The assessee had disclosed full details in the Return of Income in the matter of its dealing in stocks and shares. According to the assessee, the loss incurred was a business loss, whereas, according to the Revenue, the loss incurred was a speculative loss. Rejection of the objections of the assessee to the re-opening of the assessment by the Assessing Officer vide his Order dated 23rd June, 2006, is clearly a change of opinion. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the order re-opening the assessment was not maintainable

Explanation 3 to s. 32 states that the expression “asset” shall mean an intangible asset, being know-how, patents, copyrights, trademarks, licences, franchises or any other business or commercial rights of similar nature. The words “any other business or commercial rights of similar nature” in clause (b) of Explanation 3 indicates that goodwill would fall under the expression “any other business or commercial right of a similar nature“. The principle of ejusdem generis would strictly apply while interpreting the said expression which finds place in Explanation 3(b). Consequently, “Goodwill” is an asset under Explanation 3(b) to s. 32(1) & eligible for depreciation. Though the AO held that the assessee had not “paid” anything for the goodwill, this cannot be accepted because (a) the CIT (A) & Tribunal (correctly) held that that the difference between the cost of an asset and the amount paid in the process of amalgamation constituted “goodwill” and (b) this aspect was not challenged by the department before the High Court

The ruling should in the first instance be challenged before the High Court instead of directly in the Supreme Court. To avoid the matter remaining pending in the High Court for years, which would defeat the objective of enabling the applicant to get an expeditious ruling, the matter should be heard directly by a Division Bench of the High Court and decided as expeditiously as possible

The assessee paid Rs. 3.97 Crores to an associate concern in Singapore on account of discounted charges for getting the export sale bills discounted. The AO held that that the discounting charges was “interest” u/s 2(28A) and that as there was no TDS, the expenditure had to be disallowed u/s 40(a)(i). This was reversed by the CIT (A) and Tribunal. The High Court (335 ITR 94 (Del) included in file) relied on Circular No.65 dated 2.09.1971, Circular No.674 dated 22.03.1993 & Vijay Ship Breaking 219 CTR 639 (SC) held that as the discounting charges were not in respect of any debt incurred or money borrowed and were merely discount of the sale consideration on sale of goods, it was not “interest” u/s 2(28A) and there was no obligation to deduct TDS thereon. On appeal by the department to the Supreme Court, HELD

For AY 2001-02, the assessee filed a ROI declaring loss of Rs.43.47 crores under the normal provisions of the Act and book profits of Rs.3.86 crores u/s 115JB. The AO assessed a loss at Rs.36.95 crores as per normal provisions and book profits at Rs.4.01 crores. As there was a reduction in the loss under the normal provisions owing to various additions and disallownaces, the AO levied penalty u/s 271(1)(c) in accordance with with Explanation 4 & Gold Coin 304 ITR 308 (SC). Before the High Court, the assessee argued that even if there was a concealment u/s 271(1)(c) with respect to the normal assessment, the same was not relevant because the assessee’s income was assessed u/s 115JB. The High Court accepted the plea and held that as the s. 115JB “book profits” were by a legal fiction deemed to be the “total income”, the furnishing of wrong particulars had no effect on “the amount of tax sought to be evaded” as defined in Explanation 4 to s. 271(1)(c). On appeal by the department to the Supreme Court, HELD

Issue notice on the applications for condonation of delay as also on the special leave petitions. In our view, S.A. Builders Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) and Another, reported in 288 ITR 1, needs reconsideration

Put up for final disposal on October 03, 2012. During the pendency of the special leave petition, the direction of the High Court in paragraph 24 of the impugned judgment shall remain stayed

We have carefully gone through the review petition filed by the Union of India on 17th February, 2012. We find no merit in the review petition. The review petition is, accordingly, dismissed

As regards the constitutional challenge, while the right to practice as an advocate is not only a statutory right under the Advocates Act but is also a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, it is subject to reasonable restrictions. The restriction imposed by s. 129(6) of the Customs Act is constitutional because (i) the restriction is partial to the extent of practice before CESTAT and does not bar practice before other judicial bodies & (ii) the restriction is intended to serve a larger public interest and to uplift the professional values and standards of advocacy in the country. It adds to public confidence in the administration of justice by the Tribunal

In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation for the delay, the question to be posed is why the delay should be mechanically condoned merely because the Government is a party. Though in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. It is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. As there was no proper explanation for the delay except mentioning of various dates and the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay, the appeals have to be dismissed on the ground of delay