An amount paid for investment in share capital of subsidiaries outside India is not in the nature of an “international transaction” as defined in s. 92-B. Transfer pricing provisions are not applicable to transactions where there is no income (Circular No. 14, dated 22/11/2011, Dana Corporation 321 ITR 178 (AAR) & Amiantit International 322 ITR 678 (AAR) referred)

S. 40(a)(i) does not impose an absolute disallowance for failure to deduct TDS. It provides that the deduction shall be allowed in the year of deduction of the TDS. As the assessee had in fact deducted TDS in the immediately succeeding year, it had substantially complied with the provision. Also, as the fact that TDS was not deducted was stated in the tax audit report which was filed with the return, it could not be said that the assessee has not disclosed the correct particulars of income

The CBDT’s instructions for assumption of jurisdiction for selection of cases of corporate assesses for scrutiny and assessment are issued u/s 119 and are binding on the AO and have to be followed by him in letter and spirit. The burden lies on the authority assuming jurisdiction to show and establish that such instructions have duly been complied and satisfied in letter and spirit. On facts, as there was no disallowance of Rs. 5 lacs or more in the earlier years and as no identical issue had arisen in the present year, the notice issued u/s 143(2) was not in terms of the CBDT’s Scrutiny Guidelines and consequently the assumption of jurisdiction was illegal and the entire assessment proceedings were invalid (Nayana P. Dedhia 270 ITR 572 (AP) followed)

Under the policy of the Central Government and the SEBI (FII) Regulations, 1995 a FII can only “invest” in securities and cannot do “business” in securities. S. 115AD also provides that all income arising to a FII from securities, whether from their retention or from their transfer, is taxable as a capital gain. This is also the view expressed in Press Note F. No. 5(13)SE/91-FIV dated 24.03.1994 issued by the Ministry of Finance. If the Revenue is permitted to make a distinction between the securities held by a FII by classifying them as a capital asset or as stock in trade, s. 115AD will become otiose. The result is that all income arising to a FII, including from dealings in derivatives has to be assessed as capital gains. The contrary view of the AAR in Royal Bank of Canada cannot be followed (LG Asian Plus Ltd 46 SOT 159 followed)

The affidavit produced by the AR is not a valid affidavit because there is no verification appended on it and there is no mention as to which of the paras are true to the knowledge of the deponent and which of the paras of the affidavit are true to his belief. The affidavit is also not a duly sworn affidavit as required under Rule 10 of the ITAT Rules 1963 because it has not been properly endorsed by the notary regarding the oath of affirmation before him by the executant of the affidavit. The notary has put his signatures under his name seal but there is no mention whether the oath was administered to the signatory or if done so, when and where it was administered. Even words “Sworn before me” are missing. If the affidavit does not certify or endorse the fact that oath has been administered, it remains a waste paper. On merits, the case is one of gross negligence and inaction on the part of the assessee and the AR. The explanation that the AR’s assistant kept the papers in his drawer and failed to take necessary action is vague and evasive and not sufficient cause for condonation. There is also no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. There is also total inaction and gross negligence on the part of the assessee for not inquiring the status of the appeal from the AR. Though courts adopt liberal view while condoning delay on the principle that technicalities should not prevail over the cause of justice, litigants should not take the courts for granted

