging the names of the Law Secretaries and making personal allegations

The fundamental question is whether there was in fact a gift of 14,000 bonus shares made by the assessee to the transferee. The answer to this question lies in s. 4(1)(c) of the Gift-tax Act which provides that “where there is a release, discharge, surrender, forfeiture or abandonment of any debt, contract or other actionable claim or of any interest in property by any person, the value of the release, discharge, surrender, forfeiture or abandonment to the extent to which it has not been found to the satisfaction of the AO to have been bona fide, shall be deemed to be a gift made by the person responsible for the release, discharge, surrender, forfeiture or abandonment“. On facts, the assessee had made a valid revocable gift of 6000 equity shares in the company on 20.2.1982 to the transferee. The only event that took place in AY 1989-90 was the revocation of the gift by the assessee on 15.6.1988. The question whether the revocation of the gift of the original shares in AY 1989-90 constitutes a gift of the bonus shares that were allotted to the transferee on 29.09.1982 and 31.05.1986 requires to be answered in the light of s.4(1)(c). The question of applicability of Escorts Farms has to be decided after a finding is reached on the applicability of the first part of s. 4(1)(c) (matter remanded).

S. 32 requires that the asset must be “owned, wholly or partly, by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business”. The Department’s argument that the assessee is not the “owner” of the vehicles is not acceptable because the lease agreement specifically provided that the assessee was the exclusive owner of the vehicle at all points of time and that it was empowered to repossess the vehicle (and not merely recover money) if the lessee committed a default. At the conclusion of the lease period, the lessee was obliged to return the vehicle to the assessee. Also, the assessee had the right of inspection of the vehicle at all times. As the assessee has a right to retain the legal title of the vehicle against the rest of the world, it would be the owner of the vehicle in the eyes of law. The fact that at the end of the lease period, the ownership of the vehicle is transferred to the lessee at a nominal value not exceeding 1% of the original cost of the vehicle does not make a difference. Also the fact that the Motor Vehicles Act deems the lessee to be the “owner” has no relevance

For a receipt to be exempt on the principles of Mutuality, three conditions have to be satisfied. The first is that there must be a complete identity between the contributors and participators. The second is that the actions of the participators and contributors must be in furtherance of the mandate of the association. The third is that there must be no scope of profiteering by the contributors from a fund made by them which could only be expended or returned to themselves. On facts, though the interest was earned from banks which were corporate members of the club, it was not exempt on the ground of mutuality because (i) the arrangement lacks a complete identity between the contributors and participators. With the funds of the club, member banks engaged in commercial operations with third parties outside of the mutuality, rupturing the ‘privity of mutuality’, and consequently, violating the one to one identity between the contributors and participators, (ii) the surplus funds were not used in furtherance of the object of the club but were taken out of mutuality when the member banks placed the same at the disposal of third parties, thus, initiating an independent contract between the bank and the clients of the bank, a third party, not privy to the mutuality & (iii) The Banks generated revenue by paying a lower rate of interest to the assessee-club and loaning the funds to third parties. The interest accrued on the surplus deposited by the club like in the case of any other deposit made by an account holder with the bank. A façade of a club cannot be constructed over commercial transactions to avoid liability to tax. Such setups cannot be permitted to claim double benefit of mutuality

S. 158B(b) defines the expression “undisclosed income” to mean that income “which has not been or would not have been disclosed for the purposes of this Act”. The only way of disclosing income on the part of an assessee is through filing of a return and therefore an “undisclosed income” signifies income not stated in the return filed. It cannot be said that payment of Advance Tax by an assessee per se is tantamount to disclosure of total income. There can be no generic rule as to the significance of payment of Advance Tax in construing intention of disclosure of income. This depends on the time at which the search is conducted in relation to the due date for filing return. If the search is conducted after the expiry of the due date for filing return, payment of Advance Tax is irrelevant in construing the intention of the assessee to disclose income because it is a case where income has clearly not been disclosed. The possibility of the intention to disclose does not arise since the opportunity of disclosure has lapsed. If search is conducted prior to the due date for filing return, the opportunity to disclose income by filing a return still persists. In such a case, payment of Advance Tax may be a material fact for construing whether an assessee intended to disclose. An assessee is entitled to make the legitimate claim that even though the search or the documents recovered show income earned by him, he has paid Advance Tax for the relevant assessment year and has an opportunity to declare the total income, in the return of income, which he would file by the due date. Hence, the fulcrum of such a decision is the due date for filing of return of income vis-à-vis date of search. Also, because Advance Tax is based on estimated income, it cannot result in the disclosure of the total income assessable and chargeable
to tax. The proposition that payment of Advance Tax is tantamount to disclosure of income would be contrary to the very purpose of filing of return. On facts, as the assessee had not filed the ROI by the date of search and the due date had lapsed, the income found was “undisclosed” even though advance-tax thereon had been paid. Similarly, as TDS is also computed on the estimated income of an assessee for the relevant FY, it does not amount to disclosure of income, nor does it indicate the intention to disclose income if the ROI is not filed

Though the assessee trust issued a receipt in March 2002 when it received the cheque dated 22.4.2002, it was clearly stated in its record that the amount of donation was receivable in future and it was shown as donation receivable in the balance sheet as on 31.3.2002. Also Apollo Tyres Ltd did not avail any advantage of the said donation during the FY 2001-2002. When a post-dated cheque is issued, it will have to be presumed that the amount was paid on the date on which the cheque was given to the assessee and, therefore, it cannot be said that any undue favour was done by the assessee to Apollo Tyres Ltd. A cheque, unless dishonoured, is payment (Ogale Glass Works 25 ITR 529 (SC) followed)

The details disclosed by a person in his income tax returns are “personal information” which stands exempted from disclosure under clause (j) of Section 8(1) of the RTI Act, unless it involves a larger public interest and the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information. On facts, as the Petitioner has not made a bona fide public interest in seeking information, the disclosure of such information would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual u/s 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act

The interpretation of Section 40A(9) of the Act clearly brings out a dichotomy between `contribution’ and `reimbursement’. Section 40A(9) of the Act was inserted by Finance Act No.2 of 1984. The Explanatory Memo to the Finance Bill, 1984 indicates the reasons why the word `contribution’ finds place in Section 40A of the Act. It appears that Section 40A(9) of the Act was inserted as a measure for combating tax avoidance

Notwithstanding the fact that the assessee is undoubtedly a reputed firm and has great expertise available with it, it is possible that even the assessee could make a “silly” mistake. The fact that the Tax Audit Report was filed along with the return and that it unequivocally stated that the provision for payment was not allowable u/s 40A(7) indicates that the assessee made a computation error in its return of income. Apart from the assessee, even the AO who framed the original assessment order made a mistake in overlooking the contents of the Tax Audit Report. The contents of the Tax Audit Report suggest that there is no question of the assessee concealing its income. There is also no question of the assessee furnishing any inaccurate particulars. All that happened in the present case is that through a bona fide and inadvertent error failed to add the provision for gratuity to its total income. This can only be described as a human error which we are all prone to make. The calibre and expertise of the assessee has little or nothing to do with the inadvertent error. That the assessee should have been careful cannot be doubted, but the absence of due care, in a case such as the present, does not mean that the assessee is guilty of either furnishing inaccurate particulars or attempting to conceal its income. Consequently, given the peculiar facts of this case, the imposition of penalty on the assessee is not justified