Although at the time of hearing, the initial impression was to write a reference to the President for constituting a larger Bench the fact that an appeal has been filed in the Bombay and Delhi High Courts against Daga Capital mean that (as per the decision of the President in Star India) a reference to a larger bench cannot be made. However, the appeals should be blocked for 6 months or till the disposal of appeal by the Bombay High Court in Daga Capital whichever is earlier.

SCM Creations is not an authority on how s. 80-IA (9) is to be applied because the effect and implementation of above provision was neither raised, nor examined nor decided by the Court. A decision is an authority for the proposition that it decides and not what can logically be deduced there from. A point not raised nor argued at the Bar cannot be said to be the ratio of the decision. Accordingly SCM Creation does not impinge upon the ratio of Rogini Garments.

As the assessee had earned tax-free dividend income, s.14A was applicable. The question of determination of the disallowable amount has to be worked out by the AO as per Rule 8D as held the Special Bench judgement in ITO Vs. Daga Capital Management Pvt. Ltd. (2008) 119 TTJ (Mum) (SB) 289. However, the disallowance u/s 14A in the fresh proceedings cannot exceed the original amount disallowed by the AO in the assessment order.

The judgement in UOI vs. Dharmendra Textile Processors has to be understood in the correct perspective. It does not make a radical change in the law nor does it affect the basic scheme of s. 271 (1) (c). Even in K P Madhusudanan vs. CIT 251 ITR 99, the assessee’s plea to the effect that ‘revenue was required to prove mens rea of a criminal offence’ before penalty u/s 271(1)(c) can be imposed was rejected. Penalty u/s 271 (1) (c) has been held to be ‘civil liability’ in contradistinction to prosecution u/s 276C. It is wrong to infer that because the liability is a “civil liability”, it ceases to be penal in character. There is no contradiction in a liability being a civil liability and the same liability being a penal liability as well, though a civil liability cannot certainly be a criminal liability as well. As observed in Om Prakash vs. UOI AIR 1984 SC 1194 @ 1209 “A penalty imposed by the sales tax authorities is a civil liability, though penal in character”.

In the light of the judgement of the Supreme Court in ONGC vs. CIDCO (2007) 7 SCC 39 and that of the Madras High Court in Tamilnadu Warehousing Corp Ltd vs. DCIT (2008) 15 DTR 67, even appeals involving State Government undertakings require approval of the Committee on Disputes. The appeal can be proceeded with only if the appellant is either able to obtain the requisite COD clearance or file satisfactory evidence to prove that a COD to deal with State – Centre disputes has not been formed.

Note: The judgement of the Special Bench in DCIT vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation 100 ITD 187 is no longer good law in view of the judgements referred to above.

Where the assessee floated a GDR issue and made payments to the foreign lead manager by way of management and underwriting commission etc and the AO took the view that the said payments was chargeable to tax in the hands of the recipient u/s 9 (1)(vii) as “fees for technical services” and that the assessee ought to have deducted tax thereon u/s 195 and on account of its failure to do so was liable to be treated as an “assessee in default” u/s 201 and the question arose whether the said order u/s 201, having been passed after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant financial year, was barred by limitation, in the absence of any provision in the Act HELD:

(a) The argument that s. 201(1) (pre amendment by the FA 2008 w.r.e.f 1.6.2002) applies only where there is a failure to deposit the deducted tax and not where there is a failure to deduct tax and that it is only after the amendment that a failure to deduct tax is covered is not acceptable as the amendment is clarificatory of the legislative intent;

(b) Though s. 201 (1) does not impose any time limit for the initiation of proceedings or the passing of an order, a reasonable time limit would have to be read in as otherwise the authorities would have an indefinite period to take action and the sword of uncertainty would hang forever over an assessee;

Where the assessee constructed a project in Pune in which the percentage of commercial area to the total area was 20.83% and the said project was approved by the Pune Municipal Corporation as a “New/ Residential + Commercial project” (and not as a “housing project”) and the question arose whether prior to the amendment of s. 80 IB (10) w.e.f. 1.4.2005 (which provides that the commercial area in a housing project should not exceed the lesser of 5% of the built up area or 2,000 sq ft), the assessee’s project was a “housing project” eligible for deduction u/s 80-IB (10), HELD:

(i) S. 80 IB (10) is aimed at promoting construction of housing projects so as to address the problem of shortage of dwelling units. It cannot be said that the object is to encourage house building activity per se, irrespective of whether these are dwelling or commercial units;

(ii) However, given that under the DC Rules (of Pune) there cannot be a pure residential project and it is incumbent on the developer to reserve a part of the plot for shopping, commercial use of area must be regarded as an integral part of a housing project and does not vitiate the character of a housing project;

The judgement of the Supreme Court in Dharmendra Textiles Processors which holds that penalty u/s.271(I)(c) is a civil liability and that “willful concealment” and “mens rea” are not essential ingredients for imposing penalty cannot be read to mean that in all cases where addition is confirmed, penalty shall mechanically follow. In order to attract s. 271 (1) (c), there must be “concealment” – the fact that the same is willful or unintentional is irrelevant.

Where the assessee suo motu filed returns as “agent” of a non-resident but no assessment was made and after the expiry of two years from the end of the assessment year a notice under section 148 of the Act seeking to assess the income and the question arose whether the said notice was barred by limitation u/s 149 (3), HELD:

(i) Ss 160 to 166 are machinery and enabling provisions and give the department the option to either assess the non-resident or his agent;

(ii) U/ss 160 to 166, agents are of two types: (1) agents who admit their liability as agents of a non-resident either expressly or impliedly. In such cases, there is no obligation to give a hearing or even to pass an order treating them as an agent u/s 163. (2) Agents u/ss 160(1)(i) or 163(1) who deny their liability to be agents of the non-resident. In such cases, an opportunity of a hearing and a formal order is require to be passed. Whether a person falls in one or the other category depends on the facts of the case;

(iii) S. 149 (3) applies only in a case where a person is “treated as an agent” of a non-resident u/s 163 i.e. persons disputing their liability as agent. It does not apply to persons who have voluntarily treated themselves as an agent of the non-resident.

(iv) On facts, as the assessee had treated himself as the “agent”, it was not necessary for authorities in this case to provide any opportunity of being heard to the assessee as regards his liability to be treated as an agent under the Act. The time limit prescribed in s. 149 (3) was also not applicable.

Where the assessee entered into an agreement with the Vidharbha Irrigation department for supply, erection and installation of dam gates and the question arose whether it was “developing an infrastructural facility” so as to be eligible for deduction u/s 80-IA(4) or it was a mere contractor, HELD:

(i) Though the Explanation to s. 80IA (4) inserted by the FA 2007 w.r.e.f 1.4.2000 provides that s. 80-IA shall not apply to a person executing a works contract, the assessee was not a mere “contractor”. The term “developer” means a person who makes things happen and as the assessee was mobilizing and synthesizing people, plans, technical expertise, supervision, co-ordination and control etc, it could be regarded as the developer. The term “contractor” is not essentially contradictory to the term “developer”.

(ii) The Explanation to s. 80IA does not apply to a works contract entered into by the Government and the enterprise. It only applies to a work contract entered into between the enterprise and other party’s “sub-contractor”. The amendment merely aims at denying deduction to the sub-contractor who executes a works contract with the enterprise;

(iii) It is not required that the developer should also “operate and maintain” the infrastructure facilities so as to be eligible for deduction.