The Proviso to s. 10A(1A) provides that “no deduction under this section shall be allowed to an assessee who does not furnish a return of his income on or before the due date specified u/s 139(1)”. The assessee’s argument that the said Proviso is merely directory and not mandatory is not acceptable. The Proviso is one of the several consequences (such as interest u/s 234A) that befall an assessee if he fails to file a ROI on the due date. As the other consequences for not filing the ROI on the due date are mandatory the consequence in the Proviso cannot be held to be directory (Shivanand Electronics 209 ITR 63 (Bom) & other judgements distinguished)

S. 153C is analogous to s. 158BD. In the context of s. 158BD, the Supreme Court held in Manish Maheshwari 289 ITR 341 that the recording of satisfaction by the AO that undisclosed income belongs to any person, other than the person who was searched, is a condition precedent. This principle applies to s. 153C as well. The burden is on the Revenue to show that the necessary ingredients of s. 153C have been complied with. On facts, there is material to show the AO in the case of the person searched was satisfied that any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles or things or books accounts or documents seized or requisitioned belongs to someone else. There is nothing to show that such satisfaction was recorded by the AO. Even in the assessment order, no seized document or material has been referred to by the AO. Consequently, the conditions of s. 153C are not satisfied and the assessment order had to be quashed (Vijaybhai N. Chandrani 333 ITR 436 (Guj) and other judgements followed)

The assessee had made a clear disclosure in the ROI that it was claiming exemption under Article 11 for the interest income. This was accepted u/s 143(1). The assessment was sought to be reopened without there being any new material on record. In Telco Dadajee Dhackjee it was held by the Third Member that even in a case where only an intimation had been issued u/s 143(1)(a), it is essential that the AO should have before him tangible material justifying his reason to believe that income had escaped assessment. In the absence of such tangible material, the reassessment proceedings are invalid. Though in Praful Chunilal Patel 236 ITR 832 (Guj),, it was held that there is no necessity for the AO to have fresh facts coming to his notice subsequent to the original assessment to justify the reopening this view has not been subscribed to by the Full Bench in Kelvinator of India 256 ITR 1 (Del) which has been affirmed by the Supreme Court (320 ITR 561)

Hon’ble Shri. G. E. Veerabhadrappa, Vice President, who was earlier appointed officiating President till his replacement by Hon’ble Shri. H. L. Karwa, has filed a case before the CAT, Mumbai Bench, claiming that his transfer from Mumbai to Kolkota during the pendency of a representation made to the Law Minister seeking review of the decision to replace him as officiating President, was “mala fide” and “not in bona fide exercise of power” and contrary to the guidelines laid down in Ajay Gandhi vs. V. B. Singh (2004) 2 SCC 120. Vide order dated 27.11.2012, the CAT has directed that status quo should be maintained till the next date of hearing

Every payment by a company to its shareholders may not be a loan/ advance so as to come within the ambit of s. 2(22)(e). In the present case, the amount was withdrawn by the assessee from the company only to meet her short term cash requirements. By virtue of offering personal guarantee and collateral security for the benefit of the company, the liquidity position of the assessee had gone down. In the strict sense, the amount forwarded by the company to the assessee was not in the shape of advances or loans. The arrangement between the assessee and the company was merely for the sake of convenience arising out of business expediency (Pradip Kumar Malhotra 338 ITR 538 (Cal) & Creative Dyeing & Printing 318 ITR 476 (Del) followed)

Deduction u/s 24(b) and computation of capital gains u/s 48 are altogether covered by different heads of income i.e., income from ‘house property’ and ‘capital gains’. Neither of them excludes the other. A deduction u/s 24(b) is claimed when the assessee computes income from ‘house property’, whereas, the cost of the same asset is taken into consideration when it is sold and capital gains are computed under section 48. There is no doubt that the interest in question is an expenditure in acquiring the asset. Since both provisions are altogether different, the assessee is entitled to include the interest at the time of computing capital gains u/s 48

The objects of the assessee is not for advancement, support or propagation of a particular religion. Worshipping Lord Shiva, Hanumanji, Goddess Durga and maintaining the temple is not advancement, support or propagation of a particular religion. Lord Shiva, Hanumanji & Goddess Durga do not represent any particular religion. They are merely regarded to be the super power of the universe. Further, there is no religion like “Hinduism”. The word “Hindu” is not defined in any of the texts nor in judge made law. The word was given by British administrators to inhabitants of India, who were not Christians, Muslims, Parsis or Jews. Hinduism is a way of life. It consists of a number of communities having different gods who are being worshipped in a different manner, different rituals, different ethical codes. The worship of god is not essential for a person who has adopted Hinduism way of life. Therefore, expenses incurred for worshipping of Lord Shiva, Hanuman, Goddess Durga and for maintenance of temple cannot be regarded to be for religious purpose (Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar 1954 SCJ 335 & T. T. Kuppuswamy Chettiar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1987) 100 LW 1031 followed)

Article 22 (1) provides that items of income of a resident of Switzerland “which are not dealt with” in the foregoing Articles of the DTAA shall be taxable only in that State. The department’s argument that by agreeing to exclude shipping profits from Article 8 as well as Article 7 of DTAA, it has been “dealt with” and, therefore, Article 22(1) shall not apply is not correct. The expression “dealt with” contemplates a positive action and it is necessary that the relevant article must state whether Switzerland or India or both have a right to tax such item of income. Vesting of such jurisdiction must positively and explicitly stated and it cannot be inferred by implication. It is also the view of the Competent Authorities in the letters exchanged that shipping profits would be governed by Article 22 & not s. 44B of the Act (Gearbulk AG 184 Taxman 383 (AAR) not followed)

The scope of proceedings after remand depend on the terms of the remand order. If the appellate authority has set aside the assessment and directed the making of a fresh assessment without imposing any restrictions or limitations, the AO has the same powers in making fresh assessment as he originally had. However, if any restrictions are placed, the AO cannot travel beyond those restrictions. The scope of the remand order has to be determined depending on the subject matter of the appeal and the appellate order read as a whole in its proper context. On facts a perusal of the findings of the CIT (A) shows that he was concerned with the additions made in the original assessment order and it was in the light of the additions made therein, that the assessment was set aside for denovo consideration. This clearly shows that the directions of the CIT (A) for denovo assessment were restricted to the additions made by the AO in the original assessment order and, therefore, the AO had no jurisdiction to look at other issues

S. 115JB (6) does not refer to either s. 10A or s. 10AA but simply provides that the MAT provisions shall not apply to income arising from any business carried on in an unit located in a SEZ. Consequently, despite the fact that an amendment was made in clause (f) of Explanation (1) to s. 115JB(2) to provide that MAT shall apply to units eligible for s. 10A or 10B, a unit which is situated in a SEZ will continue to be exempt from MAT by virtue of s. 115JB(6)