S. 43B covers only the sums payable by way of contribution by the assessee as an employer, i.e., the employer’s contribution to the PF and ESI funds. It does not cover the employees contribution. While the employer’s contribution is allowable u/s 37(1), the employees’ contribution collected by the employer is deemed to be his income u/s 2(24)(x) and is allowable as a deduction u/s 36(1)(va) only if it is paid to the relevant fund by the due date as prescribed in the relevant legislation. Even if one assumes that s. 43B(b) applies to s. 36(1)(va) payments, a deduction would not be admissible because the s. 36(1)(va) payments are not ‘otherwise allowable’ if they are paid beyond the “due date”. The decisions in Vinay Cement 213 CTR (SC) 268 & Alom Extrusions 319 ITR 306 (SC) are not an authority on the point that employees’ contributions are also covered by s. 43B. Though in AIMIL 321 ITR 508 (Del) it was held that employees’ contribution to EPF and ESI funds are covered by s. 43B, it cannot be followed because (i) the Court moved on the premise that employees’ contribution is subject to clause (b) of s. 43B and did not notice the condition in s. 36(1)(va), (ii) the decision by the tribunal, which was approved by the High Court in AIMIL was rendered without considering the decision of the Special Bench in ITC Ltd & (iii) it is inconsistent with Godaveri (Mannar) Sahakari 298 ITR 149 (Bom). Accordingly, AIMIL cannot be followed and the deductibility of employees’ contribution has to be seen only with reference to s. 36(1)(va) (together with grace period) (Bengal Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals (included in file) & ITC Ltd 112 ITD 57 (Kol)(SB) followed)

The AO has not brought on record anything which proves that there is any expenditure incurred towards earning of dividend income. The AO has not examined the accounts of the assessee and there is no satisfaction recorded by the AO about the correctness of the claim of the assessee and without the same he invoked Rule 8D. While rejecting the claim of the assessee with regard to expenditure or no expenditure, as the case may be, in relation to exempted income, the AO has to indicate cogent reasons for the same. The AO has not considered the claim of the assessee and straight away embarked upon computing disallowance under Rule 8D of the Rules on presuming the average value of investment at ½% of the total value. This is not permissible (J. K. Investors (Bombay) followed)

In All Cargo Global Logistics 137 ITD 287 (Mum)(SB), the Special Bench held that in a case where the assessment has abated the AO can make additions in the assessment, even if no incriminating material has been found. However, in a case where the assessment has not abated, an assessment u/s 153A can be made only on the basis of incriminating material (i.e. books of account & other documents found in the course of search but not produced in the course of original assessment and undisclosed income or property disclosed during the course of search). On facts, as the assessment was completed u/s 143(1) and the time limit for issue of s. 143(2) notice had expired on the date of search, there was no assessment pending and there was no question of abatement. Therefore, the addition could be made only on the basis of incriminating material found during search. As the addition u/s 153A was made on the information/material available in the return of income (i.e. the information regarding the gift was available in the return of income as capital account had been credited by the assessee by the amount of gift) and not on the basis of any incriminating material found during the search, the AO had no jurisdiction to make the addition u/s 153A

The view taken by the Tribunal and the High Court in Clifford Chance was that if Article 15 of the India-UK Treaty is not applicable because the stay of the partner exceeded 90 days, then the taxability of the income would be determined by s. 9(1)(i) of the Act. It was held that for determination of income u/s 9(1)(i), the territorial nexus doctrine plays an important part and if the income arises out of operations in more than one jurisdiction, it would not be correct to contend that the entire income accrues or arises in each of the jurisdictions. The High Court applied the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the context of s. 9(1)(i) that if all the operations are not carried out in the taxable territories, the profits and gains of business deemed to accrue in India through and from business connection in India shall be only such profits and gains as are reasonably attributable to the operations carried out in the taxable territories. Accordingly, the view expressed in Linklaters LLP that the judgment of the Bombay High Court is based on the premise of s. 9(1)(vii) and that the said premise no longer holds good in view of the retrospective amendment is not correct. The law laid down by the High Court continues to be good law

The assessee’s argument that it does not have a PE under Article 5(1) cannot be accepted because its employees frequently visited the premises of CIS to provide supervision, direction and control over the operations of CIS and such employees had a fixed place of business at their disposal. CIS was practically the projection of assessee’s business in India and carried out its business under the control and guidance of the assessee and without assuming any significant risk in relation to such functions. Besides the assessee has also provided certain hardware and software assets on free of cost basis to CIS. However, it does not constitute a dependent agent PE in terms of Article 5(4) and 5(5) of the DTAA